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Editor’s Foreword 
DIANAWOODWARDBEGAN TO PLAN this Library Trends on intellectual 
freedom several years ago. She intended two issues, the first dealing 
with public protection and paternalistic censorship and the second 
with economic and practical aspects. Each section of each issue was 
to be preceded by a brief ‘‘nutshell’’-her overview of the problem 
addressed in a particular group of papers. 
Tragically, Diana Woodward died before her work on this project 
could be completed. She finished only one of her nutshells and was 
unable to write her introduction to the two issues, although she 
requested that a paper she had presented at the Rutgers School of 
Communication, Information and Library Studies, early in 1989, be 
used for that purpose. 
Regrettably, too, several of the authors who promised to write 
papers for Professor Woodward failed to honor their commitments. 
Notable omissions are a paper on economic aspects of copyright and 
one on economic aspects of the secrecy of information. 
Rather than trying to second-guess Professor Woodward’s 
intentions-for example, by having the missing parts written by other 
contributors-we decided to use the material available to us at the 
time of her death and to present it, as far as possible, in the way 
that she had planned. 
This double issue of Library Trends, then, is offered as a memorial 
to Diana Woodward and as a tribute to her scholarship. 
-F. W. Lancaster 
Introduction 
DIANAWOODWARD 
[EDITOR’SNOTE:since Diana Woodward was unable to write her 
introduction to this issue, the journal editor decided to form a brief 
introduction from a portion of the paper Professor Woodward 
presented at a symposium at Rutgers in 1989 and from the “nutshell” 
she was able to complete. The following introductory commentary 
was prepared by Jana Varlejs of the Rutgers School of 
Communication, Information and Library Studies.] 
How might a philosopher reason about intellectual freedom? 
This is the question Diana Woodward would have addressed in her 
introduction to this issue of Library Trends. She had planned to 
rework a paper which she delivered at Rutgers in 1989 for a symposium 
on ethics in the information professions. In that paper, she described 
several approaches to ethical reasoning, and concluded with a 
dlscussion of how one could apply two kinds of arguments in a defense 
of intellectual freedom. The full text of the paper is published 
elsewhere (Woodward, forthcoming), and should be read by those 
interested in understanding the broader context of Dr. Woodward’s 
thinking about intellectual freedom. She noted the fact that most 
people have not thought through the principles upon which they 
base actions and make choices. Too many, she seemed to feel, were 
content to respond to a moral or ethical issue on the basis of feeling, 
rather than reason. 
Her concern was not so much with making an elegant case for 
the defense of intellectual freedom, but rather with demonstrating 
that one could apply methods of ethical reasoning to intellectual 
freedom issues. The principle that Diana Woodward adhered to was 
that clear and logical thought must underlie the behavior of 
professionals who purport to have a sense of ethics in regard to their 
practice. She ended her Rutgers presentation by taking her audience 
3 WOODWARD/INTRODUCTION 
through two types of ethical arguments-the consequentialist and 
deon tological-only to conclude that she had reached a “beginning, 
not an end, of an ethical investigation concerning intellectual 
freedom.” Tragically, she was not able to carry the investigation 
forward, for she was grappling with a fundamental issue of concern 
to the library/information profession, and had much to teach us. 
The following is an excerpt from Dr. Woodward’s paper, which she 
planned to rewrite and elaborate on for this issue. 
-Jana Varlejs 
As a case study in reasoning about information ethics, consider 
how one might defend intellectual freedom. One can give both 
consequen tialist and deon tological arguments for intellectual 
freedom, but the choice of an ethical theory upon which intellectual 
freedom is based can result in different decisions about what ought 
to be done in particular cases. 
The term intellectual freedom, broadly construed, includes both 
the right to the intellectual efforts of others and a right to distribute 
one’s own intellectual efforts. These efforts include written works, 
conversation, speeches, and various art forms (e.g., dance or sculpture) 
that can be used to communicate ideas. 
To defend intellectual freedom on consequentialist grounds, one 
must make the case that i t  is best for someone (me, everyone except 
me, or all concerned) if information is broadly disseminated. The 
best known consequentialist defense of intellectual freedom comes 
from John Stuart Mill (1951)who made his defense from the negative 
side-i.e., restricting intellectual freedom is harmful. He argued that 
if we suppress ideas we may be suppressing the truth. Even if the 
ideas we suppress are not the truth, there may be some germ of truth 
in them or something that gives insights into new truths. 
Furthermore, even if the promoted opinion is the truth and suppressed 
views are completely false, people will not have as much faith and 
commitment to the promoted opinion if they do not see i t  openly 
debated and defended in contest with other views. For all these reasons, 
intellectual freedom is needed to make certain the truth is both 
discovered and believed. 
The assumption behind this reasoning is that people are better 
off if the truth is known. Not everyone agrees with this. The whole 
point of paternalistic censorship (whether i t  be censorship of 
pornographic or racist material in the United States or censorship 
of political news in the Soviet Union), is that i t  is better for society 
in general and often better for individuals themselves if they are not 
exposed to certain sorts of ideas, even if there is some truth to those 
ideas. The consequentialist defense of intellectual freedom then 
depends upon first establishing whether or not people are better off 
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when they are exposed to all intellectual efforts. The typical result 
is that one starts dividing up intellectual efforts into those that are 
good for people and those that are not. Defending the distribution 
of the former only is not defending intellectual freedom in principle. 
To defend intellectual freedom in principle, and not merely in 
those cases where it can be shown to be of benefit to someone, one 
needs to provide a deontological defense of intellectual freedom. One 
method of providing such a defense involves deriving the right to 
information from the nature of man. Another method involves 
demonstrating that one could not consistently will that information 
be withheld from people. 
It would be inconsistent to will that the truth be withheld from 
people. If the truth were withheld from everyone, including you, 
then you would not have enough evidence to decide what are the 
truths that are to be withheld. Withholding all information, not 
merely the truth, does not lead to inconsistency. There does, however, 
seem to be some silliness in the suggestion that we might adopt 
the maxim: Withhold all information from everyone. Adopting the 
maxim: Withhold harmful information sounds more like a maxim 
that a censor might wish to act upon. While I cannot demonstrate 
that there is any inconsistency involved in adopting such a maxim, 
I would like to point out that i t  returns us to consequentialist 
reasoning as we must determine what information has harmful 
consequences. The defender of intellectual freedom can reply that 
one can consistently act upon the maxim: Withhold no information. 
To adopt this maxim is to refuse to censor information even when 
that information is regarded as harmful. To adopt this maxim is 
to say that no one needs to justify his or her request for information 
on any consequentialist grounds. Thus this is a “safer” ethical theory 
for defending intellectual freedom than is consequentialism. 
One can obtain similar results if one provides a deontological 
defense of intellectual freedom based not on Kantian criteria for a 
maxim, but on rights derived from the nature of man. Assuming 
for the sake of argument that man’s nature (or essence) is his 
rationality, one may argue that any attempt to limit man’s ability 
to reason is an attack on man’s very nature, his primary mode of 
survival. Next, one argues that limiting man’s access to the ideas 
of others would limit man’s ability to reason. The conclusion is that 
limitations on intellectual freedom are attacks on man himself. By 
this reasoning, all people have a right to all information regardless 
of whether or not that information might be harmful to them. Again, 
one need not justify any request €orinformation on consequentialist 
grounds. Thus this deontological defense of intellectual freedom is 
also a “safer” defense than consequentialist defenses. 
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A “safer” defense is one that admits of fewer exceptions to the 
principle being advocated. To say that deontological defenses of 
intellectual freedom are “safer” is not to say that they are more 
ethically valid. Perhaps, as consequentialist ethics allows, there 
should be limits to intellectual freedom based on consequences. To 
say that deontological defenses of intellectual freedom are safer is 
not to say that they admit of no circumstance in which censorship 
is justified. It is possible that the maxim: withhold no information 
may conflict with another maxim, such as those protecting personal 
privacy or those protecting private property. As was stated earlier, 
establishing a deontological right to information is the beginning, 
not the end, of an ethical investigation concerning intellectual 
freedom. 
THEPROBLEMIN A NUTSHELL-PATERNALISTIC 
CENSORSHIP PROTECTIONAND PRIVACY 
If intellectual freedom is understood as the right both to 
disseminate one’s own views and to obtain access to the views of 
others, then censorship is one (of several) activities that may conflict 
with intellectual freedom. When people have strong negative 
reactions to censorship, often it is because they are identifying 
censorship with those cases designed to hide crime or to increase 
the power of someone “underserving.” By controlling information, 
one may get away with treason, extortion, even murder. But these 
cases of censorship do not provide ethical dilemmas. The censorship 
is as wrong as the activities it is hiding. 
Censorship becomes an ethical issue when there is some “good” 
reason for censoring that is set in opposition to a “good” reason 
for not censoring. As noted in the introduction to this series of articles, 
the value of intellectual freedom is always a “good” reason for not 
censoring or otherwise restricting the flow of information. Two 
conflicts that arise are between intellectual freedom and the right 
to information and between intellectual freedom and paternalistic 
censorship. 
Paternalistic censorship is the censoring of information for the 
sake of the public (as opposed to the sake of the censorer). If one 
believes i t  is bad for society if children grow up reading books that 
portray women or blacks in subservient roles, then one may be 
inclined to limit children’s access to such reading material. This is 
paternalistic censorship. If one believes that certain news stories will 
merely make people feel frustrated and fearful, avoiding printing 
those stories for that reason is paternalistic censorship. The difficulty 
about paternalistic censorship is that i t  is applicable if and when 
one is one’s brother’s keeper. This is clearly appropriate if the brother 
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is a child. Children need guidance in many matters including what 
they should read at what age. But for those who believe that adults 
should have autonomy to read whatever they wish (even if i t  makes 
them sad or perverted), the difficulty is determining at what age 
different sorts of reading material might be no longer censored- 
at what point is society no longer its brother’s keeper with regard 
to what material is read. 
There is a long history to paternalistic censorship, much of which 
has been misunderstood. Our image of the Spanish Inquisition tends 
to be of evil men censoring the beliefs of others even to the point 
of tormenting or even killing those whose beliefs could not be 
changed. This is not likely to be the way in which they saw themselves. 
If there was no smallpox vaccine, then we would try to keep those 
infected away from the rest of society because of the physical damage 
it would do to others if they were exposed to the pox. We would 
attempt to cure them (if possible), if that failed we would attempt 
to isolate them, and if that failed we would kill them to keep them 
away from ourselves and friends. We would do all this to protect 
ourselves from physical harm. How much more important it would 
be to keep society from the spiritual harm that could damage one 
for all eternity. The Inquisitors attempted to cure the disbelievers, 
if that failed, to isolate them, and if that failed, to kill them before 
they could infect good people. The attempt to cure dissenters from 
their beliefs was seen as to the dissenters’ advantage as well as to 
that of society. The remainder was to society’s advantage. But even 
this paragon of evil censorship, the Spanish Inquisitor, can be 
understood as doing his work not out of meanness, but out of concern 
for society. He was his brother’s keeper to both the dissident and 
the innocent. 
The ethical problem lies not so much with the Inquisitor’s motive, 
as with the information on which he based his reasoning. We no 
longer agree that one is likely to spend eternity damned if one is 
exposed to the beliefs of dissenters. For one thing, many people do 
not believe they will spend eternity damned regardless of what beliefs 
they hold. Furthermore, even if holding some beliefs could lead to 
damnation, mere exposure to those beliefs may do more to innoculate 
one against them than to cause one to succumb to them. 
Finally, i t  may be that the interesting question for salvation versus 
damnation is not what one does believe, but what one would have 
believed if subjected to certain dissenter opinions. In this last case, 
our brother’s keeper cannot help us by governing what we are exposed 
to, but only by helping us understand and evaluate the material to 
which we might be exposed. In this last analysis, not only the 
Inquisitor, but also any paternalistic censor has the job of helping 
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the public analyze and evaluate potentially harmful materials so that 
exposure to them is innoculating and not disease-producing. The 
difficulty is in determining for what sorts of people at what ages 
this process is possible (assuming that for those sufficiently young, 
emotionally disturbed, or men tally retarded the analyze-and-evaluate 
techniques will not work). The problem for the paternalistic censor 
is to determine for what people (if any) which materials (if any) 
should be withheld (by whom) and with what justifications and 
procedures to ensure that only these materials are withheld from only 
these people. 
The other area where the value of intellectual freedom comes 
into conflict with other ethical values is in the area of privacy 
protection. When something I want to read is something you want 
kept private, then a conflict has arisen. These conflicts can be very 
difficult to sort out in part because it  is difficult to say what material 
should receive privacy protection in what circumstances. 
Together these two ethical concerns, intellectual freedom versus 
privacy protection and versus paternalistic censorship, make up  the 
first section of this Library Trends. 
REFERENCES 
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A Framework for Deciding Issues in Ethics 
DIANAWOODWARD 
ABSTRACT 
DISCIJSSES ADVANTAGES and disadvantages of two ethicalTHE 
theories-consequen tialism and deon tology-as bases for reasoning 
about ethical principles in general and intellectual freedom in 
particular. Concludes that a deontological defense of intellectual 
freedom is safer than a defense on consequentialist grounds. 
INTRODUCTION 
When one asks, “Why did person P do action A?” one may be 
asking a question about P or a question about A. If one interprets 
the question as asking what caused P to do A, then we are asking 
for information about person P such as was he abused as a child, stressed 
by his job, or suffering from a brain tumor. If one interprets the question 
as asking what reasons P had for doing A, then we are asking about 
the nature of the action A; on what basis might P (or anyone else) 
justify doing A? This article will be concerned with the latter problem: 
How can we provide reasons for or against a course of action? 
One hundred years ago this topic was better understood than 
i t  is today. Perhaps you have watched episodes of the T V  series Ethics 
in  America.’ What you saw was a discussion leader posing moral 
dilemmas to distinguished guests and then asking them how they 
felt about the problem or what they thought they would do. The 
guests would introspect to see how they felt or guess what they might 
do. This is not reasoning about ethics. Only a few of the guests 
were explicitly committed to sets of principles against which they 
Diana Woodward, College of Information Studies, Drexel University, Philadelphia, 
PA 19104 
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tested their options. Their reasoning from principles to choices was 
not the focus of the program and a more abstract reasoning about 
the principles themselves was not part of the show. To many of our 
contemporaries, ethics is no more than it is on that series-
introspecting how one feels about morally significant choices. 
It was different before our culture felt the influence of Freud 
in particular and the social sciences in general. It is these influences 
that prompt us to construe the question “Why did P do A?” as a 
question of causes (with which the social sciences deal) instead of 
a question about reasons. This perspective has become so common 
that people often forget that there is another issue to be considered. 
Never mind what caused P to do A ,  should she have done it? This 
question asks if there are reasons for P to do A (whether or not P 
is aware of those reasons). If there are justifying reasons, then those 
reasons apply to us as well. The results we obtain when looking 
for reasons tell us not only what P should have done but also what 
anyone relevantly similar to P should do. 
Unfortunately, the perspective of the social sciences has become 
so prevalent that it is common to find people who question whether 
or not it is even possible to reason about ethics. It will be demonstrated 
here that it is and, at the same time, introduce a method of ethical 
reasoning. Consider the Golden Rule: Do unto others as you would 
have them do unto you. People who do not reflect much on these 
matters often cite this as an acceptable moral principle. It isn’t and 
I hope that I can lead you to uncover its flaws. The most obvious 
problem is that this should not be the guiding moral principle of 
a masochist who would hurt others because he wishes them to hurt 
him. What we have done is find a counterexample to the proposed 
moral principle. A counterexample is an example of the principle 
(the masochist who hurts others is treating them as he wishes to 
be treated) but counter to personal intuitions about ethics or to another 
the purported moral principle that one should not harm the innocent. 
Counterexamples to the Golden Rule are not limited to those 
involving people such as the masochist. Otherwise it could be said 
that for all who are not masochists the Golden Rule is an acceptable 
moral principle. Another counterexample to the Golden Rule is that, 
i f  obeyed as a moral principle, it would prohibit putting criminals 
in jail since we do not wish to be placed in jail. In this case we 
find a practice that ethical intuitions tell us is just (penalizing the 
guilty), and note that this runs counter to the principle in question- 
i.e., the Golden Rule. The method of counterexample will not prove 
that the purported ethical principle is a poor one. If one can produce 
a counterexample to a purported ethical principle, then either the 
principle is wrong or else the example counter to the principle is 
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wrong. (Perhaps the Golden Rule is an acceptable moral principle 
in which case i t  is okay for the masochist to harm people and it  
is wrong to penalize the guilty.) The method of counterexamples 
demonstrates a conflict to be resolved without itself determining 
which side of the conflict is right and which is wrong. Note also 
that the method of counterexamples cannot prove that an ethical 
principle is true. If we attempt to produce a counterexample to the 
principle and fail, perhaps that is because the principle is invulnerable 
to counterexample, but then again it may be that counterexamples 
exist and we have failed to find them. 
The point of this discussion about counterexamples to the Golden 
Rule is that we can reason about ethical principles. Moreover, the 
methods employed are similar to those of the research scientist who 
is reasoning about a purported scientific principle. If a counterex- 
ample can be found then there is so’mething wrong with the principle 
or with the counterexample. If no counterexample can be found, 
then the principle is still not provein (perhaps a counterexample exists 
but we did not discover it), but when a principle withstands serious 
attempts to develop counterexamples, it is said that the principle 
is confirmed. 
Many people base ethical judgments on principles that are 
prescribed by their religion or culture. However, accepting such 
principles as a starting point does not eliminate the need for ethical 
reasoning. One may accept the principle, “Thou shalt not kill” but 
have to decide whether letting someone die counts as an instance 
of killing. One may accept the principles “Thou shalt not kill” and 
“Thou shalt not lie” but have to resolve a conflict when the only 
way to prevent a killing is by telling a lie. Furthermore, the decision 
to accept principles prescribed by culture or religion involves ethical 
reasoning. The Ten Commandments are widely accepted (in part) 
because they seem ethically reasonable and not simply because they 
are religious teachings. The Ten Commandments would not have 
been so readily accepted if they had stated “Kill all siblings” or “Lie 
to all strangers.” 
To assess a purported ethical principle, one needs an ethical 
theory. There are two important types of theory and they often- 
but not always-yield the same results. The theories can be used 
to evaluate principles and to evaluate particular courses of action. 
The first to be discussed is based on consequences and the second 
is based on a system of rights, duties, and obligations. 
The theory based on consequences is of ten called consequen- 
tialism.2 There are several varieties depending on what consequence 
is deemed desirable and on what parties are being considered. If one 
seeks the best consequences for everyone except herself, she is an 
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altruist. If one seeks the best consequences for everyone including 
herself she is a utilitarian. If one seeks the best consequences for 
oneself only then she is an egoist. It is generally agreed that the 
consequences to be sought are some sort of long range well being 
(as opposed to short term pleasure). There is, however, considerable 
disagreement about what constitutes long-term well being. For 
instance, is a person better off contented or discontented, cared for 
by others or taking care of himself. 
It should be mentioned that some ethicists regard egoism as 
unacceptable as an ethical theory on the basis that it is merely a 
concern with one’s own well-being and not with that of others. 
However, the enlightened egoist will realize that to promote her own 
happiness, she must promote that of others as well. In defense of 
egoism one might note that i t  is the only ethical theory that can 
answer the question (which the Greeks considered important), “Why 
should I be moral?”3 The answer that egoism alone can give is that 
i t  is to your advantage to be moral. 
The great difficulty with consequentialist ethics is that it requires 
a large database of facts and huge amounts of processing time. How 
can one determine what is best even for oneself let alone what is 
best for everyone? The answer is that one never really can. 
Consequentialist ethics merely directs one to do one’s best at the 
relevant cost-benefit analyses. This can be particularly difficult if 
one must make a decision in a short time. 
A version of consequentialism has been developed to deal with 
this difficulty. Rule utilitarianism4 is a version of utilitarianism that 
directs us to use utilitarian principles to develop a set of rules. The 
rules can be developed at our leisure and then be quickly applied 
even in an emergency situation. It is granted that the rules may result 
in the wrong decision in a few cases. The suggestion is that they 
will serve us better than a hastily done consequentialist analysis of 
each individual ethical problem. 
There are two pitfalls to be avoided when consequentialism is 
used as a basis for decision making in professional ethics. The first 
pitfall is to analyze benefits without attention to costs. As a 
consequentialist deciding whom to promote to a higher position, 
one must consider not only what the benefits would be of having 
each different candidate in the higher position, but also the costs 
of losing that person at the lower position and the costs of not 
promoting other candidates. The second pitfall is to determine the 
ideal state of affairs without considering the problems of how to 
get from here to there. One’s consequentialist analysis might confirm 
that it would be best to have the proportion of librarians that are 
women and minorities equal to their proportion in the population. 
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One must then do a second analysis of each proposed method for 
achieving this goal. If there is no good way of achieving the goal, 
then one may have to sacrifice the goal. One cannot say the ends 
justify the means and thus endorse any means to a consequentially 
confirmed ideal goal. 
The other type of ethical theory-the one based on rights, duties, 
and obligations-is called deontology.5 It is as ancient as Homeric 
Greece where a person’s moral character was judged by how well 
that person carried out the duties of the person’s station in life. The 
duties of a nobleman, a wife, and a slave were all different. Socrates 
then wondered what duties might be expected of any citizen, and 
eventually the Lutherans and Calvinists speculated on what duties 
God might require of any person.6 It is, however, with the moral 
philosophy of Immanuel Kant7 that deontology is most closely 
associated today. 
Early in his reasoning, Kant concluded that the only thing good 
without exception was a good will. A person acting from good will 
was doing the right thing even if the consequences proved disastrous. 
Then Kant reasoned that a person is acting from good will if the 
person bases his action on what Kant called the “Categorical 
Imperative” (because it  was not a hypothetical command such as, 
“If you want A, do B,” but simply a command “Do B ” ) .  He had 
four ways of formulating the Categorical Imperative of which the 
best known is probably that you should act so that you could 
consistently will that everyone act the same. 
For example, I cannot consistently will that everyone always lie. 
To do so would merely change the meaning of negation. For instance, 
“I am happy,”’ would mean, “I am unhappy,” etc. Furthermore, I 
cannot even consistently will that people sometimes lie. If we could 
not assume that others were speaking the truth, no language 
community would evolve and thus lying (at least verbally) would 
be impossible. A child cannot learn the meaning of the word “red” 
if there is no reason to presume that a person saying “This is red” 
is telling the truth. Since we cannot consistently will that people 
always, or even sometimes, lie, we must adopt the maxim that one 
must never lie. 
Similar reasoning can lead one to establish a number of maxims 
to guide one’s ethical decision making. One problem that arises is 
how to phrase the maxim: I do not want to refrain from making 
love to my spouse on the grounds that I cannot consistently will 
that everyone do so. Instead of testing the maxim, “Make love to 
my spouse,” I want to test the maxim, “Make love to one’s own 
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spouse” or perhaps even “Make love to one’s own spouse if both 
parties are healthy, willing, and co-located.” It’s sort of difficult to 
know how to phrase the maxim. 
There are other forms of deontology besides that of Kant. for 
example, the American Constitution refers to the rights of mans that 
were developed by another line of reasoning. One begins with the 
question, “What is the nature of man?” If the answer is that man 
is essentially rational, then one draws conclusions about the ethical 
implications: that man has a right to that which he needs in order 
to exercise his rationality. Thus we have a right to life, a right to 
assemble and discuss, a right to read and publish. Also, the rights 
to assemble and discuss mean we have a right to liberty. 
One problem that arises with any claim concerning a person’s 
rights, is how to specify what is included. The best way to test a 
purported right is by considering the corresponding obligation. When 
we say, “Mary has a right to life,” do we mean merely that we are 
all obliged not to kill her or do we mean that we are all obliged 
to keep her alive? If her health care is expensive, then her right to 
life construed in the latter way conflicts with our rights to our own 
property. 
Resolution of conflicts is a problem for deontological theories. 
One may reason out what rights a person has or on what maxims 
one ought to act, but this is piecemeal support for each purported 
right and maxim. When two maxims come into conflict (one must 
lie to protect the innocent), then the deontologist has no further 
level of reasoning to which she can appeal to resolve the problem. 
Each maxim is categorical and must be obeyed under all  
circumstances. 
One hybrid ethical theory has arisen to deal with this problem. 
The concept of “prima facie” duties is that we can use deontological 
reasoning to determine what duties we all clearly have. However, 
in those cases where our duties come into conflict with each other, 
we may turn to consequentialist reasoning to resolve the conflict. 
One such conflict that occurs frequently in professional ethics 
for information managers is between one person’s right to information 
and another person’s right to privacy. The suggestion is that each 
right can be defended on principles deriving it from, for instance, 
the nature of man; but when the two rights come into conflict because 
A wants information about B that B wants kept private, then the 
issue is to be resolved by an appeal to consequences. This might 
be done on a case by case basis or by reasoning out a rule utilitarian 
solution that would apply to all cases of a given sort. 
There are both theoretical difficulties with deontological theories 
and pitfalls to be avoided in using these theories. One theoretical 
14 LIBRARY TRENDUSUMMER & FALL 1990 
difficulty lies with basing rights and obligations (what ought to be 
the case) on any version of the nature of man (what is the case). 
Some philosophers have argued that what is never entails what ough t  
t o  be. Others point out the difficulty of establishing any such thing 
as the nature of man. One of the two main pitfalls of using 
deontological ethical theories is, as mentioned earlier, the problem 
of phrasing the maxim to be tested by the Categorical Imperative. 
The other pitfall to be avoided is claiming that there is a right without 
making clear its limitations. This can best be done by specifying 
the corresponding obligations. If you have a right to information, 
what is my corresponding obligation: (1) not to take information 
from you, (2) to provide information to you for free, (3)  to provide 
information to you for an affordable price, (4) to educate you so 
that you can understand the information provided, (5) to provide 
a machine or person to read to you if you are blind? Am I obliged 
to do that? Establishing a deontological right to information is the 
beginning, not the end, of an ethical investigation concerning 
intellectual freedom. 
As a case study in reasoning about information ethics, consider 
how one might defend intellectual freedom. One can give both 
consequentialist and deontological arguments for intellectual 
freedom, but the choice of an ethical theory upon which intellectual 
freedom is based can result in different decisions about what ought 
to be done in particular cases. 
The term intellectual freedom, broadly construed, includes both 
the right to the intellectual efforts of others and a right to distribute 
one’s own intellectual efforts. These efforts include written works, 
conversation, speeches, and various art forms (e.g., dance or sculpture) 
that can be used to communicate ideas. 
To defend intellectual freedom on consequentialist grounds, one 
must make the case that i t  is best for someone (me, everyone except 
me, or all concerned) if information is broadly disseminated. The 
best known consequentialist defense of intellectual freedom comes 
from John Stuart Milllo who made his defense from the negative 
side-restricting intellectual freedom is harmful. He argued that if 
we suppress ideas we may be suppressing the truth. Even if the 
suppressed ideas are not the truth, there may be some germ of truth 
in  them or something that gives insights into new truths. 
Furthermore, even if the promoted opinion is the truth and suppressed 
views are completely false, people will not have as much faith and 
commitment to the promoted opinion if they do not see i t  openly 
debated and defended in con test with other views. For all these reasons, 
intellectual freedom is needed to make certain the truth is both 
discovered and believed. 
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The assumption behind this reasoning is that people are better 
off if the truth is known. Not everyone agrees with this. The whole 
point of paternalistic censorship (whether it be censorship of 
pornographic or racist material in the United States or censorship 
of political news in the Soviet Union), is that it is better for society 
in general and often better for individuals themselves if they are not 
exposed to certain sorts of ideas even if there is some truth to those 
ideas. The consequentialist defense of intellectual freedom then 
depends upon first establishing whether or not people are better off 
when they are exposed to all intellectual efforts. The typical result 
is that one starts dividing up intellectual efforts into those that are 
good for people and those that are not. Defending the distribution 
of only the former is not defending intellectual freedom in principle. 
To defend intellectual freedom in principle, and not merely in 
those cases where it can be shown to be of benefit to someone, one 
needs to provide a deontological defense of intellectual freedom. One 
method in providing such a defense involves deriving the right to 
information from the nature of man. Another method involves 
demonstrating that one could not consistently will that information 
be withheld from people. 
It would be inconsistent to will that the truth be withheld from 
people. If the truth were withheld from everyone, then you would 
not have enough evidence to decide what are the truths that are to 
be withheld. Withholding all information, not merely the truth, does 
not lead to this inconsistency. There does, however, seem to be some 
silliness in the suggestion that we might adopt the maxim: Withhold 
all information from everyone. Adopting the maxim: Withhold 
harmful information sounds more like a maxim that a censor might 
wish to act upon. While it cannot be demonstrated that there is any 
inconsistency involved in adopting such a maxim, it should be pointed 
out that it returns us to consequentialist reasoning as we must 
determine what information has harmful consequences. The defender 
of intellectual freedom can reply that one can consistently act upon 
the maxim: Withhold no information. To adopt this maxim is to 
refuse to censor information even when that information is regarded 
as harmful. To adopt this maxim is to say that no one needs to 
justify hidher request for information on any consequentialist 
grounds. Thus this is a “safer” ethical theory for defending 
intellectual freedom than is consequentialism. 
One can obtain similar results if one provides a deontological 
defense of intellectual freedom not based on Kantian criteria for a 
maxim but based on rights derived from the nature of man. Assuming 
for the sake of argument that man’s nature (or essence) is his 
rationality, one may argue that any attempt to limit man’s ability 
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to reason is an attack on man’s very nature, his primary mode of 
survival. Next, one argues that limiting man’s ability to receive 
criticism of his own ideas and/or limiting man’s access to the ideas 
of others would limit man’s ability to reason. The conclusion is that 
limitations on intellectual freedom are attacks on man himself. By 
this reasoning all people have a right to all information regardless 
of whether or not that information might be harmful to them. Again, 
one need not justify any request for information on consequentialist 
grounds. Thus this deontological defense of intellectual freedom is 
also a “safer” defense than consequentialist defenses. 
A “safer” defense is one that admits to fewer exceptions to the 
principle being advocated. To say that deontological defenses of 
intellectual freedom are “safer” is not to say that they are more 
ethically valid. Perhaps, as consequentialist ethics allows, there 
should be limits to intellectual freedom based on consequences. To 
say that deontological defenses of intellectual freedom are “safer” 
is not to say that they admit to no circumstance in which censorship 
is justified. It is possible that the maxim: Withhold no information 
may conflict with another maxim such as those protecting personal 
privacy or private property. As stated earlier, establishing a 
deontological right to information is the beginning, not the end, 
of an ethical investigation concerning intellectual freedom. 
NOTES 
1. The public 	 television series Ethics in  America was produced by Columbia 
University Seminars on Media and Society. Three books are available to those 
who wish to use the series in  teaching ethics: a source reader, a study guide, 
and a preview packet. These have been published in  1989 by Prentice Hall, 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ. 
2. 	Any ethics textbook will have information on both consequentialist and 
deontological theories. One good source for further reading is Modern Moral 
Philosophy by W.D. Hudson, published by Anchor Books Doubleday and Co. 
Inc., Garden City, NY in 1970. Another good source on ethics (or any other 
philosophical topic) is T h e  Encyclopedia of Philosophy edited by Paul Edwards 
and published by Macmillan Publishing Co. Inc. and The Free Press, NY, 1967. 
3. 	This topic is discussed at length in the Republic by Plato. In the Nichomachean 
Ethics, Aristorle assumes that it must be to our advantage to be ethical and develops 
an ethical theory consistent with this assumption. More recently the advantage 
of being ethical was a major topic in T h e  Moral Point of View by Kurt Baier 
published by Cornell in  Ithaca, NY in 1958. 
4. 	While many versions of this theory have been developed in  the last thirty years, 
the terminology used here was introduced by R.B. Brandt in  his book Ethical 
Theory published by Prentice Hall, Englewoods Cliffs, NJ in  1959. 
5. 	The term deontology derives from the Greek words deon for duty and logos for 
science. Thus deontic ethics is the science of duty. 
6. This story is told in  A Short History of Ethics by Alasdair MacIntyre published 
in 1966 by Macmillan Publishing Company, NY. 
7. Kant’s theory is developed in  the Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of 
Morals written in 1785. There are many English translations. The translation 
by L.W. Beck was published by the Library of Liberal Arts, New York, in 1963. 
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8. 	The natural rights theory that influenced the authors of the U.S. Constitution 
was developed by John Locke in Two Treatises of Government, first published 
in 1690. For an excellent modern discussion of natural rights theories, see William 
Frankena, “Natural and Inalienable Rights.” Philosophical Review, vol. 64, 1955, 
212-232. 
9. The theory of “prima facie duties” was developed by W.D. Ross in Foundations 
of Ethics, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1939 and T h e  Right  and the Good, Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1930 and by H.A. Prichard in papers that were published in the 
collection Moral Obligation, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1949. 
10. Mill’s discussion of this topic is found at the end of the section titled “Of Thought 
and Discussion” in O n  Liberty which was first published in 1859. This work 
can be found in many collections including, Utilitarianism, Liberty, and 
Representative Government, by John Stuart Mill published by E.P. Dutton and 
Company, NY in 1951. 
Censorship: Current Issues in American Libraries 
R. KATHLEENMOLZ 
ABSTRACT 
Two n P E s  OF CENSORSHIP pervade contemporary society. The first, 
regulative censorship, aims at the suppression of values inimical to 
the safeguard of such orthodoxies as religion, the protection of the 
state, or personal morality and purity. As a result, books or other 
media professing alleged blasphemy, heresy, sedition, or immorality 
are liable to be banned. A second form of censorship, existential 
censorship, is linked to monopolistic domination by either the state 
or the market to subvert or deny public access to some forms of 
knowledge and information. The protection of the state may lead 
to a control of information under the aegis of national security, and 
then needs of the market may lead to a delimitation of information 
through the imposition of fees and charges. The author sees evidence 
of the first form in the attacks on materials deemed unsuitable for 
young readers (school library censorship) and of the second in stricter 
governmental controls over the dissemination of information (the 
FBI Library Awareness Program). She believes that a distinctive 
change from a liberal to a conservative stance in American regime 
values has contributed to the present state of censorship activity in 
this country. 
INTRODUCTION 
Like the word pornography, which Justice Potter Stewart said 
he found difficult to define although he knew it when he saw it, the 
word censorship is equally difficult to delimit. Conjured up by one 
of its oldest meanings is the work of the ancient Roman magistrates 
assigned to take the census of the citizens and to supervise their moral 
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conduct. Time, however, has considerably extended the boundaries 
of this original surveillance and today the invocation of the word 
censorship summons up  entire chapters of history ranging from the 
Spanish Inquisition or the New England witch hunts to the book 
burnings of Nazi Germany. 
Because this article must of necessity address a “climate” of 
censorship rather than serve as a mere iteration of seemingly random 
acts of proscription-either of a governmental or nongovernmental 
nature-no precise definition of censorship will prove to be wholly 
adequate. But since some limits to the terrain which is to be 
subsequently explored here are necessary, it may prove helpful at 
the outset to use a distinction made by Sue Curry Jansen in her 
book on censorship. In distinguishing between two types of censorial 
activity, Jansen defines the first as regulative and the second as 
constitutive or existential. The one most familiar is regulative 
censorship, which refers to those exercises of power summoned up  
in defense of ideations imbued with auras of orthodoxy, such as 
religious deities, public safety, the protection of the state, or even 
personal purity. Throughout history, values seemingly inimical to 
the safeguard of such concepts are suppressed (hence accusations are 
leveled against blasphemy or heresy, sedition, obscenity, or 
immorality), with the consequence that the proponents or followers 
of these heterodoxies “can be identified, profiled, and evaluated in 
terms of humanistic standards,” such as the level of violence needed 
to maintain control, the degree of tolerance for unorthodox ideas, 
or the severity of the purgation needed to remedy the situation. 
“Regulative censorships,” she notes, “can be amended or 
revolutionized in ways that raise or lower bodycounts, numbers of 
books banned or citizens ghettoed or gulaged” (Jansen, 1988, p. 8). 
In contrast to this overt and documentable battle between 
orthodoxy and heterodoxy, constitutive or, as I prefer to call it, 
existential censorship, is far more pervasive and invidious. Elite 
interests, whether those in control of the state, the market, or 
increasingly, those in which the interests of the state and the market 
are allied, exhibit a form of monopolistic domination in which public 
access to some forms of knowledge and information is either subverted 
or denied. Evidences of this latter type of censorship in which 
knowledge and power are inextricably linked abound in the recent 
decade, beginning with the concept that knowledge produced in the 
public interest has become a purchasable commodity subject to the 
regulation of the market and l e a l n g  to private-sector control of 
information even though it was initially gathered in the public 
interest and paid for through public taxation (Jansen, 1988, pp. 167-
72). 
Historically, the literature of librarianship has been dominated 
by aspects of regulative censorship; only recently has existential 
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censorship with its recognition of the commodification of 
information/knowledge emerged as a topic of discourse. If any recent 
year might be selected to mark a coincidence of events dealing with 
both regulative and existential censorship, it might be 1977, the year 
in which the final report of the Commission on Federal Paperwork 
was issued and also the year in which plaintiffs in the case of Pic0 
u. Board of Education, Island Trees U n i o n  Free School District began 
litigation alleging violation of their First Amendment rights. The 
first of these actions led to the passage of the Paperwork Reduction 
Act of 1980, which was subsequently used to sanction a singular role 
for the U.S. Office of Management and Budget as the national czar 
of federal information resources, and the second resulted in the first 
major decision of the U.S. Supreme Court involving the holdings 
of a school library and the rights of its students to have access to 
them. 
The year 1977 is also interesting in that it witnessed the admixture 
of the American Library Association (ALA) film, T h e  Speaker, 
dedicated to the concept that tolerance must be extended even to 
the most detestable ideas, and the protest of holocaust survivors in 
the Village of Skokie, Illinois, to the threat posed by the National 
Socialist Party of America in planning a demonstration there in spring 
1977. The defense of the Nazis by the American Civil Liberties Union 
resulted in a severe diminution of its national membership, and the 
pros and cons relating to the ALAS continued sponsorship of the 
film occasioned national attention in both the press and on television. 
The ideological conflicts involved in both of these incidents are still 
matters of debate (Berry, 1978; Downs, 1985). 
This article will explore the trajectories of both regulative and 
existential censorship during the decade of the 1980s as they have 
influenced the perspectives and perceptions of the American library 
profession. It is written at a time when world response to T h e  Satanic 
Verses by the Indian-born novelist Salman Rushdie was a dominant 
front page feature and when the closing salvos in the trial of Oliver 
North were heard in the federal courts. Of these two developments, 
the alleged insult to the sacred writings and religious beliefs of Islam 
was suggested as the rationale for the first while the protection and 
defense of United States “national security” was raised as a central 
issue in the second. 
REGULATIVE IN THE SCHOOLS: PICO CASE CENSORSH P THE 
Although many notable lower court decisions regarding the 
censorship of books in school libraries had been issued prior to 1982, 
such as Minarcini u. Strongsuille City School District (1976), the R i g h t  
t o  Read Defense Commit tee  of Chelsea u. School Commit tee  of t he  
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City of Chelsea (1978), and Saluail u. Nashua Board of Education 
(1979), the Supreme Court had not substantively addressed the 
question until it heard the case of Pic0 u. Board of Education. 
The Pic0 case arose out of an incident in the fall of 1975 involving 
several members of a Long Island, New York, school board. Three 
board members, including its president and vice-president, had 
attended a conference sponsored by a conservatively oriented group 
called Parents of New York United (PONY-U). They obtained excerpts 
selected from books deemed by PONY-U as “objectionable.” Several 
books were subsequently removed either from the school libraries 
or from use in the curriculum. Included were the anonymously 
published Go Ask  Alice; Alice Childress’s A Hero Ain’t Nothin’ B u t  
a Sandwich; Eldridge Cleaver’s Soul o n  Ice; Oliver LaFarge’s 
L a u g h i n g  Boy; Bernard Malamud’s T h e  Fixer; Desmond Morris’s 
T h e  Naked Ape;  Piri Thomas’s D o w n  These Mean Streets; Kurt 
Vonnegut’s Slaughterhouse-Five; Richard Wright’s Black Boy; an 
anthology, T h e  Best Short Stories by Negro  Writers, edited by 
Langston Hughes; and A Reader for Writers, edited by Jerome Archer, 
which included the text of Jonathan Swift’s A Modest Proposal. The 
school board subsequently issued a press release making reference 
to the books in these terms: “anti-American, anti-Christian, anti- 
Semetic (sic), and just plain filthy.” In justification of their actions, 
the board noted that “we who are elected by the community, are 
the eyes and ears of the parents. It is our duty, our moral obligation, 
to protect the children in our schools from this moral danger as 
surely as from physical and medical dangers” (Pico u. Board of 
Education, 474 F. Supp. 387 at 390, 1979). 
In January 1977, several students in the school and their parents 
who represented them as “next friends” filed an action for injunctive 
and declaratory relief alleging violation of their rights under both 
federal and state constitutions. In its initial ruling in the case, the 
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York found in 
favor of the school board in deference to “the school board’s substantial 
control over educational content ....” In citing precedence for the 
decision, District Judge George C. Pratt quoted from a prior case: 
“The very notion of public education implies substantial public 
control. Educational decisions must be made by someone; there is 
no reason to create a constitutional preference for the views of 
individual teachers over those of their employers” (Pico u. Board 
of Education, 474 F. Supp. 387 at 397-398, 1979). 
In 1980, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 638 
F. 2d 404 (1980), reversed the lower court decision and found in favor 
of the students. The judgment of the court cited examples of the 
“erratic, arbitrary and free-wheeling manner” in which the school 
board had proceeded in the case, and noted the “substantive confusion, 
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not to say incoherence,” which had typified the board’s 
rationalizations in removing the material (Picou. Board of Education, 
638 F. Supp. 2d 404 at 416-417, 1980). 
The school board appealed the decision of the appellate court, 
and the Supreme Court, in a five to four opinion, handed down 
their decision in 1982 (Board of Education, Island Trees U n i o n  Free 
School District no. 26, et al. u. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 1982). The plurality 
(Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, Blackmun, and White) held that 
the case should be remanded back to the district court where, if tried, 
evidence should be introduced to determine if the board’s actions 
were based on “constitutionally valid concerns” rather than on what 
appeared to be the rash and injudicious personal convictions of school 
officials. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and 
O’Connor dissented, finding that the school board was the proper 
vehicle for the determination of decisions affecting the education 
of the children within the public school system. 
History links this case with another and equally historic school 
censorship controversy, the bitter dispute in 1974 over the decision 
of the Kanawha County (West Virginia) Board of Education to adopt 
a collection of books for use with the curriculum which were 
subsequently characterized as ‘‘anti-Christian, anti-American, anti- 
authority, depressing and negative (Teacher Rights Division, 1988, 
p. 2). Almost unprecedented in terms of its violence (actions by 
protestors included firebombings, phone threats to intimidate parents 
from sending their children to school, gunshot blasts at school buses, 
assaults, and spraying with MACE), the Kanawha County incident 
ground to its unhappy end in 1975 when an uneasy truce took place 
between the educational establishment and the protest movement, 
members of which were largely drawn from the rural areas of the 
county. It was a resident of this county who was later to speak on 
the topic of litigation involving the control of textbooks and library 
books in the schools at the PONY-U conference attended by three 
officials of the Island Trees School Board. 
The polarity in the value systems held by both the plaintiffs 
and the defendants in the Island Trees case is comparable to that 
which distinguished the urbanized Charleston residents from their 
fundamentalist rural neighbors in Kanawha County. These value 
systems are not unrelated to what political scientists call regime 
values-those principles that in fact sustain a sociopolitical vision 
of society from one administration or regime to another. Since World 
War 11, revolution has dramatically changed the contours of the globe, 
including the overthrow of governments in Eastern Europe, China, 
Cuba, the majority of African nations, and much of Asia. By contrast, 
the United States has been characterized by comparative stability, 
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although the ideological dichotomies between value systems have 
contributed greatly to the experience of stress and the expression 
of discontent by many Americans during the last few decades. 
In a 1972 published analysis of American regime values, political 
scientist Donald J. Devine (1972) held that, although consensual 
support for the liberal values of the American regime still existed, 
future events could change their position: 
Political leaders may ignore member values; environmental stress may 
make political or other social structure unworkable; elites may organize 
non-mass-based revolution or coups d’&tat; foreign forces may come to 
dominate the system; members may come to “rationally” reject the values; 
or the values may not be transferred to the next generation. (pp. 368-
69) 
It is my contention here that the liberal values of the American 
regime have been considerably eroded within the past decade and 
that the 1988 presidential campaign revealed many of the polarities 
and differences in American sociopolitical perceptions: conservative 
versus liberal; support of or opposition to the death penalty; a 
predisposition for a stronger as opposed to a weaker role for the 
federal government; pro-life versus pro-choice in the matter of 
abortion; and others. In particular, Presidential Candidate Bush’s oft- 
repeated references to the “1------” word (almost making the 
term liberal offensive of itself) symbolized the alleged weakness of 
his opponent’s position and was used to support the charge that 
Governor Dukakis was unpatriotic, soft on crime, and prone to 
overspending and “big” government. 
The shaping of these regime values is complex, induced by such 
factors as age, sex, ethnicity, education, class, political affiliation, 
religious preference, place of residence, and many others. It is 
interesting to note, for example, that several of these differentials 
figured in the Island Trees case. Of the books banned, one dealt with 
the teenage drug culture; several were written or edited by African- 
Americans; D o w n  These Mean Streets was the work of a Puerto Rican; 
L a u g h i n g  Boy dealt with a Native American child; and Barnard 
Malamud’s T h e  Fixer was written by a prominent Jewish author. 
The generation gap was also apparent in the case, the students being 
themselves products of a more religiously and ethnically integrated 
society than that known to the older generation represented by the 
school board officials. At present, the incidences of school library 
censorship continue to dominate proscriptions of library materials, 
an indication, perhaps, of parental dissatisfaction with the more 
permissive lifestyle of today’s youth (Attackson the  Freedom to  Learn, 
1989). 
The issues of regulative censorship that sprinkle the pages of 
the A L A  Newsletter un Zntellectual Freedom are linked to the censors’ 
perception of threats to their personal or community value systems. 
Because American society does not readily lend itself to the coercion 
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of its dissident members (coups d’e‘tat are usually accompanied by 
the incarceration or slaughter of the regime’s opponents), those 
threatened seek their redress through a variety of means: protest, 
litigation, legislation, and, in some cases, the actual suppression of 
the offending artifact be it book, movie, radio broadcast, or telecast. 
THECOMMISSIONSON PORNOGRAPHY 
As a further illustration of the differences between regime values, 
one might cite the two national commissions on obscenity and 
pornography that have been appointed within recent memory. The 
first of these resulted from legislation passed in 1967 in which Congress 
directed that a commission be empaneled to study the causal 
relationship of obscene and pornographic materials to an tisocial 
behavior and to advise Congress on the means by which the traffic 
in pornography and obscenity could be regulated “without in any 
way interfering with constitutional rights.” The following year, 
President Johnson nominated eighteen members from the judiciary, 
the publications media, academe, the clergy, and the law and medical 
professions. Because of the resignation of one of the Johnson 
appointees, President Nixon later named Charles H. Keating, Jr., 
founder of Citizens for Decent Literature, to the commission. The 
commission’s chairman was William B. Lockhart, dean of the 
University of Minnesota Law School and a liberal theorist on the 
interpretation of the First Amendment; the vice chairman was 
Frederick H. Wagman, librarian of the University of Michigan and 
former president of the American Library Association. 
To many observers, the commission’s findings were stunningly 
simplistic: repeal all federal, state, and local legislation which might 
“interfere with the right of adults who wish to do so to read, obtain, 
or view explicit sexual materials.” Legislative regulations were 
recommended in the case of minors, and precautions were also 
suggested to protect the public from having sexually explicit material 
thrust upon them either through the mails or through public display. 
Twelve of the commissioners supported these recommendations, 
several others supported them conditionally, while two commissioners 
openly dissented, both of them clergymen. Keating, the maverick 
commissioner, did not participate in the commission’s final 
deliberations but concurred with the opinions of the two dissenters 
and additionally submitted his own report in which he described 
the majority’s findings: “Credit the American public with enough 
common sense to know that one who wallows in filth i s  going to 
get dirty. This is intuitive knowledge. Those who will spend millions 
of dollars to tell us otherwise must be malicious or misguided, or 
both” (U.S. Commission on Obscenity and Pornography, 1970, p. 
622). 
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In references to the commission’s final report, made while he 
was campaigning in Maryland on behalf of Republican candidates 
for Congress, President Nixon announced that he would 
“categorically reject its morally bankrupt conclusions and major 
recommendations” (“Nixon on Commission,” 1971, p. 22). The Senate 
voted, in a 60-5 decision, to reject the report. 
Over fifteen years later, President Reagan called for the 
establishment of a new commission, and Attorney General Edwin 
Meese announced the appointment of the eleven-member panel in 
May 1985. Again the membership included representatives of the 
judiciary, the clergy, the communications and publications media, 
the medical profession, and the law. Unlike the Johnson Commission, 
no librarian was invited to serve. In a little over a year, the Meese 
Commission made its final report, calling for tighter controls over 
sexually explicit material and a stringent enforcement of obscenity 
laws. As with the first commission report, the Meese Commission’s 
findings had their dissenters, interestingly, both of them women, one 
a clinical psychologist and the other a journalist with particular 
interest in women’s issues (statement of Dr. Judith Becker and Ellen 
Levine, 1986, vol. 1, pp. 195-212). 
Although their minority report contains no reference to the 
Johnson Commission, its description of the conduct of the Meese 
inquiry panel provides some clues as to the different way in which 
the two commissions operated. Granted two years to conduct its 
investigation, the Johnson Commission had at its disposal almost 
$2 million for contracted behavioral studies. By contrast, the Meese 
panel was allowed one year for its deliberations and a more modest 
appropriation of $400,000. As a result, the Johnson Commission was 
able to rely heavily on empirical data from a series of studies conducted 
at American universities, studies which found no evidence of causality 
between pornography and anti-social conduct. Lacking the 
wherewithal to commission research, the Meese panel largely 
depended on public hearings where victims of anti-social acts opined 
about the dangers of pornography. As the dissenters commented, since 
few persons would come forward willingly to reveal their personal 
consumption of erotica or pornographic materials, the testimony 
provided was of necessity one sided. 
The choice of commission chairmen was equally apposite: the 
Johnson chairman, William B. Lockhart, a law school dean, had 
done considerable legal research prior to his appointment on issues 
involving the obscene; his successor under Meese was Henry Hudson, 
prosecutor for Arlington County, Virginia, whose background was 
in the area of law enforcement. Another distinction between the two 
commissions was the fact that the earlier commission could 
concentrate on print (magazines and books) or on film and broadcast, 
while the later one was confronted with still newer means of delivery, 
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namely, home video and cable, the dimensions or effects of which 
in the distribution of pornography are still largely unknown. Then, 
too, considerable change in American social patterns differentiated 
the periods in which the two commissions were called: an escalating 
divorce rate; a nationwide medical crisis over the advent of AIDS; 
the widespread use of birth control devices; and the legalization of 
abortion had all shaped attitudes toward sexuality in significant ways 
between 1970 and 1986. 
If the majority of the Johnson commissioners represented values 
of liberalism, freedom of choice, and individual rights of conscience, 
the majority of the Meese panelists spoke for the values of the new 
right. Crusaders in their moral cause, they associated pornography 
with sexually deviant crimes, although the causalities that provoke 
rape or assault may come from a host of other variables, both 
behavioral or environmental. If there was one small constant between 
the two commissions it was, perhaps, that the testimony of the 
witnesses for the American Library Association communicated a 
strikingly similar message: no censorship (Krug, 1970, 1985). 
Although with very few exceptions American libraries buy little 
in the way of obscene or pornographic literature or other forms of 
media, the position of the ALA is remarkably permissive. 
In general terms, the American Library Association rejects anti-obscenity 
laws as unwarranted intrusions upon those basic freedoms which Justice 
Cardozo once described as the matrix of all our other freedoms. Anti- 
obscenity laws, which are directed not at the control of anti-social action 
but rather at the control of communication, represent a form of censorship 
ultimately aimed at the control of the thoughts, opinions, and basic 
beliefs of citizens in a free democracy. (“ALA Protests ..., 1977, p. 144) 
The libertarian stance of the association has not been taken without 
criticism from some of its members. 
The issue is exacerbated by two quite distinct phenomena: 
( 1) the wholly differing opinions concerning the causality between 
an tisocial behavior and pornographic listening, viewing, and 
reading; and (2)  the identification of the anti-pornography 
movement as a feminist concern. In regard to the first of these, the 
two national commissions took totally opposite positions. The 
Johnson Commission found “no evidence to date that exposure to 
explicitly sexual material plays a significant role in the causation 
of delinquent or criminal behavior among youth or adults” (U.S. 
Commission on Obscenity ..., 1970, p. 27). By contrast, the Meese 
Commission concluded that “the available evidence strongly supports 
the hypothesis that substantial exposure to sexually violent materials 
as described here bears a causal relationship to antisocial acts of sexual 
violence, and, for some subgroups, possibly to unlawful acts of sexual 
violence” (U.S. Attorney General’s Commission on Pornography ..., 
1986, p. 326). Since the acceptance of either of these positions is a 
somewhat subjective matter, the question of causality remains moot. 
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The second matter, the perception by prominent feminists that 
pornography is a principal means by which women are subjugated 
and degraded, has precipitated a very active literature (Griffin, 1981; 
Dworkin, 1981; MacKinnon, 1987; Morgan, 1989; Millett, 1970) and 
the initiation of a number of local ordinances that have seldom been 
upheld in higher courts of jurisdiction on the grounds of their 
“chilling effect” on First Amendment rights. 
A recent scholarly assessment of this issue, The New Politics 
of Pornography, analyzes the works of two prominent feminists, 
Catherine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin, in support of anti- 
pornography ordinances introduced in  two municipalities, 
Minneapolis and Indianapolis in 1983 and 1984 respectively. Written 
by Donald Alexander Downs (1989), a professor of political science, 
this carefully researched and balanced argument attempts to restore 
civility to public discourse, a civility that has been threatened in 
late years by the intolerance expressed by both liberals and 
conservatives alike on the issue of the obscene. Although the author 
holds that “violent obscenity”-depictions of murder, 
dismemberment, brutality, or violence in the context of obscene acts- 
should be disallowed constitutional protection, he rejects the feminist 
proposition that all pornography be denied free expression: 
The position one takes on the pornography issue reveals how far one 
is willing to go in tolerating human weakness. The best position, in 
my estimation, is a compromise ....Social policy in a liberal democracy 
should recognize the higher ideals of equal respect and reason but should 
also tolerate the human need for remissive relief and retreat. If some 
behavior must be restricted, thought and imagination must remain free. 
(P. 188) 
In reflecting the dichotomy between the conservative and liberal 
spirit in American life, the issue of pornography has been increasingly 
politicized. As Downs points out, branches of the American Civil 
Liberties Union in both Minneapolis and Indianapolis reacted 
violently to the proposed feminist ordinances, “denouncing them 
as assaults on the very foundations of free speech.” At the same time, 
activists for the ordinances “espoused largely monolithic 
interpretations of pornography, so public debate assumed an ‘all or 
nothing’ quality.” These “emotional, symbolic, and polarizing 
stands” render public discussion almost impossible (Downs, 1989, 
p. xvii). 
One interested policy actor in the debate over the pornography 
issue has been the Freedom to Read Foundation, which has taken 
up  a number of cases challenging the constitutionality of anti- 
obscenity ordinances. In 1984, for example, the foundation filed a 
friend-of-the-court brief on behalf of the Indiana Library Association 
and the Indiana Library Trustees Association in the case of American 
Booksellers Association, Znc., et al., u. William Hudnut,  ZZZ, 598 F. 
Supp. 1316 (S.D. Ind. 1984). Hudnut, mayor of Indianapolis, supported 
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the ordinance in that city, unlike Mayor Donald Fraser who vetoed 
a comparable ordinance in Minneapolis. The foundation also filed 
a brief the following year when the ABA u. Hudnut case was appealed 
in the Seventh Circuit Court 771 F. 2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), which, 
like the court of original jurisdiction, ruled the ordinance 
unconstitutional, a decision affirmed by the Supreme Court. Through 
this and similar actions, the foundation, and, in some cases, ALA 
have taken their stance against the chilling effect that may result 
from over-repressive legislation. 
The screening of books for school libraries, the debate over the 
suitability of specific materials for a student curriculum, or the effort 
to delimit the production and dissemination of pornography or 
obscenity are all examples of regulative censorship; as such they are 
matters that can be publicly scrutinized and, depending on one’s point 
of view, supported or attacked. But existential censorship is not so 
easily identified, operating in a covert manner and in some cases 
protected by one of the most powerful shibboleths of all times, the 
concept of “national security.” A particularly virulent form of 
existential censorship has been the so-called Library Awareness 
Program, which is still occasioning national press coverage and 
attention. 
THELIBRARY PROGRAMAWARENESS 
Instigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the U.S. 
Department of Justice, visits by federal agents were paid to specialized 
scientific and technical libraries in search of information about 
foreign nationals capable of exploiting these collections for the use 
of Soviet intelligence services. 
Among the first to blow the whistle on these activities was Paula 
T Kaufman, then acting university librarian at Columbia University. 
On June 7, 1988, two FBI agents approached a clerical staff member 
of the Mathematics/Science departmental library at Columbia. 
Within a few days, Kaufman met with the agents herself, at which 
time they alerted her to what has subsequently been called the Library 
Awareness Program, an investigative device through which federal 
agents seek information on foreign threats to American national 
security. Citing violations of First Amendment guarantees to protect 
the right of patron privacy, the laws of New York State which 
guarantee anonymity to library users, and university policies inimical 
to such revelations, Kaufman refused to cooperate. 
A front-page story in the New York Times, “Libraries Are Asked 
by FBI to Report on Foreign Agents,” published on September 18, 
1987, was among the first of many articles in the national press that 
were, for the most part, sympathetic to the rights of library users 
and laudatory of the librarians’ resistance to the program. An early 
report of the Office of Intellectual Freedom of the American Library 
MOLZ/CENSORSHIP: CURRENT ISSUES 29 
Association cited FBI inquiries besides Columbia in the following 
institutions: New York University; George Mason University; 
Pennsylvania State University; the State University of New York at 
Buffalo; and the Universities of Maryland, Kansas, California at Los 
Angeles, Michigan, Houston, Cincinnati, Utah, and Wisconsin; the 
Broward County (Florida) Public Library; the Brooklyn Public 
Library; the New York Public Library; and the Information Industry 
Association (“FBI Library Program Still in Crossfire,” 1988, p. 113). 
On May 17, 1988, William Sessions, FBI director, testified before 
the Senate Judiciary Committee as part of an FBI oversight hearing. 
At that time, Sessions presented an unclassified report entitled “The 
KGB and the Library Target: 1962-Present,” in which the bureau 
alleged that agents of the Soviet Intelligence Services (SIS) had been 
using American technical libraries for subversive purposes since 1962. 
According to Sessions, the Library of Congress, scientific and 
technical sections of public libraries, specialized departments of 
university libraries, and large information clearinghouses had all been 
prominent targets of the SIS intelligence collection effort (U.S. Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, 1988, p. 4). 
Although many contemporary news accounts date the beginnings 
of the Library Awareness Program to the 1960s, there is evidence 
to suggest that i t  (or at least some form of a prototype) has a much 
earlier provenance. Through the courtesy of one of my Columbia 
colleagues, I received a copy of a letter obtained through the Freedom 
of Information Act. The letter, dated September 25, 1941, is signed 
by E. E. Conroy, special agent in charge of the Newark (New Jersey) 
FBI. In the four-page document, Conroy informs the FBI Director, 
J. Edgar Hoover, in Washington of a suggestion “which could be 
of value to the Bureau in connection with its National Defense 
investigations.” The suggestion arose in a conversation between a 
bureau special agent (name deleted) and an employee (name deleted) 
of the Newark Public Library, who “stated that their library, together 
with other business libraries, has a world of information concerning 
the United States, some of which she feels would be most valuable 
to a person bent on subversive activities.” Such information included 
data concerning Army and Navy contracts, locations of manufacturing 
plants, and their ability to generate products. She further advised 
the agent that “often times suspicious persons come into the library 
and ask for information of this type.” The library employee also 
said that libraries could take “the names and addresses of all persons 
desiring information of a particular type,” and i f  this procedure 
proved undesirable, names and addresses could be obtained on a 
register “with appropriate notations by the librarian as to the kind 
of information requested by each individual.” T h e  library 
representative is further quoted as having “stated that she felt that 
if the Bureau would explain the situation to all libraries and request 
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that they do what has been set forth in this letter that they would 
be more than glad to do so.” In addition, she furnished the agent 
a list of the business and technical departments in the major public 
libraries of the country, including among others those of Baltimore, 
Boston, Cleveland, Hartford, Los Angela, Nashville, New York City, 
Pittsburgh, Providence, and San Francisco. Special Agent Conroy 
included the list, with addresses, in his letter to Hoover. He also 
noted that in the case of plant explosions it would prove particularly 
helpful to the bureau to have lists of the names of all persons who 
had done “considerable readmg” on explosives. In concluding his 
letter, Conroy commented that these library registers “may prove 
valuable to the Bureau in investigations of espionage and sabotage.” 
The exchange of correspondence between Conroy and Hoover 
suggests another example of distinctive regime values. Consider the 
date of the letter: September 25, 1941. The United States is poised 
on the brink of a world conflict; Hitler’s armies portend great 
destruction to the democratic ideal; England, our natural ally, is 
already at war and France has already surrendered. Small wonder 
that the employee in the Newark Public Library was offering her 
assistance to the national defense effort. 
A half-century in time separates this unidentified 1940s’ librarian 
from the present generation of her peers. It is almost unthinkable 
that any librarian today would give similar advice to an FBI agent. 
The reasons for this reversal are many and complex, but some are 
suggested by Evelyn Geller in her work on library censorship. Geller 
traces the growing liberalism of the library profession from 1876, 
the year of the ALAS founding, to 1939, the year in which the Library 
Bill of Rights was adopted by the association. Eschewing its original 
censorial stance of forbidding the inclusion of certain books in library 
collections, the profession gradually adopted a more open stance and 
came to the defense of works that in earlier periods would probably 
not have been added. Geller (1984) attributes this change in part 
to “a new perspective [that] meshed freedom with the advocacy of 
a host of democratic values-civil liberties, pacifism, antifascism, 
racial equality” (p. 164). 
The adoption of governmental loyalty oaths following World 
War I1 also contributed indirectly to the liberalization of the library 
profession. In 1947, the same year which witnessed the establishment 
of the National Security Council, President Truman issued Executive 
Order 9835 creating the Federal Employees Loyalty Program, a device 
by which the patriotism of government employees could be probed. 
State loyalty programs were also begun. Among those heard in 
excoriation of these measures of dubious constitutionality were the 
librarians (“It is the Loyalty Oaths that are Subversive,” 1950, p. 
82; Berninghausen, 1950, pp. 16-17; “ALA Resolution on Loyalty 
Programs,” 1950, p. 306). The subsequent witchhunts carried out 
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by Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin, in which innuendo and 
allegation were used to discredit innocently accused persons, were 
also resisted by library leaders. The then prevailing climate of fear 
and repression occasioned the publication of the Freedom to Read 
statement in May 1953 by the Westchester Conference of the ALA 
and the American Book Publishers Council, a statement subsequently 
revised in 1972 and adopted by many national organizations (ALA 
Office for Intellectual Freedom, 1983, pp. 77-91; Moore, 1971, pp. 
1-17). 
The Cold War, which dominated and indeed ironically fueled 
the worst excesses of the McCarthy era, continued to cast its influence 
on the activities of the federal government. Secrecy became more 
pervasive and it  was systematized and bureaucratized in many ways, 
including surveillance, classification, intelligence and counter-
intelligence, and covert operations. Although unaccountable 
government as revealed in the disclosures of the Watergate scandals 
ultimately brought Richard Nixon to resignation, the Irangate or 
Iran-Contra affair seems to have little damaged the popular estimate 
of President Reagan’s Administration. 
THEPRICETAGOF PUBLICINFORMATION 
Central to the current unrest expressed by many civil libertarian 
groups and representatives over the increasingly repressive apparatus 
of government is the role of information (see ALA, 1988; Benton 
Foundation Project ..., 1989; Demac, 1984; Demac, 1988; Curry, 1988; 
Katz, 1987; Pell, 1984). Not only are the interests of various political 
administrations best served by keeping the operations of their 
governments secret, in part through the absence of information and 
in part through deliberate misinformation, the interests of the 
information capitalists also have a stake in its control. Jansen perceives 
this latter development as a contributory factor in the growth of 
existential censorship. She argues that the classic liberal model of 
democracy was based on a concept of knowledge as a public good. 
“Even the much criticized Utilitarian image of a ‘free-market of ideas’ 
protects the belief that access to knowledge is a right rather than 
a privilege,” she comments, but that right is currently being 
threatened by the growing recognition that knowledge should be 
regarded now as a commodity. Hitherto regarded as communal 
property, knowledge can only produce profit when: (1) i t  is removed 
from the public sphere, and (2)when the channels available for its 
distribution are limited. Since the new information capitalists have 
vested interests in keeping information privileged, they have brought 
pressure on the federal government to limit its supply. Since 1980, 
federal information policy has been shaped by at least eight responses 
to this economic pressure. Drawing largely on the earlier research 
of Donna Demac, Jansen lists these as follows: (1) “deregulation” 
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has eliminated much of the responsibility of private industry to report 
to the government; (2) information gathered and analyzed by the 
federal government for local governments has been curtailed; 
(3)  classification of government documents has been made more 
stringent; (4) information made available through the Freedom of 
Information Act has been made more expensive; ( 5 ) the number and 
volume of publications available from the Government Printing 
Office have been reduced, and decisions concerning future 
publications have been made contingent on cost; (6)prior censorship 
has been invoked over the writings and publications of over 100,000 
current or former government officials; (7) access to nonstrategic 
scientific and technological information produced in universities 
under government contract has been reduced; and (8) cuts have been 
made in the budget of the Library of Congress affecting its services 
to users (Jansen, 1988, p. 169), and one could, in addition, cite the 
continuing Reagan Administration posture of no fiscal support for 
federal library programs. Literally hundreds of supporting examples 
for Jansen’s iteration have been identified by the ALA Washington 
Office in their serial publication, “Less Access to and Less Information 
by and about the U.S. Government,” now in its fifteenth semi-annual 
number (ALA Washington Office, 1990). 
There are those who would, of course, question alluding to the 
Reagan Administration’s efforts at privatizing information as 
censorship, but in Jansen’s words, “the marketplace of ideas is no 
longer a public utility which serves all who seek its goods. Increasingly 
it  becomes a private enterprise which serves only those who can afford 
to pay a price for the commodities it markets to citizen/shoppers” 
(Jansen, 1988, p. 168). The threat to that very marketplace was the 
rationale for the establishment of the Coalition on Government 
Information in 1986, a coalition initiated by ALA members and 
headquartered at the ALA Washington Office. This federation of 
some fifty organizations serves as a clearinghouse “to collect and 
disseminate information about attempts to limit the right to know 
and to ensure that member organizations are aware of actions which 
might result in a reduction of access to government information 
(Coalition of Government Information, n.d.). Among the concerns 
of its members are the cessation of statistical compilations published 
by the federal government, the contracting out of federal libraries, 
the repressive classification of government documents inhibiting 
historical research, the questionable requirement that federal 
employees should sign lifetime prepublication contracts, and the 
revision of OMB Circular A-130 which places untoward responsibility 
on the U.S. Office of Management and Budget for the development 
of government-wide information policy. 
Whether or not the member organizations of the coalition agree 
with Jansen that censorship is “the knot that binds power and 
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knowledge” in the current economy, they are all aware that during 
the 1980s the notion of information as a public good and the concept 
of assuring equitable access to information/knowledge came not only 
under review but also, and more unfortunately, under attack. 
That attack has come for the most part from a conservative 
regime, and the dichotomy separating the values of conservative and 
liberal regimes can serve as a useful device to inform our dialogues 
about censorship. It influences almost every instance of proscription 
cited in the newspaper or broadcast over the airwaves. Should arts 
and humanities projects supported by federal funds be subjected to 
prior censorship? Should the FBI’s surveillance of the users of 
scientific libraries have been extended to the very librarians who 
resisted the investigation and rose to the support of the privacy rights 
of their patrons? Are objections to such books as T h e  Catcher zn 
t he  R y e  or T h e  Grapes of Wrath really based on their alleged profanity 
or obscenity or do such objections mask deeper community concerns 
that are more difficult to express (Honan, 1989; People for the 
American Way; L. F. Crismond, personal communication to S. J. 
Markman, Dec. 1, 1989; Mydans, 1989)?As distinctive as each of these 
questions is, they are all marked by invisible Maginot lines separating 
the left from the right. 
At this writing, i t  is impossible to foresee any resolution of this 
dichotomy, one which has deep roots in the American ethos, but 
it is important to realize that what distinguishes this dualism from 
similar ideological differences in past eras of American history is 
the celerity with which the censorious power of liberalism’s critics 
grows. In quoting from Thomas Jefferson, Walter Karp observes: 
“Every government degenerates when trusted to the rulers of the people 
alone,” Jefferson warned us two centuries ago, and “even under the 
best forms, those entrusted with power have, in  time and by slow 
operations, perverted it into tyranny,” The operations are no  longer 
slow. They have become ominously swift, and they leave us no time. 
(Demac, 1988, p. xii) 
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The New Age Rage and Schoolbook Protest 
EDWARDB. JENKINSON 
ABSTRACT 
EXPLORES“MYTHS, LEGENDS, and misunderstandings” surrounding 
attempts to remove textbooks and library materials from public 
schools, reviews related legal decisions, and presents conclusions on 
the schoolbook protest movement that are based on seventeen years 
of studying the issues involved. 
INTRODUCTION 
Myths, misconceptions, and misunderstandings surround the 
public schools. These can serve as the basis of attempts to remove 
textbooks and library books, courses, and teaching methods. They 
can become planks in platforms for potential school board members. 
They can even be perpetuated by administrators, librarians, and 
teachers who object to the inclusion of certain materials in classrooms 
and libraries. 
During the seventeen years that this author has studied “the 
schoolbook protest movement,” the following myths, legends, and 
misunderstandings were discovered. 
1. 	 T h e  belief that  all schools and all courses are alike. Thus, if values 
clarification is included in the curriculum in school A ,  some critics 
think that i t  must be in schools B, C, andD. If an allegedly “sexually 
explicit” film is shown in school J, then citizens might challenge 
its use in schools K ,  L, and M .  The facts may be that the film 
would not be labeled sexually explicit by more than a handful 
of people and that i t  was never seen by students in any of those 
schools. 
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2. 	 T h e  m y t h  that students accept uncritically all that is included 
in any book but especially in a textbook. This myth encompasses 
the belief that teachers teach every page of a textbook, that they, 
too, are uncritical of its contents, and that most schools use exactly 
the same textbooks. Some critics of the schools are convinced that 
textbooks exert tremendous influence on children. Two of the 
leading textbook protesters in the United States have expressed 
their creed in these two statements: “Until texts are changed we 
must expect a continuation of the present epidemic of promiscuity, 
unwanted pregnancies, VD, crime, violence, vandalism, rebellion, 
etc.” (Gabler & Gabler, 1981). “TEXTBOOKS mold NATIONS 
because textbooks largely determine HOW a nation votes, WHAT 
it becomes and WHERE it  goes” (Gabler). Those same protesters 
for years have singled out one particular textbook in their speeches 
leading listeners to believe that i t  is in nearly every elementary 
school in America and helping to perpetuate the myth that all 
schools use the same books. But, at its peak, that textbook captured 
only 4 percent of the school market, and i t  has been out of print 
for more than a decade (Hefley, 1976, p. 122). 
3. 	T h e  m y t h  that anything that is in a book is endorsed by the  school 
s y s t em.  According to this belief, if a book contains any 
“objectionable” language, the school endorses that language. If 
a character in a novel or short story lies or steals, i t  is alleged 
that the school system sanctions those activities because school 
officials permitted the book to be in the library or classroom. 
4. T h e  m y t h  that all teaching is indoctrination. Some schoolbook 
protesters seem to believe that whatever teachers talk about in class, 
they want students to believe. Thus if teachers explain communism 
or socialism, they allegedly want students to accept those forms 
of government. In the case of books, poems, stories, plays, and 
songs, it is alleged that whatever an author, poet, lyricist, or 
playwright includes in a work is there to be taught, to be spread 
through indoctrination. Thus a nationally prominent minister 
charged that the public schools “were teaching pure Communism, 
Red Chinese style” because he found in one story in a course on 
global education a lttle Chinese girl who revered Chairman Mao 
and memorized his sayings. Apparently the reverend thought that 
the readers were expected to do the same. (The Reverend Greg 
Dixon is pastor of the Indianapolis Baptist Temple and former 
national secretary of the Moral Majority. He and this author have 
debated 12 times including appearances on the Today show and 
other television programs broadcast from Indianapolis and 
Bloomington, Indiana. He made the charges quoted here in 
television appearances and in a formal debate sponsored by the 
Indiana State Teachers Association.) 
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The minister also declared in several speeches, debates, and 
sermons that “public schools encourage children to commit 
suicide.” One basis for his charge was that a music teacher allowed 
students to bring their favorite music to class as a reward for their 
performance in a concert. One student brought the theme song 
from M*A#S*H* which contains the line, “Suicide is painless.” 
The minister charged that public school teachers are working with 
environmentalists to reduce the population so that there will be 
enough clean air and water for an overpopulated planet at the 
turn of the century. 
5 .  	T h e  misconcefition that a hook should be judged equally by 
external factors and its contents. Schoolbook protestors frequently 
cite an author’s background and politicai and religious affiliations 
as sufficient reasons to reject a book. Some of the protestors care 
little about what is actually in the book itself; in fact, some do 
not bother to read books they consider to be objectionable. Instead, 
they concentrate on the author’s activities and/or affiliations or 
on what someone else has said about the book. Thus it  is not 
uncommon for a book to be condemned by a person who has 
neither read i t  nor, in some cases, actually seen it. 
6. 	T h e  m y t h  that “alien” religions have invaded the  schoolhouse. 
Several of the major organizations protesting books and courses 
have declared that, since the Supreme Court “threw prayer out 
of” public schools, students are being indoctrinated in the religions 
of secular humanism, New Age, and globalism (this charge will 
be examined later in this article). 
Misunderstandings about academic freedom also abound. They 
stem partly from the fact that some teachers think they are free to 
teach anything in any manner they deem fit. On the other hand, 
some critics believe that public school teachers may teach only what 
is in a textbook-and nothing else-in the manner prescribed in the 
teacher’s manual. Both are wrong. 
Teachers should be “aware of the relationship between the 
particular materials or teaching methods employed and the course 
being taught. If methods or materials are completely unrelated to 
course objectives, their use would not be viewed as legally protected” 
(McCarthy& Cambron, 1981, p. 49). Noting that the courts have treated 
academic freedom for public school teachers as more of a protected 
“interest” than a “right,” Martha McCarthy and Nelda Cambron 
caution that the courts have preferred to view each case individually. 
“Therefore, teachers must rely on the various judicial decisions for 
general guidance only” (p. 49). 
The courts have frowned upon teachers who have departed from 
their assigned subject matter or who use unacceptable teaching 
methods. For example, the courts held that a teacher could not discuss 
sex in an all male speech class (State ex rel. Wasilewski u. Board 
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of School Directors), that a teacher could not talk about politics in 
an economics class (Ahern u. Board of Education, 1971), that a teacher 
could not express his disapproval of ROTC in an algebra class 
(Birdwell u. Hazelwood School District, 1972), and that teachers have 
no constitutional rights to use unorthodox teaching methods (Adams  
u. Campbel l  Coun ty  School District, 1975). But in Keefe u. Geanakos, 
the court held that a teacher had been improperly dismissed for 
assigning an Atlantic M o n t h l y  article that contained a taboo word. 
The court concluded that the principles of academic freedom 
embodied in the Constitution barred the teacher’s dismissal (Keefe 
u. Geanakos, 1969). In its decision, the court included this quotation 
from the Supreme Court case of W i e m a n n  u. Updegraff (1952): “Such 
unwarranted inhibition upon the free spirit of teachers affects not 
only those who...are immediately before the Court. It has an 
unmistakable tendency to chill that free play of the spirit which 
all teachers ought especially to cultivate and practice ....” 
In Parducci u. Rut land ,  1970, pp. 352-58), a high school teacher 
of English was dismissed for being insubordinate when she refused 
to comply with her superiors’ orders that she never again teach Kur t  
Vonnegut’s short story, “Welcome to the Monkey House.” Two of 
the administrators in the school district called the story “literary 
garbage,” and they claimed that its “philosophy” favored killing 
old people and practicing free sex. They also told the teacher that 
three students asked to be excused from the assignment and that 
several parents complained about the story. When the teacher &d 
not follow the administrators’ orders, the school board dismissed her 
on the grounds that the story had a “disruptive effect” on the school 
and that she had refused “counseling and advice of the school 
principal” and was therefore guilty of “insubordination” (Parducci 
u. Rut land ,  1970, pp. 353-54). 
The court upheld the teacher’s right to teach the story and denied 
the school board the right to dismiss her. The court found that the 
story was appropriate for high school juniors and that it was not 
obscene. The court also noted that Vonnegut was not advocating 
the kil l ing of the elderly but that  he was satirizing the 
depersonalization of man in society (pp. 355-56). 
In a significant case involving the academic freedom of secondary 
school teachers, Judge Richard P. Matsch wrote: 
To restrict the opportunity for involvement in an open forum for the 
free exchange of ideas ...would not only foster an unacceptable elitism, 
it would also fail to complete the development of those not going on 
to college, contrary to our constitutional commitment to equal 
opportunity. Effective citizenship in a participatory democracy must not 
be dependent upon advancement toward college degrees. Consequently, 
it would be inappropriate to conclude that academic freedom is required 
only in the colleges and universities (Bob Cary, et al. v .  Board of 
Education, 1977, pp. 945-56). 
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Judge Matsch noted that if teachers must follow only the wishes 
of the majority as reflected by the school board and school authorities, 
the result would be tyranny. “The tyranny of the majority is as 
contrary to the fundamental principles of the Constitution as the 
authoritarianism of an autocracy” (p.952). 
During seventeen years of studying the schoolbook protest 
movement, this author has made a number of discoveries-discoveries 
that other scholars probably made years before-and has drawn some 
conclusions that may be worth sharing. 
First, parents have the right to know what their children read 
and study in school. As a parent, I believe there is an obligation 
to keep informed about what my children are studying in school 
and what they are reading both for school and on their own. But 
I also believe that my parental rights extend solely to my own children. 
Therefore, if I should decide that my children should not read a 
particular novel in English class, for example, I believe that I have 
the right to ask for an alternate assignment. But I do not believe 
that I should demand that no student in the class or in the school 
can read the book. However, if I am very upset about the novel, 
I have the right to challenge i t  so that i t  can subjected to 
reconsideration by a duly authorized committee that will report to 
the school board. But i t  should be the recommendation of the 
reconsideration committee and the decision of the school board- 
not my opinion-that would precipitate the novel’s removal from 
the school. Other parents should also have the right to object to, 
or to endorse, the novel before final action is taken on it. 
Second, citizens who object to a text or library book should read 
it. I am appalled by the number of people who object to books and 
courses without knowing anything about them except that “they 
are bad.” Such people rely on others for their information. What 
is most unfortunate is that some administrators and school board 
members have agreed with the protestors and have removed books 
without reading them. 
Third, to prevent the kind of removal described earlier, all school 
systems must have established policies for selecting classroom and 
library materials and must have procedures for handling complaints. 
Several years ago, I carefully examined 222 sets of policies and 
procedures for school systems in Indiana. I believe that my findings 
are applicable to all states. It was discovered that less than 15 percent 
of the school systems had both policies and procedures that protected 
intellectual freedom and, at the same time, guaranteed a fair hearing 
to all who might protest. In many instances, school systems had edited 
documents such as the Library Bill of Rights and procedures for 
handling complaints (published by the National Council of Teachers 
of English or some other professional organization) so that they would 
neither be controversial nor strong. In a few cases, the school systems 
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had simply removed any statements that mght be considered 
controversial. As a result, what was left almost guaranteed success 
for the protestor. 
Fourth, according to the results of surveys conducted by Lee 
Burress, professor of English at the University of Wisconsin at Stevens 
Point, parents file the majority of complaints about books. Then 
come administrators, teachers, clergymen, librarians, English 
department chairpersons, school board members, and students 
(Burress & Jenkinson, 1982). An emerging group consists of 
“concerned citizens” who may or may not have children in school 
but who belong to organizations that plan to “clean up” the schools. 
Organizations proliferate. In a book that I wrote a decade ago, 
it was stated that I could name at least 200 organizations at the state, 
local, and national levels that, among other things, protest school 
textbooks, courses, and library books. Now I believe that there are 
more than 2,000 such organizations because of the ever-increasing 
number of local affiliates of the Eagle Forum, Concerned Women 
of America, Citizens for Excellence in  Education, National 
Association of Christian Educators, the John Birch Society, and other 
state and national organizations. 
Fifth, closet censorship is everywhere. Examples abound. An 
English department chairperson locked up all classroom sets of 
Steinbeck’sOf Mice and M e n  because he read that it had been removed 
from a high school in another state. Members of his department had 
taught it without complaint for more than a decade. A librarian 
decided not to order a replacement copy of She1 Silverstein’s Where 
t h e  Sidewalk Ends because of a complaint in a neighboring district. 
An administrator quietly told a teacher that it would be prudent 
for her to remove several novels from her recommended reading list 
because of objections he had heard about (for additional examples, 
see later discussion). 
Sixth, the number of incidents of schoolbook protest seems to 
be rising. During the early seventies, approximately 100were annually 
reported to the American Library Association’s Office for Intellectual 
Freedom. By 1976, the number had risen to slightly less than 200 
and climbed to nearly 300 in 1977 (Indianapolis Star, 1978, p. 1; Los 
Angeles T imes ,  1978, p. 1). Shortly after the 1980 presidential election, 
Judith F. Krug of the ALA reported a fivefold increase in incidents 
reported to her office. She later revised her estimate to a threefold 
increase, which would mean roughly 900 reported incidents a year 
(Krug, 1983). 
But reported incidents are only a small part of the attempts to 
remove school materials and methods. Very early in this study, I read 
an article by a librarian in Wisconsin who estimated that, for every 
incident reported in the newspapers or to a professional organization, 
at least twenty-five go unreported. After talking with teachers, 
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librarians, and administrators in meetings ,in more than forty states, 
I believe that for every reported incident of censorship at least fifty 
go unreported. 
Seventh, approximately 95 percent of the schoolbook protests 
studied have been precipitated by persons who would be classified 
as being on the far right politically. Protest comes from the left as 
well. Several years ago, two school librarians in Indana reported 
two incidents that merit mentioning here. The first involved a 
directive from a school administrator ordering the librarian to search 
the shelves for any books unfavorable to blacks and to remove them. 
Her carefully drafted response to the directive pointed out that, if 
she searched the shelves for books that might be construed to have 
statements offensive to any group, the library’s shelves would be 
decimated, at least. She then pointed out that teachers can teach 
children how to handle such books, and that such handling is the 
hallmark of an educated person. 
In the second incident, a local group requested that the librarian 
remove all of the “Little House” books since they contain sexist 
stereotypes. She refused to comply with the request. 
The principal of the Mark Twain Junior High School in Fairfax 
County, Virginia, removed T h e  Adventures of Huckleberry F inn  from 
the school because he charged that i t  was racist. He had done the 
same thing when he worked in a school in Illinois. But the school 
board in Virginia restored the Mark Twain classic to the school named 
for the author. 
Individuals and groups that could be classified as being on the 
left have protested such works as To Kill a Mockingbird,  Daddy Was 
a Numbers  Runner,  Mary Poppins ,  Back to  School w i t h  Betsy, and 
the Harlequin romances. They have also protested plays such as S h o w  
Boat and T h e  Merchant of Venice which they charge are offensive 
to one group or another. 
Eighth, when this author first began to study the schoolbook 
protest movement, an attempt was made to identify the major 
objections of the protestors. After three years of study, twenty-five 
such objections were discovered; today there are more than 200. The 
following forty are the most common: 
1. 	“Education in human sexuality, including pre-marital sex, 
extramarital sex, contraception, abortion, homosexuality, group 
sex and marriages, prostitution, incest, masturbation, bestiality, 
divorce, population control, and roles of males and females; sex 
behavior and attitudes of student and family” (Schlafly, 1984, 
appendx B). 
2. 	“Values clarification, use of moral dilemmas, discussion of 
religious or moral standards, role-playing or open-ended 
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discussions of situations involving moral issues, and survival 
games including life/death decision exercises” (Schlafly, 1984, 
appendix B). 
3. 	Courses on drug and alcohol abuse. 
4. Preventive guidance programs, 	especially those that include 
“contrived incidents for self-revelation; sensitivity training, group 
encounter sessions, talk-ins, magic circle techniques, self-
evaluation and auto-criticism; strategies designed for self-
disclosure (e.g., zig-zag)” (Schlafly, 1984). 
5. 	Programs that enhance self-esteem. 
6. “Death education, including abortion, euthanasia, suicide, use 
of violence, and discussions of death and dying” (Schlafly, 1984). 
7. 	“Organic evolution, including the idea that man has developed 
from previous or lower types of living things” (Schlafly, 1984). 
8. 	Stories about, or discussions of, the supernatural, the occult, 
magic, witchcraft, Halloween, etc. 
9. “Autobiography assignments; log books, diaries, and personal 
journals” (Schlafly, 1984). 
10. “Anti-nationalistic, one-world government 	or globalism 
curricula” (Schlafly, 1984). 
11. World geography if there is mention of “one worldism.” 
12. Histories that mention the United Nations, that refer to this 
country as a democracy instead of as a republic, that point out 
weaknesses in the founders of this nation or in any of the nation’s 
leaders. 
13. 	Human development and family development programs usually 
taught in home economics classes. 
14. Novels, stories, poems, or plays that portray conflicts between 
children and their parents or between children and persons in 
authority. Also, literary works in which children question the 
decisions or wisdom of their elders. 
15. 	Literary works that contain profanity or any “questionable” 
language. 
16. Literary works that contain characters who do not speak standard 
English. Such characters, it is alleged, are designed by the authors 
to teach students “bad English.” 
17. Black literature and black dialect. 
18. 	Literary works and textbooks that portray women in  
nontraditional roles (anything other than housewife and mother). 
On the other hand, some feminist groups object to illustrations 
in basal readers and other textbooks that show women in the 
so-called traditional roles. 
19. Mythology-particularly if the myths include stories of creation. 
20. 	Stories about any pagan cultures and lifestyles. 
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21. The humanities. 	 Several organizations have objected to the 
humanities because they “are part of the religion of secular 
humanism.” The groups also reject “humanistic education” for 
the same reason. 
22. Passages that describe sexual acts explicitly or passages that refer 
to the sex act. 
23. Invasions 	 of privacy. Any questions, theme assignments, or 
homework that asks students to examine their personal 
backgrounds-e.g., family, education, religion, childhood 
experiences. 
24. Literature 	 written by homosexuals, literature written about 
homosexuals, any favorable treatment of homosexuals. 
25. Books and stories that do not champion the work ethic. 
26. Books and stories that do not promote patriotism. 
27. Negative statements about parents, about persons in authority, 
about the United States, about American traditions. 
28. Science fiction. 
29. Works of 	 “questionable writers.” Writers so labeled include 
Langston Hughes, Dick Gregory, Richard Wright, Malcolm X, 
Eldridge Cleaver, Joan Baez, and Ogden Nash. 
30. “Trash.” Examples: 	 T h e  Catcher in the Rye, Go Ask Alice, 
Flowers for Algernon, Black Boy, Native Son, Manchild in t h e  
Promised Land ,  T h e  Learning Tree, Black L i k e  Me ,  Daddy Was 
a Numbers  Runner,  and Soul on Ice. 
31. Any books or stories that do not portray the family unit as the 
basis of American life. 
32. Critical thinking skills. 
33. Books and stories that are perceived to be unfavorable to blacks. 
34. The use of masculine pronouns to refer to both male and female. 
35. News stories that deal with the harsh realities of life-war, 	 crime, 
death, violence, and sex. 
36. Magazines that contain advertisements for alcoholic beverages, 
birth control devices, or trips to countries like Cuba. 
37. The swimwear issue of Sflorts Illustrated. 
38. Nudity. Examples: the little boy in Maurice Sendak’s I n  the  N i g h t  
Kitchen and reproductions of paintings showing half-clad gods 
and goddesses. 
39. Depressing thoughts and negative statements about anything. 
Two of the most prominent schoolbook protestors objected to 
the inclusion, in a basal reader, of P. T Barnum’s statement, 
“There’s a sucker born every minute,” because it is a depressing 
thought. Those two protestors also have a special category for 
negative thoughts in their guidelines for reviewing textbooks. 
40. Any psychological or psychiatric method practiced in the public 
schools. Any psychological principle used in teaching. 
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At least a dozen of the targets listed can be placed under the 
umbrella charge of secular humanism. During the last decade, the 
religion of secular humanism, which is commonly and inten tionally 
confused with humanism by ultra-conservative schoolbook protestors, 
became a major objection of organizations critical of public school 
teaching materials. 
The charge i s  that secular humanism is faith in man instead 
of faith in God and that the tenets of secular humanism are spread 
throughout the schools in all subjects. The Supreme Court allegedly 
“ruled” that secular humanism is a religion with these words in 
a footnote in the case of Torcaso u. Watkins (1961): “Among religions 
in this country which do not teach what would generally be considered 
a belief in the existence of God are Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, 
Secular Humanism and others.” 
Tim LaHaye, a California minister and a founder of the Moral 
Majority, attacks humanism in his best-selling books, sermons, 
speeches, and television appearances. In T h e  Battle for the Mind  
(1980), he declared: “Most of the evils of the world today can be 
traced to humanism, which has taken over the government, the UN, 
education, TV, and most of the other influential things of life” (p. 
9). In T h e  Battle for the  Public Schools (1983), LaHaye charged that 
humanists have invaded public classrooms, brainwashing children 
with ideas about evolution, sex, death, socialism, internationalism, 
and situation ethics. Humanists, according to the writer of the “battle” 
series, are “secular educators who no longer make learning their 
primary objective. Instead our public schools have become conduits 
to the minds of youth, training them to be anti-God, antimoral, 
antifamily, anti-free enterprise, and anti-American” (p. 13). LaHaye 
lists these “hallmarks” of secular humanism: the look-say method 
of reading, values clarification, death education, global education, 
evolution, sex education, total reading freedom, the “negation” of 
Christianity in the schools, and socialism-among others (LaHaye, 
1983, p. 13). 
But, regardless how much is written about secular humanism 
and how many definitions are circulated, i t  is interesting to note 
that few persons in local school districts can define the religion of 
secular humanism even though they believe i t  is corrupting youth. 
One organizer of parent protest groups defined the religion on a 
national television program as “the philosophy of anything goes” 
(Janet Egon of Parents of Minnesota, Inc., on the MacNeil-Lehrer 
Report,  February 20, 1980). Another school critic told a school board 
that humanism is the “belief that i f  something feels good, do it.” 
Others believe that the Supreme Court established secular humanism 
as the religion of the public schools when it  “removed God” from 
classrooms in the case of Abing ton  u. Schempp.  That belief is 
supported by Senator Jesse Helms (1979), who wrote: 
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When the U.S. Supreme Court prohibited children from participating 
in voluntary prayers in public schools, the conclusion is inescapable 
that the Supreme Court not only violated the right of free exercise of 
religion of all Americans; it also established a national religion in  the 
United States-the religion of secular humanism. (p. 4) 
Secular humanism as the alleged religion of the schools has been 
taken to court four times. In the first case, Grove v. Mead School 
District (1985), a parent in the State of Washington claimed that 
the school system promoted the religion of secular humanism by 
allowing an English teacher to have his students read and discuss 
Gordon Parks’s The Learning Tree in an elective course. After the 
teacher had given the plaintiff’s daughter an alternate assignment, 
the mother filed a complaint against the book, seeking its removal 
from the school. The reconsideration committee approved the book 
and the teacher’s syllabus, and the school board voted to keep both 
the course and the book. The mother then took her case to federal 
court. 
The district court judge dismissed the suit without a trial. The 
plaintiff appealed the decision, and the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals upheld the lower court, finding no violations of either the 
establishment or free exercise clauses of the First Amendment. The 
Supreme Court denied certiorari, thus upholding the appellate court 
decision. 
The second case, Bob Mozert, et al. v. H a w k i n s  County Board 
of Education (1987), started out as a case against secular humanism 
and the violation of First Amendment rights of the plaintiffs. But 
when the district court dismissed the suit without trial, the plaintiffs 
amended the complaint and appealed to the circuit court which 
remanded the case for trial by the district court. Humanism became 
only one of seventeen categories of objectionable ideas that the 
plaintiffs charged offended their “sincerely held religious beliefs.” 
The case involved a series of basal readers in grades one through 
eight, and the judge said the plaintiffs had so many objections to 
the stories and poems in the readers that he ordered the school system 
to allow the children to “opt out” of reading class and be taught 
at home. The circuit court reversed the decision, and the Supreme 
Court denied certiorari. 
At first examination, Edwards v. Aguillard (1987) does not seem 
to be about secular humanism. But evolution, the issue in the case, 
is considered a hallmark of secular humanism. Louisiana had enacted 
a law that called for the balanced treatment of evolution with creation 
science. The lower courts held the teaching of creationism to be a 
violation of the First Amendment establishment clause, and the 
Supreme Court upheld the lower courts. The Court noted that the 
Louisiana legislature “sought to alter the science curriculum to reflect 
endorsement of a religious view that is antagonistic to the theory 
of evolution” (p. 592). 
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The fourth case, S m i t h  u. Board of School Commissioners of 
Mobile Coun ty  (1987), ultimately became a clear-cut decision about 
secular humanism. Originally, the case involved Alabama’s school 
prayer law which the district court judge upheld as constitutional. 
When his decision was reversed, he realigned the parties and 
conducted a trial on the religion of secular humanism. The new 
plain tiffs charged that the state advanced the “anti-religious’’ religion 
in forty-four textbooks in science, social studies, and home economics. 
The judge restrained and enjoined all parties named in the suit from 
using the books except as a “reference source in a comparative religion 
course that treats all religions equivalently” (p. 989). He ordered the 
Alabama State Board of Education not to furnish the listed books 
to any school system. His decision prompted an immediate outcry 
throughout the nation with attorneys noting that this was the first 
case in which a federal judge censored books. Members of the new 
religious right celebrated the decision, but their joy  was shortlived. 
The circuit court of appeals reversed the judge’s decision, and the 
plaintiffs did not appeal to the Supreme Court. 
Those four decisions were cheered by many advocates of First 
Amendment rights who thought that secular humanism as an issue 
was no longer defensible. However, the secular humanism charge 
is far from dead. In the meantime, two other so-called religions- 
New Age and globalism-have moved to center stage. 
In Gibson County, Indiana, three teachers joined four other 
women to form a group dedicated to removing a thinking skills 
program from the public schools. The seven women believe that these 
three exercises in Tactics for T h i n k i n g  (1986), a critical thinking 
skills program published by the Association for Supervision and 
Curriculum Development, could cause students to fall into hypnotic 
trances: 
1. 	 Have students focus their attention on some stimulus (e.g., a spot 
on the wall). Explain to them that you want them to focus all 
of their energy for about a minute and ask them to be aware of 
what i t  is like when they are trying to attend to something. 
2. 	 Again have students attend to some stimulus for a short period 
of time. However, this time have them identify the physical 
characteristics they associate with raising their energy level (e.g., 
sit up straight, raise your head off your neck). 
3. 	Have students practice the attention control process periodically 
throughout the day (p. 11). 
The seven women tied Tactics to the New Age Movement and 
to globalism, both of which they maintain are religions that have 
invaded the public schools. They charge that these religions are 
attempting to impose one religion and one government on the entire 
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world. By making a highly emotional case against Tactics, they 
succeeded in removing it  from one of the two school systems in which 
they launched their full-scale attack. 
Tactics also fell to a group of irate citizens in Battle Ground, 
Washington, for its alleged New Age connections (Hoskins, 1987, 
p. 2). In Putnam City, Oklahoma, one woman objected to PUMSY, 
a self-help, decision-making program used by one elementary school 
counselor. She described one activity in which the student is told 
to relax and imagine walking in a meadow and gazing into a pond. 
She charged that using such “mind pictures” is a tool of occultists 
and New Age believers. She also objected to the suggestion that 
students were to listen to their inner voices. Even though the 
reconsideration committee found nothing wrong with PUMSY, the 
school board voted 3-2 to remove it from the school (Letters to the 
Editor, 1989). 
Those are only three incidents involving New Age and/or 
globalism. Others will definitely follow since books denouncing both 
are being hurried into print. For example, Texe Marrs’s first book, 
Dark Secrets of the New Age (1987), was so successful (my copy is 
from the sixth printing) that he had a second, Mystery Mark of the 
New Age (1988), ready for publication one year later. 
Each of the books denouncing the New Age states directly or 
implies that New Age (and/or secular humanistic or globalistic) ideas 
pervade public school classrooms. The message is clear: anything 
that can be labeled New Age is evil. And the New Age mission is 
to work toward control of the world through a one-world religion 
and a one-world government. But the books do not make i t  clear 
how New Age and globalism operate since there is no central 
headquarters, since everything from channeling through holistic 
health to UFOology has been labeled New Age, and since many so-
called New Agers do not even know they are New Agers. (It must 
be noted again that many teachers who were accused of being secular 
humanists did not know the term.) 
One theologian critical of the New Age noted: 
As a working definition, the New Age Movement is a broad coalition 
of various networking organizations that (a) believe in a new world 
religion (pantheism), (b) are working for a new world order, and 
(c) expect a New Age Christ. Of course not all who participate in the 
New Age Movement are necessarily conscious of all these aspects. (p. 82) 
But books accusing New Agers and global educators of spreading 
their religions in the schools continue to be published. Here are 
just a few: 
William M. Bowen, Jr. (1984). Globalism: America’s Demise. 
Shreveport, LA: Huntington House. 
Constance E. Cumbey. (1983). T h e  Hidden Dangers of the Rainbow. 
Shreveport, LA: Huntington House. 
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. (1985). A Planned Deception: The  Staging of 
a New Age “Messiah.” East Detroit, MI: Pointe Publishers. 
Douglas R. Groothuis. (1986). Unmasking the New Age. Downers 
Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press. 
Dave Hunt. (1983). Peace, Prosperity, and the Coming Holocaust. 
Eugene, OR: Harvest House. 
Texe Marrs. (1987). Dark Secrets of the New Age. Westchester, IL: 
Crossway Books. 
.(1988).Mystery Mark of the New Age. Westchester, 
IL: Crossway Books. 
H. Edward Rowe. (1985). New Age Globalism: Humanist Agenda 
for Building a New World Without  God. Herndon, VA: Growth 
Publishing. 
Charges that the public schools are advancing a religion- 
be i t  secular humanism, globalism, New Age, or something else- 
will continue into the next century. Why? If critics of the public 
schools can convince the courts that the schools are violating the 
establishment or free exercise clause of the First Amendment, then 
the critics can expect the courts to make one of two decisions: 
(1) to order the schools to stop teaching any of the tenets of the 
religion, or (2) to order state, local, and national governments to 
provide equal funds to private schools for their religions. 
New religions will be named. As recently as May 1989, the 
Reverend Dr. D. James Kennedy, pastor of the Coral Gables (Florida) 
Presbyterian Church, announced on his national television program 
that psychology is a religion. It seems that as long as the religion 
charge excites followers, critics will continue to use i t  effectively, 
and some school boards will respond to the charge by removing books, 
courses, and other teaching materials willy-nilly. 
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Moral Autonomy, Censorship, and the 
Enlightened Community 
DAVID WEISSBORD AND PAULMCGREAL 
ABSTRACT 
INLIGHT OFTHE WAVE of attacks on constitutional freedoms and rights 
in the 1980s, i t  is perhaps an opportune moment to reflect on the 
arguments offered in support of broad discretion granted to local 
school boards in determining the contents of school library shelves. 
Students, especially those in secondary school, are guaranteed 
constitutional rights; those rights, however, are balanced against the 
competing interests of a community in general or a school board 
in particular. In this article we will examine this balance as it has 
been struck in the courts and we will argue that a more enlightened 
conception of community interest would involve narrower discretion 
in school board and community actions. 
INTRODUCTION 
There are three ways in which the government may manipulate 
a library’s holdings. First, a librarian, school board, or local 
government can create a biased literary selection in its libraries 
through the systematic addition of books catering to a particular 
ideological perspective (hereinafter referred to as the “addition 
problem”). Through careful forethought, government can prevent 
politically and socially “incorrect” ideas from entering libraries in 
the first place, hence avoiding the need to engage in noticeable and 
controversial removal of those books at a later date. The industrious 
government censor can avoid public clamor against the librarian’s 
actions if he/she can plan ahead and carefully screen books he/she 
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finds objectionable. The efficient censors are thus rewarded for their 
efforts with little or no public opposition. (The conscientious censor 
has also been rewarded by the United States Supreme Court. In Board 
of Education u. Pico, Associate Justice Brennan stated that the 
addtion of books to libraries did not present constitutional problems 
as did the removal of books from libraries. For an article that shows 
the logical inconsistency of Brennan’s position see Van Gee1 [1983]. 
“The Search for Constitutional Limits On Governmental Authority 
to Inculcate Youth.”) The addtion problem-because it occurs 
continuously, gradually, and covertly-poses an insidious threat to 
our libraries and liberties. 
A second type of manipulation is the labeling of books and other 
library material by the government (hereafter referred to as the 
“labeling problem”). The labeling problem occurs when the 
government attempts to characterize the content of a book or issues 
a warning with regard to its subject matter. By labeling such material, 
the government maintains the appearance of noncensorship since 
the material remains available to the public, while sending a message 
that the public interprets as official disapproval. (An example of such 
government action is the Foreign Agents Registration Act [FARA] 
which allows the Department of Justice to label some foreign material 
entering the United States as “political propaganda.” What FARA 
in fact does is to allow the government to place a non-neutral label 
on foreign films entering the United States. The label of political 
propaganda is to be given to all foreign films “reasonably adapted 
to ...p revail upon, indoctrinate, convert, induce, or in any way 
influence a recipient or any section of the public ...with reference 
to the political or public interests, policies, or relations of a foreign 
government or political party or foreign policy of the United States” 
[Tribe, 19881. In popular usage, “propaganda” has a much more 
negative connotation than the standard in FARA. Lawrence Tribe 
of Harvard Law School finds FARAs labeling provision troublesome 
because “the word ‘propaganda’ has long been an explosive, value- 
laden term with such pejorative connotations that the registration 
process necessarily does more than simply label the source of a film 
of foreign origin; rather, i t  almost certainly discourages audiences 
from viewing the film by branding tit as a product of half-truths 
and distortions” [p. 8101. The FARA label stigmatizes a work with 
an apparent mark of official government disapproval.) 
A third type of manipulation is the removal of books from library 
shelves (hereafter referred to as the “removal problem”). Selective 
addition and removal can be differentiated on the basis of the effect 
they have on public attitudes. With removal, the public knows what 
material has been removed because the government’s actions are 
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affirmative and overt. The result is that specific material (the removed 
material) is branded with the official stamp of government 
disapproval. Thus the full effect of removal may be to close off a 
large segment of the population from the removed material. The 
perceived evils of the material may generate the attitude either: 
(1) that the government would not have removed the material if i t  
was worth reading, or (2)that since the government does not approve 
of the book, I should not read it, even if I want to: if I do read 
it I might be labeled subversive or anti-American. While some 
educated adults may be able to assess critically and reject the 
government’s actions, impressionable children and less informed/ 
concerned individuals may uncritically accept the government’s 
assessment of the removed material. 
Selective addition, on the other hand, works no such broad 
slanting of public perception. The public still has access to the 
material not selectively added; however, there is no longer the stigma 
of seeking material banned by the government as there is with the 
removal problem. We believe that removal poses a greater magnitude 
of harm because it  carries the added threat of a de facto complete 
removal of the material that is not a danger with selective adhtion. 
Some instances of removal, or what is in many cases outright 
banning, of books have culminated in landmark legal cases. Some 
of these cases provide an excellent starting point and context for 
an extended analysis of the rather uneasy balance struck between 
community interest and individual liberty. These cases raise 
fundamental questions concerning the very nature and function of 
school libraries in our society and they help to more clearly define 
the role of school libraries in maintaining a fully functioning 
representative democracy with an electorate capable of full and 
meaningful political participation. 
THECASES 
In Evans u.Selma U n i o n  High School (Bosmajian, 1983, pp. 
3-5), the California State Supreme Court decided that a high school 
district was permitted to purchase twelve copies of the Bible in the 
King James version for the Selma Union High School Library. The 
plaintiff claimed that the King James version of the Bible is a book 
of sectarian character and, as such, should not be purchased for the 
library of a public school. It was argued that purchase of i t  would 
be contrary to constitutional provisions against discrimination or 
preference and against public aid of any religious sect, church, or 
creed. And i t  was argued that such purchase would be contrary to 
statutory provisions in the state prohibiting use, or distribution, of 
any publication of a sectarian, partisan, or denominational character. 
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The court argued, however, that the King James version of the Bible 
was not sectarian but was, instead, a “widely accepted translation 
of the Bible,” a “recognized classic” of literature (p. 4). More 
important, the court noted the following: “The mere act of purchasing 
a book to be added to the school library does not carry with ii any 
implication of the adoption of the theory or dogma contained therein, 
or any approval of the book itself, except as a work of literature 
fit to be included in a reference library” (p. 5). This work’s classic 
stature and widespread approval and readership were taken as 
sufficient evidence of what constitutes “fitness” or “appropriateness.” 
In subsequent cases, we see less consensus on the question of a book’s 
status and a corresponding argument to prevent a book’s appearance 
on library shelves. 
In Rosenberg v. Board of Education of City of New York 
(Bosmajian, 1983, p. 5), the New York Supreme Court decided that 
Oliver Twist and T h e  Merchant of Venice cannot be banned from 
New York City schools, libraries, or classrooms. There were three 
main grounds adduced for the ruling: (1) there is a “public interest 
in a free and democratic society [based upon free inquiry and learning 
that] does not warrant or encourage the suppression of any book 
at the whim of any unduly sensitive person or group of persons, 
merely because a character described in such book as belonging to 
a particular race or religion is portrayed in a derogatory or offensive 
manner” (p. 5). The exception noted is when a book is written 
maliciously with the purpose of promoting “bigoted hatred” against 
a particular racial or religious group. (2) If evaluation of any literary 
work were based on a requirement that i t  be free from derogatory 
reference to any religion, race, and so on, endless litigation would 
probably ensue. (3) Censorship and suppression are not particularly 
effective at removing religious and racial intolerance; in fact, they 
may lead instead to “misguided readings and unwarranted inferences” 
(p. 5). Arguing that there was no “substantial reason” which would 
compel the suppression of the two books, the court found that the 
Board of Education acted in the best interests of the school system. 
What constitutes an “unduly sensitive person” is left unclear, 
as is what would constitute a “whim” of such a person. When does 
a whim become a good argument? When does an unduly sensitive 
person become a reasonably tolerant but reasonably offended one? 
How does one determine authorial intent to malign? Should intent 
be necessary, or could we reasonably point to consequences (i.e., to 
the fact that persons are maligned)? These are questions that become 
central in subsequent cases. 
In President’s Council u. Community  School Board (1972), we 
see the convening of the first federal court ever to adjudicate the 
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conflicting claims of high school students and a local school board. 
The case concerns the removal by a school board of Down These 
Mean Streets, a novel by Piri Thomas in which there is a violent 
and ugly depiction of a Puerto Rican youth growing up  in the East 
Side barrio of New York City. There are descriptions of criminal 
violence, sex, and drug shooting; the presumed educational value 
of the work (in this educational setting) is to acquaint the 
predominantly white, middle-class junior high school students of 
Queens with the harsh life in Spanish Harlem (Bosmajian, 1983, 
p. 18). The school board removed the book in light of complaints 
from parents that the vulgar language and explicit sexual descriptions 
in the book would have an adverse moral and psychological effect 
on eleven- to fif  teen-year-old children. The plaintiffs (parents, 
teachers, and children) challenged this action in federal district court 
claiming that there was a violation of their First Amendment rights 
and arguing that the book was valuable educationally and had no 
adverse effect on the development of the children. The court rejected 
the plaintiffs’ claims and asserted that the school board had acted 
permissibly. The court reasoned that the board had not prohibited 
the book’s discussion in class, parents could borrow the book for 
their children, and there was only a “miniscule” intrusion of the 
board on any First Amendment constitutional right (Bosmajian, 1983, 
p. 19). The issues in this case are complex and space does not allow 
a detailed comment. Some of the claims made in various petitions 
for a writ of certiorari are noteworthy-although the writ was denied. 
It is to those claims we now turn. 
SOME SALIENT REASONS FOR AND OFFERED 
AGAINSTGRANTINGTHE WRIT 
1. The U.S. Supreme Court ought to decide to what extent school 
professionals should be at the mercy of politically responsible lay 
boards of education in determining what their students may read, 
learn, and have access to in the schools. 
2. 	Parents, students, and professionals ought to be able to rely on 
the judiciary when school libraries are stripped of politically 
disfavored books by a shifting majority of the school board. 
3. 	The federal courts ought to prevent our nation’s schools from 
becoming instruments of majoritarian propaganda. 
4. Constitutional principles of academic freedom limit the power 
of school boards even over allegedly educational matters. 
5.  	The removal of the book deprived students of their First 
Amendment right to know. 
6. 	The students claim no unqualified First Amendment right of access 
to books but make, instead, three claims: (a) they no longer have 
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access to a book previously available to them; (b) their right to 
know has been impaired; and (c) there is no compelling state 
interest justifying that impairment (pp. 21-24). The unlimited 
power of selection or banning gives the transitory majority of 
a board great opportunities to impose their personal, social, and 
political views on the teachers and public of the school district. 
Dissenting from the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision to deny 
certiorari, Justice Douglas wrote: 
What else can the School Board now decide it does not like? How else 
will its sensibilities be offended? Are we sending children to school to 
be educated by the norms of the School Board or are we educating our 
youth to shed the prejudires of the past, to explore all forms of thought, 
and to find solutions to our world’s problems? (Bosmajian, 1983, p. 35) 
There were fascinating arguments presented in a brief in opposition 
to the petition for certiorari. Some main points included the 
following: 
1. The power of selection of books for educational purposes must 
include the “power to choose between books and to exclude those 
which are found inadequate, irrelevant, or otherwise inappropriate 
for the particular children to be served, and not merely the power 
to exclude those books which have been held to be illegal for 
sale to minors” (Bosmajian, 1983, p. 26). 
2. 	The limitation to the librarian’s right to choose the selection of 
books does not violate the librarian’s professional freedom, as the 
library remained in possession of the book and she may lend it  
to parents who request it. 
3. “That a parent may disagree with that [librarian’s right to choose] 
does not give him a constitutional right to compel the purchase 
or retention of any particular book, or to compel that i t  be available 
directly to students rather than to their parents” (Bosmajian, 1983, 
p. 27). 
4. The students have not been deprived of any “right to know.” 
There has been no ban on the discussion of any field of study. 
5. 	The age of the children (eleven to fifteen) is sufficiently immature 
to warrant some limitation on the kind of books made freely 
available to them (p. 27). 
Minarcini u. Strongsville City School Dist.(Bosmajian, 1983, pp. 
43-47) presents the case of a school board removing Kurt Vonnegut’s 
Cut’s Cradle and Joseph Heller’s Catch-22 from the school library 
against the faculty recommendation that authorized them as library 
books or textbooks. Further, the board passed resolutions limiting 
discussions of the books in class and their use as supplementary 
reading. 
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After a trial in district court, the judge dismissed Minarcini’s 
original complaint finding that the school board’s actions had not 
violated rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 
The case was then appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth 
Circuit. 
The court of appeals sided with the high school students, 
invoking concepts of academic freedom and a First Amendment right 
to know and, correspondingly, to have access to information. The 
students, then, could establish a prima facie constitutional violation 
upon the removal of a book from the school library. 
The court’s discussion of the book banning issue contained 
critical factual information. First, both Minarcini and the school 
district agreed that the banned books were of some “literary value” 
and that none of those books contained “obscenity as defined in 
the Supreme Court’s cases (Miller u. California, 1973). (The Supreme 
Court announced its obscenity standard in the 1973 case Miller u. 
California, 413 U.S. 15: “The basic guidelines for the trier of fact 
must be: (a) whether the ‘average person, applying contemporary 
community standards’ would find that the work, taken as a whole, 
appeals to the prurient interest, . . ; (b) whether the work depicts 
or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically 
defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken 
as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” 
Thus, by conceding that the banned books were of literary value, 
the school district also admitted that the material was not  obscene 
under (c) of the Miller standard.) With these admissions, the court 
had to look in the minutes of the school board’s meeting concerning 
the offending books to find the motivation behind the district’s 
actions. The minutes reflected the school board’s judgment that 
Vonnegut’s writing was “completely sick,” and that the book was 
“written by the same character (Vennegutter) who wrote, using the 
term loosely, God Bless You Mr. Rosewater.” The court concluded 
from these statements that “the School Board removed the books 
because it  found them objectionable in content” (Bosmajian, 1983, 
p. 45). 
Minarcini highlights the conflict that arises in any instance of 
the removal problem: the student’s interest in receiving continued 
exposure to a variety of literary materials is pitted against the 
government’s interest in providing a “proper” education. Each side 
deserves some weight. The pivotal task in evaluating the removal 
problem is to strike the correct balance between student and 
government interests. In the Minarcini case, the school board found 
the banned material to be “objectionable.” In striking a balance, 
we need to examine the substantive content of this “objectionable” 
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standard (e.g., social mores, community values, national standards, 
individual preferences) as well as what variety is sufficient to protect 
students from a “pall of orthodoxy” in school curricula. (Associate 
Justice William Rehnquist of the United States Supreme Court, in 
his dissent in Board of Education v. Pico, infra. [the next removal 
problem case we will look at], used the phrase “pall of orthodoxy” 
to describe the educational atmosphere the government would have 
to create in order for him to feel that students’ interests were being 
harmed.) Further analysis of the student government conflict will 
be delayed until after we review the issues in the first removal problem 
case to come before the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School Dist. v. 
Pic0 (Bosmajian, 1983, pp. 93-118), arose from the attempt by a local 
New York school board to remove books from the shelves of high 
school and junior high school libraries. Several members of the school 
board had attended a conference sponsored by Parents of New York 
United (PONY-U) where they received a list of books that school 
board members described as “objectionable” and “improper fare for 
school students” [emphasis added]. (Associate Justice Brennan’s 
majority opinion in Pic0 described PONY-U as “a politically 
conservative organization of parents concerned about education 
legislation in the State of New York” [Bosmajian, 1983, p. 941). 
However, the school board did “concede that the books [on the PONY- 
U list] are not obscene” (Pico v.Board of Education, 479 F. Supp. 
387, 392 [EDNY 19791). Nine of the books on the PONY-U list were 
found in the Island Trees High School. (The nine books in the high 
school library were: Slaughterhouse-Five by Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.; T h e  
Naked Ape  by Desmond Morris; Down These Mean Streets by Piri 
Thomas; Best Short Stories of Negro Writers edited by Langston 
Hughes; Go Ask Alice of anonymous authorship; Laughing Boy by 
Oliver LaFarge; Black Boy by Richard Wright; A Hero Ain’t Nothin’ 
But a Sandwich by Alice Childress; and Soul on Ice by Eldridge 
Cleaver.) After appointing a committee to recommend to the board 
whether the books on the PONY-U list should be retained, taking 
into account the books’ “ ‘educational suitability,’ ‘good taste,’ 
‘relevance,’ and appropriateness to age and grade level” (Picov.Board 
of Education, 1979, at 857), the school board ignored the committee’s 
recommendation to keep five of the books and ordered all nine books 
removed from school shelves. (Of the other four books, the committee 
recommended that one “be made available to students only with 
parental approval” [Pico u.Board of Education, 1979, at 8581. The 
recommendation of a parental approval condition on book circulation 
can be considered a form of governmental labeling of books.) In 
removing the books, the school board described them as “anti-American, 
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anti-Christian, anti-Semetic [sic], and just plain filthy,” and justified 
their actions by claiming that “it is our [the school board’s] duty, 
our moral obligation, to protect the children in our schools from 
this moral danger as surely as from physical and medical dangers” 
(Pico v .  Board of Education, 1979, Supp. 387, 390 [emphasis 
added]). 
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled, in a confusing plurality opinion, 
that school boards could not remove disfavored books from school 
libraries with “absolute discretion.” The Court, while embracing the 
notion that school boards have a substantial legitimate role to play 
in the determination of school library content, argued that boards 
could not play that role if they did so in a “narrowly partisan or 
political manner” (Bosmajian, 1983, p. 98). The key for the Court 
was in determining the motivation behind the school board’s actions. 
If the board’s intent is to deny students access to ideas with which 
the members of the board disagreed, and if the intent is the decisive 
factor in the board’s decision, then and only then does the board 
violate First Amendment rights of the students. The rationale seems 
to be based on an aversion to “prescribed orthodoxy.” Permitted 
censorship would involve books “pervasively vulgar” or educationally 
unsuitable, not books thought inimical to the board’s moral, political, 
religious, or social taste. (This case did not affect the addition or 
labeling of books but rather concerned solely their removal.) 
The tension between student and governmental interests in 
Minarcini are equally present in Pico. The books in both cases were 
no t  claimed to be obscene (and thus not automatically denied the 
protections of free speech) but only found “objectionable” by the 
members of the school board. The delicate balance implicated in 
Pic0 concerns the extent to which the school board may follow its 
desire to “protect the children in our schools” from “objectionable” 
material before such efforts begin to suppress access to ideas to which 
students have a right. In striking this balance it will again be necessary 
to discuss various interpretations of “objectionable” material, an 
understanding of which will help to delimit the proper boundaries 
of the government’s discretion in cases of the removal problem. (Of 
course this definition will also carry implications for the addition 
problem and the labeling problem, as will be seen later.) 
IMPLICATIONSOF SCHOOL BOOK BANNINGS 
We can learn a lot from the way in which the Pic0 and Minarcini 
courts handled their respective cases. These two cases placed much 
emphasis on the fact that book bannings in school libraries implicate 
questions of education. The courts that have grappled with the 
removal problem have recognized the importance of such libraries 
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to education when they described a school library as a “storehouse 
of knowledge,” “a mighty resource in the free marketplace of ideas,” 
and a place where “a student can literally explore the unknown, 
and discover areas of interest and thought not covered by the prescribed 
curriculum ....Th[e] student learns that a library is a place to test 
or expand upon ideas presented to him, in or out of the classroom” 
(as cited in Minarcini u. Strongsuille School District [Bosmajian, 1983, 
pp. 43-47]). 
School libraries represent a relatively voluntary, informal forum 
(as opposed to the compulsion involved in normal class work) in 
which students may continue their education by seeking out material 
suggested implicitly or explicitly by their formal education. (The 
Minarcini court recognized a function similar to this for libraries 
when it stated that a teacher has a right to express an opinion about 
a book in class and that there exists a corresponding right on the 
part of the student “to hear [the teacher] and to find and read the 
book” [Minarcini,  supra at 5821.) Schools should teach their students 
how to use those “storehouses of knowledge” so that they can expand 
their horizons through independent exploration of library material 
long after the structure of the classroom is gone. If government and 
schools are allowed to manipulate the contents of school libraries 
at will, then students are sent a message that libraries exist solely 
to provide books essential to the immediate educational function of 
their school libraries, and that libraries are not  for after school 
exploration and experimentation. Thus school libraries appear to 
serve a dual function: (1) to provide easy access to materials that 
will supplement students’ immediate education, and (2) to teach 
students how to pursue reading material on their own so that they 
do not feel that a library’s usefulness ends with their formal education 
but, rather, that libraries should serve as one of the foci of their 
ongoing informal education. 
But what should the contents of these libraries be? The foregoing 
suggests that the contents should bear some relationship to the 
mission of education. We shall limit our consideration to a brief 
discussion of the function of education, and thus libraries, as it relates 
to our nation’s commitment to a democratic form of government. 
Education plays a large role in shaping informed citizens. The 
U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized the importance of education 
to the proper functioning of our government. (See e.g., Meyer u. 
Nebraska, 282 U.S. 390, 1923. [“education and the acquisition of 
knowledge as matters of supreme importance”]; A bington SchooZ 
District u. Schempp,  374 U.S. 203, 1963 [“the public schools as a 
most vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic system 
of government”]; Ambach  u.Norwick,  441 U.S. 68, 1789 [as a way 
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of communicating “the values on which our society rests”]; and 
Wisconsin u. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 1972 [“necessary to prepare citizens 
to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political system 
if we are to preserve freedom and independence”].) Without education 
we lack the tools to make use of the choices a representative 
government presents. 
A humanistic education provides an understanding of the 
tradtions and cultures that make up our society, an understanding 
that is crucial to making informed choices in the political arena. 
Essential to a humanistic education are many materials widely 
available to the public only through the country’s libraries. By 
allowing the unfettered removal of such material from our libraries 
we risk an overwinnowing of our libraries and the creation of an 
uneducated, uninformed electorate. If such an electorate were to 
emerge, we would need to fear the decisions of the majority more 
than before, because such decisions would be uninformed and 
uneducated. If such majority decisions became the rule, we would 
have to fear the very majority rule that forms the basis of our 
democratic governmental system. Thus libraries and their role in 
education are critical to the functioning of our government and society 
(McGreal, 1989). (Some of this analysis draws directly from McGreal, 
P. [1989], “‘I Don’t Recall Senator,’ A Critical Analysis of Robert 
Bork’s Neutral Principles Theory” [unpublished manuscript].) 
Our emphasis on providing a broad humanistic education for 
American citizens leads us to object strongly to any removal that 
does not arise from a desire to keep obscene material from younger 
children. The school boards in the Minarcini and Pic0 cases obviously 
felt differently. Both school boards cited a number of different criteria 
for what they felt were “objectionable” books, while agreeing that 
the books in question were not obscene. An analysis of these boards’ 
motivations and goals, as well as the implications of their actions, 
is necessary to understand the harm their actions can inflict on youth. 
We agree with Justice Brennan’s statement in Pic0 that education 
in all its forms is “vitally important ‘in the preparation of individuals 
for participation as citizens’ ” (Pico v. Board of Education, 1979, at 
864). However, agreement ends with Brennan’s next statement that 
such “preparation” includes ‘ “inculcating fundamental values 
necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system’ ” (Pico 
u. Board of Education, 1979, quoting Ambach v. Norwick), and that 
such values include “community values” as well as “respect for 
authority and traditional values be they social, moral, or political” 
(Pzco u. Board of Education, 1979, quoting Brief for Petitioners). 
Where we advocate a broad, humanistic education for the proper 
preparation of informed citizens, Brennan argues that each 
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community must be allowed to inculcate students with its own values 
in order to promote democracy. And, of course, Brennan’s narrower 
view of education implies a narrower selection of material to 
supplement that education in our libraries. 
Other than citing Supreme Court precedent, Brennan offers little 
or no argument in support of his finding that community values 
are the proper subject of primary and secondary education. But we 
need not end the discussion with Brennan’s silence. Patrick Devlin 
(1959) takes up the subject in his article “Morals and the Criminal 
Law.” 
Devlin’s “Morals and the Criminal Law” was written mainly 
as a reply to the Wolfenden Report, also known as the Report of 
the Committee on Homosexual Offenses and Prostitution. Devlin 
asks “what part of the moral law should be embodied in the criminal” 
(p. l ) ?  Devlin’s project becomes relevant to our immediate task when 
we rephrase the question as “what part of a community’s morals 
should be embodied in our children’s education?” Keeping the 
rephrased question in mind, we will explore Devlin’s article, searching 
for arguments that support inculcation of community values. 
Devlin’s theory of community is stated very concisely in one 
paragraph. 
society means a community of ideas; without shared ideas on politics, 
morals, and ethics no society can exist. Each one of us has ideas about 
what is good and what is evil; they cannot be kept private from the 
society in which we live. If men and women try to create a society in 
which there is no fundamental agreement about good and evil they will 
fail; if, having based it on common agreement, the agreement goes, the 
society will disintegrate. For society is not something that is kept together 
physically; i t  is held by the invisible bonds of common thought. If the 
bonds were too far released the members would drift apart. A common 
morality is part of the bondage. The bondage is part of the price of 
society; and mankind, which needs society, must pay its price. (p. 10) 
Devlin concludes from the above that “societies disintegrate from 
within more frequently than they are broken u p  by external pressures. 
There is hsintegration when no common morality is observed and 
history shows that the loosening of moral bonds is often the first 
stage of disintegration, so that society is justified in taking the same 
steps to preserve its moral code as it does to preserve its government 
and other essential institutions” (Devlin, 1959, p. 13). Devlin’s theory 
of community reduces to the view that “deviation from a society’s 
shared morality ...[is] capable in [its] nature of threatening the 
existence of society ...” (p. 13n). 
The analogy from Devlin to education becomes apparent when 
we recall the motivation of the school boards in removing books. 
Devlin would probably argue that education, and libraries that serve 
that purpose (and we cannot forget that nonschool libraries serve 
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the important function of informal, continuing self-education), 
should be used to inculcate the community’s shared values lest that 
community loosen its moral bonds and disintegrate from within. 
Under Devlin’s argument, banning books that are “objectionable,” 
or against the community’s shared values, is necessary to the survival 
of the community itself. The marketplace of ideas represented by 
libraries becomes the marketplace of “shared ideas” necessary to 
strengthen the bonds of society. 
One reason we find Devlin’s argument problematic is because 
of an unexplained assumption: that there exist shared ideas of a 
community. Devlin’s assumption is difficult to maintain in a society 
that is irreducibly diverse such as the United States. Perhaps a 
majority’s views ought to be considered the consensus. But such a 
reply assumes the legitimacy of the majority’s authority to make such 
a decision, which is one of the initial questions posed by the removal 
problem. The reply also brings us to Devlin’s contention that 
enforcement of community values is necessary for the continued 
existence of society. 
Also implicated in this critique is Justice Brennan’s assertion 
that “respect for authority and traditional values, be they social, 
moral, or political,” are “fundamental values necessary to the 
maintenance of a democratic political system” (Pic0 u. Board of 
Education, 1979, quoting Ambach u. Norwick and Brief for 
Petitioners). However, Brennan recently upheld the right of 
individuals to burn the flag, an act that would seem to run contrary 
to respect for authority and traditional values. If education has as 
its purpose to foster that respect, then those who burn flags appear 
to have been failed by American education as Brennan conceives it. 
Wouldn’t prohibiting flag burning then also promote the respect 
for authority Brennan sees as so necessary to democracy? Are Brennan’s 
positions in Pic0 and the flag burning case reconcilable on this point? 
It is rather odd that the Constitution would protect conduct (flag 
burning) that works against the values necessary to the maintenance 
of a democratic political system. The above indicates either that flag 
burning .should thus be considered an insidious threat to the 
maintenance of democracy in America, or that an education that 
fosters Brennan’s values is not necessary in maintaining our 
government. 
In his article “The Search for Constitutional Limits on 
Governmental Authority to Inculcate Youth,” Tyll van Gee1 (1983) 
presents convincing empirical and theoretical arguments that refute 
Brennan and Devlin (pp.262-88).In Ambach u. Norwick, the Supreme 
Court cited several studies in support of its assertion that schools 
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properly inculcate students. Interestingly, the relevant portions of 
this work contradict the Court’s finding. For example, Dawson and 
Prewitt (Pic0 u. Board of Education, 1979) argue at one point that: 
It is doubtful ...that basic political loyalties and attachments are 
substantially developed or altered through such formal civic education. 
If the civic training in the curriculum is inconsistent with what is learned 
about the political world from adults, peer groups, and other agents 
of political socialization, i t  may not be very effective. (p. 152) 
One of the Court’s authorities suggests that we should be more 
concerned with setting good examples for our children in the political 
realm than with teaching them what they should do. 
Patrick Devlin’s argument that society is held together by shared 
values is met and turned back by several studies discussed by Van 
Geel. The first study, by Ronald Rogowski, draws from economic 
utility theory. Rogowski argues that a person will choose to support 
the present form of government over alternative forms of government 
only if the present form of government maximizes her expected utility. 
(This notion is consistent with John Rawls’s difference principle, 
according to which social and economic inequalities are just if and 
only if such inequalities give rise to advantages [expected and real] 
of the representative person in the least well-off group in society 
[see Rawls, 19711.) Individuals derive a measure of utility from 
outcomes that they desire. Many favorable outcomes will all have 
positive utility values. 
Under Rogowski’s theory, the cement that holds the bonds of 
society together is expected utility and not shared ideas. The utility 
maximization theory depends on individuals being self-interested 
actors. For such individuals to maximize their expected utility, they 
would have to be within a government that allows the greatest 
probability of (freedom to pursue) their preferred outcomes. 
Rogowski’s theory implies that a community is held together by 
assuring freedom to pursue personal preferred outcomes rather than 
Devlin’s idea of emphasis on shared ideas. 
If freedom is one of the elements that holds society together, 
then we should be concerned about preparing our young to use that 
freedom wisely. For this task, access to varied forms of human discourse 
and ideas is necessary. And this education should begin as early as 
possible. 
SOMETENTATIVECONCLUSIONS 
Students are recognized to have a legitimate claim to First 
Amendment rights. The nation, individual states, local communities, 
and individual school boards are thought to have a legitimate 
indoctrinative interest in permitting, and in some cases encouraging, 
public schools to transmit particular values to its students. Judicially, 
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the problem has been one of developing a coherent doctrine under 
which the various fact patterns could be subsumed. There have been 
commentators who have suggested that this lack of coherence reflected 
a fundamental incompatibility of First Amendment values and the 
values basic to public education; that what was most basic was the 
indoctrinative character of education; and that the U.S. Supreme 
Court ought to recognize the priority of education’s mission whenever 
that mission is to be weighed against First Amendment rights. 
(Tussman [1977] argues that the state has an important “teaching 
power” which involves inducting children into the community, and 
thereby makes notions such as children’s free speech or state 
ideological neutrality irrelevant and condemns the Supreme Court’s 
T i n k e r  and Barnette opinions as “weaken[ing] the tutelary power 
of public authority” [pp. 51-85, 1671. Diamond [1981] argues that 
the Court is wrong in trying to reconcile public education with First 
Amendment values because the school’s indoctrinative functions 
should preclude recognition of children’s first amendment rights. 
Goldstein [ 19761 argues that the scope of permissible state 
indoctrinative interests in public education should preclude any in- 
class expressive activity by teachers that is contrary to the wishes 
of the school authorities [taken from Kamiat, 1982/83, p. 4991.) Other 
commentators, supported in part by the Minarcinz and Pic0 lower 
court decisions, have argued that, in such a conflict, library censorship 
violates a student’s individual right to have access to information 
or that censorship is unjustified given its “chilling effect” on the 
overall in-school expression of students and teachers. 
Proponents on each side of this debate, however, attempt to 
validate their position on the strength of an appeal to an ideal of 
communal self-government. If indeed there is such an (often tacit) 
appeal, the question becomes more readily defined: namely, is 
emphasis on individual rights or community indoctrinative interest 
the best means of attaining the end of communal self government? 
If indeed communal self government is and ought to be the end 
toward which both a healthy respect for fundamental liberties and 
justificatory indoctrinative interest can be invoked, then part of our 
problem is solved. 
This claim, of course, is rather controversial. Many proponents 
of the Bill of Rights adopt a much more individualistic and atomistic 
perspective, arguing that liberties are basic given the nature of the 
individual and her capacities (e.g., a Kantian approach), or that 
fundamental rights ought to be respected given the beneficial 
consequences to the greatest number of individuals over time (a variant 
of rule utilitarianism). Interestingly, though, each approach can be 
employed by those who argue for an ideal form of communal 
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self-government. However, one might remain agnostic on the question 
as to whether Kantian or utilitarian grounds are more justifiably 
invoked to support basic rights so long as the ultimate foundation 
for such rights rests on a vision of communal self-government, moral 
education, and the value of self-direction and respect for various 
conceptions of the good. 
Justice Brennan, in his plurality opinion in Pico, claimed that 
the “public schools are vitally important in the preparation of 
inhviduals for participation as citizens” and, in that very sentence, 
continues by noting that the schools are also important “as vehicles 
for inculcating fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of 
a democratic system” (Bosmajian, 1983, p. 95). Here, for the first 
time in these cases, we see judicial recognition of the view that 
participation as citizens and maintenance of a democratic system are 
the basis for evaluating conflicting claims. But, of course, how much 
weight one gives to participation or system can shift the balance 
in these censorship cases. We have seen some ways in which one 
may emphasize one value or the other. The central question to ask 
about this conflict in values is: “to what end participation or system?” 
or “according to what criteria may we resolve this set of conflicting 
values?” 
We would argue that this entire debate ought to be seen in light 
of one fundamental value: moral self-dnection and self-expression. 
Rather than thinking of all values as subordinate to communal self- 
government (Kamiat, 1983), we would suggest all values, including 
communal self-government, should be seen as often a necessary means 
to moral autonomy, responsibility, and expression. (This claim is 
somewhat stronger than that of Rosemarie Tong’s: “To the degree 
that we are able, we are required to take part in governing ourselves. 
We must do so not only because values such as justice, freedom, 
minority rights, and even life itself will be protected only if people 
are vigilant and active, but also because such participation is a form 
of moral self-expression. By thinking and speaking, by deciding and 
acting, we reaffirm that we are morally responsible persons” [Tong, 
1986, p. 1351.) In this way there is a self-sustaining dialectic of civic 
action and participatory community building that would nourish 
freedom and moral equality and create the context within which 
moral self-expression can take place. (The goal, then, would be to 
create a form of political community similar to that sketched by 
Benjamin Barber [1984, chs. 8 8c 91.) 
The main problem, then, rests in deciding how one ought to 
adjudicate the type of conflict evident in the kinds of cases discussed 
earlier. Let’s focus on the Pic0 decision to see how the aforementioned 
considerations could be used in arguing the case for the students. 
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The U.S. Supreme Court’s plurality opinion in Pic0 maintained 
that there are “special characteristics of the school library” that limit 
the state’s pursuit of indoctrinative interests. Such limitations may 
not be evident in curriculum decisions; but the library has a unique 
role to play in providing a context for student freedom “to test or 
expand upon ideas,” for the “fostering [of] individual self- 
expression,” and for “affording public access to discussion, debate, 
and the dissemination of information and ideas” (Bosmajian, 1983, 
pp. 96-99). Now one might argue (as the Court in part does) that 
the above benefits of an unfettered library collection and the general 
access to ideas make “it possible for citizens generally to exercise 
their rights of free speech and press in a meaningful manner” 
(Bosmajian, 1983, p. 97). Or one might argue (as the Court in part 
does) that “such access prepares students for active and effective 
participation in the pluralistic, of ten contentious society in which 
they will soon be adult members” (Bosmajian, 1983, p. 97). The first 
appeal (to the freedom to exercise rights of free speech) is just to 
assume that such rights, if not absolute, should always trump state 
interests. That, however, is to beg the fundamental question at stake 
in these cases and, as such, is an unsatisfactory way to proceed. The 
second appeal (to preparation for active and effective participation 
in a pluralistic and contentious society) is not question begging but 
is, nonetheless, inadequate. For it remains to be shown whether in 
fact an unfettered library collection would best accomplish that goal. 
It would seem equally plausible to assume that the transmission of 
societal values through a careful censorship policy in the schools 
would equally serve the end of “active and effective participation.” 
If, however, we shift the focus away from those two concerns 
to a conception of moral flourishing for which a societal context 
is created, it becomes, or so we would argue, harder to maintain 
that censorship is justified. There is both individual and community 
benefit in respecting each person’s attempt at (moral) self-realization 
and conception of good: individual benefit insofar as individuals are 
given a context in which autonomous moral agency and self-direction 
are viewed as central to moral growth; collective benefit insofar as 
the community is more likely to progress and flourish with morally 
self-realized individuals. Individuals and communities are more likely 
to realize these ends by affording students: (1) exposure to a vast 
range of (of ten competing and potentially subversive) ideas, and 
(2) experience with autonomous choice. Such access to ideas and 
experience with choice are important means to the limited goal of 
communal self-government and are a vital means to the more 
expansive goal of moral self-realization. If the preceding consider- 
ations are compelling, it would follow that future court adjudication 
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in school library censorship cases ought to focus more on the value 
of moral development and less on the virtue of participatory 
government. 
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The Ethics of Privacy Protection 
James H. Moor 
ABSTRACT 
THECONCEPT OF PRIVACY is a widely accepted legal and moral notion 
but has uncertain legal and philosophical foundations. Prominent 
legal accounts, such as the nonintrusion theory and the freedom 
to act theory, are inadequate. The control of information theory and 
the undocumented personal knowledge theory are philosophically 
better accounts but are open to counterexamples. A restricted access 
theory of privacy is developed and defended. 
INTRODUCTION 
The right to privacy is widely acknowledged and well-supported 
in the United States. Many familiar legal and ethical arguments pivot 
on an appeal to the right to privacy. A charge that a government, 
a corporation, or an individual has invaded someone's privacy is 
regarded as a serious matter. The concept of privacy seems so obvious, 
so basic, and so much a part of American values, that there may 
seem to be little room for any philosophical misgivings about it. 
However, substantial philosophical controversy about the nature of 
privacy exists. The philosophical debate focuses largely on two major 
questions: What is privacy? and Can the right to privacy be 
philosophically justified? 
Given the considerable role that privacy plays in moral and legal 
argumentation, one might expect that assertions about the right to 
privacy are emblazoned in a prominent position in the earliest 
philosophical and legal documents of our nation. However, the right 
to privacy is not explicitly mentioned or clearly discussed in the 
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Declaration of Independence or the Constitution of the United States. 
The Declaration of Independence lists some well-known inalienable 
rights such as life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, but it does 
not mention privacy. The only hint of a concern for privacy occurs 
in the document when the signers mentioned grievances against the 
king such as sending “swarms of Officers to harass our people, and 
eat out their substance.” Of course, i t  is understandable that privacy 
is not discussed in the Declaration of Independence, for the primary 
purpose of this document was, after all, to declare independence and 
not to provide a thorough and well-reasoned philosophical account 
of human rights. 
What is surprising is that privacy is not explicitly mentioned 
in the Constitution of the United States. There are parts of the 
Constitution that support conceptions of privacy. For example, the 
Fourth Amendment states: “The right of the people to be secure 
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall 
issue but upon probable cause....” This amendment provides 
important protection of individuals from government interference 
and surveillance, but it is far from a general statement of the right 
to privacy. Aspects of privacy are supported in other amendments. 
The First Amendment grants the right to peaceably assemble, the 
Fifth Amendment grants a right against self-incrimination, and the 
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from abridging the rights 
of citizens of the United States. But, all things considered, neither 
the Declaration of Independence nor the Constitution provides a clear 
philosophical conception of, or even a solid legal foundation for, 
the right to privacy. 
PHILOSOPHICAL OF SOMELEGALCRITIQUE 
CONCEPTIONSOF PRIVACY 
The concept of privacy has played a large role in legal discussions 
and judgments during the last century. Unfortunately, much of the 
legal work on privacy is either too eclectic, such as William Prosser’s 
(1960) historic list of the various kinds of privacy cases, or too narrowly 
focused, such as the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 and the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, to be philosophically 
revealing. However, some of the classic legal accounts of privacy are 
truly philosophically inspired. Here, attention will be directed to 
the two legal landmarks on privacy that are philosophically richest. 
Privacy as Nonintrusion 
In their famous 1890 Harvard Law Review article, Samuel Warren 
and Louis Brandeis provided a sensible analysis and evolutionary 
justification for the right to privacy. They argued that privacy was 
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an emerging right that needed to be recognized. They claimed that 
common law is not static but undergoes continuing growth as culture 
develops. As they put it: “Political, social, and economic changes 
entail the recognition of new rights, and the common law, in its 
eternal youth grows to meet the demands of society” (p. 75).  This 
was a century ago, and some rather intimidating technology had 
been developed. The distrusted technology then was not the dreaded 
computer but the insidious camera: 
Recent inventions and business methods call attention to the next step 
which must be taken for the protection of the person, and for securing 
to the individual what Judge Cooley calls the right “to be let alone.” 
Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the 
sacred precincts of private domestic life; and numerous mechanical 
devices threaten to make good the prediction that “what is whispered 
in the closet shall be proclaimed from the housetops.” (p. 76) 
For Warren and Brandeis (1984)the right to privacy was not something 
that is found by squinting at the Constitution but by admitting that 
cultural values and new technology play a large role in developing 
new understandings of our rights. They assigned great significance 
to this new right of privacy and treated a violation of privacy as 
a harm worse than some physical injury: 
The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing 
civilization, have rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and 
man, under the refining influence of culture, has become more sensitive 
to publicity, so that solitude and privacy have become more essential 
to the individual; but modern enterprise and invention have, through 
invasion upon his privacy, subjected him to mental pain and distress, 
far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury. (p. 77) 
Warren and Brandeis regarded the violation of a person’s privacy 
as a kind of spiritual harm that should be addressed by the law and 
could not be addressed by then existing laws that focused on material 
damages. 
Though their article is ground breaking and insightful, Warren 
and Brandeis do not provide a clear and explicit account of privacy. 
They cite Judge Cooley’s remark that it is right to be let alone, but 
privacy so analyzed seems both too broad and too narrow to count 
as a successful definition. On the one hand if A approaches B on 
a public street and A asks B what time it is, A has not let B alone 
but neither has A invaded B’s privacy. Striking up a normal 
conversation on a public street is not regarded by most as an invasion 
of privacy. On the other hand, if unknown to B and without B’s 
permission, A looks through B’s personal files, then A has invaded 
B S  privacy, but, strictly speaking, A has let B alone. It is uncertain 
whether Warren and Brandeis thought that actual publication of 
information was required in order to have an invasion of privacy. 
They were concerned, of course, about preventing the publication 
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of gossip. But, in some situations simple eavesdropping without any 
thought of publication is a clear invasion of privacy. Therefore, the 
specific publication of information or passing i t  along in other forms 
is not a necessary condition for an invasion of privacy. 
Privacy as Freedom to Act 
Another philosophical conception of privacy is deeply embedded in 
constitutional law as i t  has developed during the last quarter of a 
century. Privacy is understood in this context as liberty or freedom 
to act in personal matters. The relevant cases considered by the courts 
usually have been about sexual and reproductive freedoms. The most 
famous case in this regard is, perhaps, Roe v. Wade in which a woman’s 
right to have an abortion was successfully argued on the grounds 
of privacy. To understand better how the concept of privacy is 
philosophically connected in constitutional law with sexual and 
reproductive freedoms, i t  is useful to look at the 1965 landmark case 
Griswold u. Connecticut in some detail. In this historic case the 
appellants were Griswold, the executive director of the Planned 
Parenthood League of Connecticut, and Buxton, a licensed physician 
who was the me lca l  director for the league at its center in New 
Haven, Connecticut. They gave married couples advice on preventing 
conception. Fees were normally charged for their services which 
included medical exams and dispensing information about 
contraception and related materials. Their activity was in direct 
conflict with the General Statutes of Connecticut. In §§ 53-32: 
Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the 
purpose of preventing conception shall be fined not less than f i f ty  dollars 
or imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more than one year or be 
both fined and imprisoned. 
And in 54-196: 
Any person who assists, abets, counsels, causes, hires or commands 
another to commit any offense may be prosecuted and punished as if 
he were the principal offender. 
The appellants to the Supreme Court had been found guilty under 
the Connecticut Statutes and had been fined $100 each. Justice 
Douglas, who was philosophically inclined, wrote for the majority 
opinion that overturned the Connecticut statute. Douglas believed 
that privacy is grounded by the Constitution. He said: “[Slpecific 
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by 
emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and 
substance.... Various guarantees create zones of privacy.” Douglas 
asked rhetorically: “Would we allow the police to search the sacred 
precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of 
contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy 
surrounding the marriage relationship” (Grey, 1983, p. 43). Douglas 
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perceived the right of privacy with regard to the marital relationship 
as a deep cultural right predating the Constitution. He proclaimed: 
“We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights- 
older than our political parties, older than our school system.” 
The other justices who agreed with Douglas’s opinion disagreed 
with his justification. Justice Goldberg agreed that: “Connecticut’s 
birth-control law unconstitutionally intrudes upon the right of 
marital privacy” but he argued that i t  is the Ninth Amendment that 
guarantees such privacy. The Ninth Amendment says that the other 
amendments do not exhaust the basic and fundamental rights of the 
people. The Ninth Amendment is a catchall amendment originally 
put forward by James Madison. Madison’s purpose in proposing this 
amendment was to satisfy those who were concerned that no bill 
of rights would be broad enough to specifically enumerate all essential 
rights and that those rights not specifically mentioned might be 
interpreted as being denied. Justice Harlan, who agreed with 
Douglas’s opinion, offered still another interpretation. Harlan agreed 
that the Connecticut statute was an unjustifiable invasion of privacy 
but appealed to the Fourteenth Amendment for support. Specifically, 
Harlan believed the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
was the appropriate basis for overturning the Connecticut statute. 
The due process clause has never been given a clear elaboration and 
it is far from a formula, but roughly the clause has been used to 
protect a wide range of liberties and Harlan maintained, as Justice 
White did as well, that the freedom of a husband and wife to use 
contraceptives is a liberty which requires such protection. 
In light of Griswold u. Connecticut, what should we conclude 
philosophically about the right to privacy? This case demonstrates 
that any constitutional guarantees to the right to privacy depend 
a lot on the eyes of the beholder. Justice Douglas saw privacy in 
the penumbra of the Bill of Rights, Justice Goldberg saw i t  in the 
Ninth Amendment, and Justice Harlan saw it covered by the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The problem with this 
kind of defense of the right to privacy is that some may not see 
it at all. Justice Black, while agreeing with the majority that the 
Connecticut law was offensive, said in his dissenting opinion: “The 
Court talks about a constitutional ‘right of privacy’ as though there 
is some constitutional provision or provisions forbidding any laws 
ever to be passed which might abridge the ‘privacy’ of individuals. 
But there is not.” 
The Griswold decision rests on an even deeper confusion of the 
concept of privacy with the concept of liberty. The real issue in 
Griswold u. Connecticut is the question of whether a married couple 
should have the freedom to obtain information about contraception 
and to use contraceptive methods. All of the constitutional arguments 
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about privacy in this case can be replaced with arguments about 
contraceptive liberty. This liberty can be placed in the penumbra 
of the Bill of Rights or included in the protection of the Ninth 
Amendment, or covered by due process stated in the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Or one might hold that the issue of contraception isn’t 
a constitutional matter at all, and that the people of Connecticut 
should persuade their legislators to repeal such an asinine law. But 
on any of these views the issue remains a question of liberty. Ironically, 
the state of Connecticut could never have enforced this law if i t  were 
violated privately. It was only the public flaunting of the law that 
gave rise to the court case. 
The separation of the concept ‘of privacy from the concept of 
liberty is important because we do not want the right to privacy 
to become a screen to protect truly harmful actions. A married couple, 
A and B, should have a right to privacy, but their privacy does not 
give A the freedom to beat B or B the liberty to poison A or A 
and B the right to torture their children. Distinguishing privacy from 
particular freedoms allows us to argue for privacy without licensing 
abuse. A common motivation for citing privacy in cases like Griswold 
is to protect individuals against intrusive laws for victimless crimes. 
As important as this may be, the conflation of personal freedoms 
with privacy only confuses the discussions of both and can put the 
defense of the important right of privacy in the service of protecting 
violent crimes. 
A PHILOSOPHICALLOOKAT THE CONCEPTOF PRIVACY 
The concept of privacy has been analyzed extensively by 
contemporary philosophers. Philosophers, like everyone, have been 
struck by the broad dissemination and the forceful impact of 
information technology during the last few decades. Therefore, i t  
is not surprising that most contemporary philosophical accounts of 
privacy tie it closely to the concept of information. 
Privacy as Control of Information 
Priuacy is frequently defined in terms of control of information. 
For example, Charles Fried (1984) states: “Privacy is not simply an 
absence of information about us in the minds of others, rather it 
is the control we have over information about ourselves” (p. 209). 
Alan Westin (1967) says that privacy is the claim that individuals 
and groups determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent 
information about them is communicated to others. Elizabeth 
Beardsley (1971) suggests that persons have the right to decide when 
and how much information about themselves will be revealed to others 
(P. 65).  
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Although control of information is clearly an aspect of privacy, 
these definitions emphasizing control are inadequate for there are 
many situations in which people have no control over the exchange 
of personal information about themselves but in which there is no 
loss of privacy. Consider some examples. A can tell B widely known 
personal information about C in a situation in which C has no control 
but in which C suffers no loss of privacy. For instance, in normal 
situations, A can tell B C’s name or where C lives or that C likes 
the Boston Celtics without diminishing C’s privacy. Moreover, if 
control is construed to mean direct, personal control of information, 
then on the control theory of privacy we are giving up privacy 
whenever we tell anyone anything about ourselves if there is no direct 
control over what the other person will do with the information. 
This seems at best counterintuitive. For instance, personal 
information confided to a doctor will be passed on to other doctors 
and to nurses in normal medical practice beyond a patient’s control 
and yet without any invasion of the patient’s privacy. Furthermore, 
because personal information about us is stored in computer 
databases, most of us have no control over how that stored information 
is used. Of course, these data banks are a potential threat to privacy 
if the stored information is improperly released. However, if the 
information in these databases is properly used or, even more clearly, 
not used at all, then privacy is not diminished by the simple lack 
of control over that information. For these reasons the very popular 
control theory of privacy is not an adequate conception of privacy. 
Privacy as Undocumented Personal Knowledge 
An interesting definition of privacy involving information has 
been proposed by W.A. Parent (1983). Parent states: “[Plrivacy is the 
condition of a person’s not having undocumented personal 
information about himself known by others” (p. 346). Parent 
maintains that “personal information” properly refers to facts that 
most people in a given society choose not to reveal about themselves 
(except to friends, family, advisors, etc.) or to facts about which a 
particular person is extremely sensitive and which he therefore does 
not choose to reveal about himself” (pp. 346-47). Parent explains 
that height may be personal information for someone who is ultra- 
sensitive about being short and who tries desperately to conceal his 
actual height even from his closest friends. Parent does not explain 
in detail what counts as undocumented personal information but 
gives as an example of documented information an item in an old 
newspaper. Thus, according to Parent, if A finds out by browsing 
through an old newspaper that B was a convicted felon, then A has 
not invaded B’s privacy for this information is documented. 
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Parent’s definition of privacy focuses on the content of 
information, not the control of information. As a result, his definition 
avoids some of the criticisms of the control theory of privacy. To 
criticize the control theory, Parent imagines a situation in which 
A has a fantastic X-ray device that allows A to look through walls. 
If A aims the machine at B’s house but doesn’t look through the 
machine, then A has deprived B of control of personal information 
but has not invaded B’s privacy (p. 344). In Parent’s example, A 
threatens B’s privacy but has not gained any undocumented personal 
information about B, and so on Parent’s account, B’s privacy remains 
intact. But there are other cases in which Parent’s undocumented 
personal knowledge theory fares less well than the control theory. 
Suppose while B is away from her personal computer, A uses i t  to 
call u p  B’s personal diary and lists the contents of the diary on the 
screen. Also suppose A is distracted so A does not read the screen 
and does not gather any undocumented personal knowledge of B. 
This surely seems to be a violation of B’s privacy and would be so 
classified by the control theory of privacy but not by the 
undocumented personal information theory. 
Parent’s personal information view not only misses some cases 
of privacy violations but also includes some cases which do not seem 
to be privacy violations at all. If in a public meeting A notices that 
B, who happens to be ultra-sensitive about his height, is wearing 
elevator shoes and A concludes that B is short, then A has gained 
some undocumented personal knowledge about B, but clearly A hasn’t 
invaded B’s privacy. If A learns from casual conversation a widely 
known, but undocumented fact that B is an alcoholic, then A has 
gained some undocumented personal knowledge about B,  but again 
A has not invaded B’s privacy. 
Priuacy as Restricted Access 
The conception of privacy that is most defensible is the 
conception of privacy in terms of restricted access. Anita Allen (1988), 
Ruth Gavison, and others have offered variations of restricted access 
definitions. The core idea of restricted access accounts is that privacy 
is a matter of the restricted access to persons or information about 
persons. 
By my definition, an individual or group has privacy in a situation 
if and only if in that situation the individual or group or information 
related to the individual or group is protected from intrusion, 
observation, and surveillance by others. The vague word situation 
was deliberately chosen with the intent that it would range over the 
kinds of states of affairs to which we normally attribute privacy. 
A situation may be an activity in a location such as living in one’s 
home, or a situation may be defined by a relationship such as a 
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lawyer/client relationship or a situation may be the storage and use 
of information related to people such as information contained in 
a computer database. The paradigm example of a private situation 
is a situation in which one is protected from the prying eyes of others. 
Private situations are islands of epistemological sanctuary. 
There are two kinds of private situations-naturally private and 
normatively private. Naturally private situations are situations in 
which people, because of the circumstances of the situation, are 
naturally protected from intrusion or information-gathering by 
others. Thus, if, for example, a family is alone hiking in the woods, 
they are in a naturally private situation. Nobody else is around and 
they are naturally protected by the forest from observation by others. 
Now, if a troop of girl scouts suddenly appears in the woods on 
the trail in front of this family, they lose their natural privacy. The 
girl scouts intrude and observe them. Of course, they are doing 
nothing wrong as they have every right to be there. A loss of natural 
privacy is not automatically an invasion of privacy. However, in 
addition to naturally private situations there are also normatively 
private situations. In normatively private situations the protection 
may be natural but is essentially legal or moral. In normatively private 
situations, some people (the outsiders) are morally or legally forbidden 
from intruding or gathering information about others (the insiders) 
who are allowed in the situation. Thus, if a family is enjoying a 
videotape in their home, they are in a normatively private, as well 
as a naturally private, situation. If a troop of girl scouts comes to 
a window of their house and the girl scouts secretly peer through 
the window to watch this family, privacy will be lost. Because in 
this situation there is normative protection, the family has a right 
to complain. The girl scouts are outsiders to the situation, and they 
have violated the right to privacy. The distinction between natural 
and normative privacy is crucial in defending a restricted access 
account. Not every situation in which one observes someone else 
or gathers information about someone else does or should count as 
a violation of privacy. When walking down a public street, one may 
give up some natural privacy but not normative privacy. 
Which situations are normatively private and which are not? 
One answer to this question is that the nature and kind of situations 
that are private is culturally determined. Obviously, cultures do vary 
about what is considered a (normatively) private situation and what 
is not. Moreover, the boundaries of private situations for one culture 
will likely change over time. However, another more complex, but 
equally true, answer to the question is that the nature and kind of 
situations which ought to be private is open to rational and moral 
argument. In general, privacy allows one to gain goods such as 
enhancing liberty and controlling personal development and to avoid 
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evils such as suffering psychological and economic losses. But, privacy 
is not an unalloyed good for it has its costs as well. One cost of 
privacy is that it makes social and political institutions less effective 
which in turn may be detrimental to individuals. For example, treating 
the use of medical records as a private situation will protect patients 
but may retard the general search for medical information by 
epidemiological researchers who would use such information to 
isolate the causes of diseases. 
The restricted access conception of privacy just discussed has 
advantages over the other conceptions of privacy without sharing 
their disadvantages. The key notion in this view of privacy is the 
concept of a private situation. Compare this concept with the notion 
of undocumented personal information in the following cases. On 
the one hand, suppose A is taking a shower at a public bath which 
has no shielding partitions for the bathers. Now B,  a member of 
the same sex, walks into the public bath. B suddenly gains a lot 
of undocumented personal knowledge about A,  and yet B has not 
invaded A’s privacy. In our culture this is a situation in which A 
is not protected from someone else of the same sex from making 
observations. If A has undocumented personal information A wishes 
to keep secret but which would be revealed by public showering, 
then A should shower in a more private situation. Of course B would 
invade A’s privacy if B came uninvited into A’s private bath at home 
to view A .  It is the situation that makes the difference in the judgment 
of privacy and not the kind of information. Consider another example. 
Suppose A ,  outside of B’s hotel room, looks through the keyhole 
at B. B is dressed and reading the evening newspaper. Here A is 
invading B’s privacy, for one’s hotel room is regarded, at least in 
this culture, as a private situation. It is not the undocumented personal 
information that A gains that matters. Indeed, it may be widely known 
and documented that B always reads the evening newspaper at that 
time in her hotel room. It is the unauthorized surveillance by A 
of a private situation that counts as the invasion of privacy. 
Control of information is important for privacy, but again i t  
is the notion of a private situation that makes the difference. Here 
is an example that contrasts the two theories. Suppose A confesses 
personal information to a priest B .  Though A has no control over 
what B will do with the information, confessions are regarded in 
this culture as a private situation. The loss of control does not entail 
any loss of privacy. Clearly, if the confessional moment had been 
recorded clandestinely by someone else, then there would have been 
an invasion of a private situation and a corresponding loss of privacy. 
The restricted access view of privacy clarifies some of the legal 
intuitions about privacy discussed earlier. The notion of a private 
situation is not unlike Douglas’s concept of a “zone of privacy.” A 
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normatively private situation, such as living in one’s home, fosters 
personal freedoms since insiders cannot be intimidated by the presence 
or observations of outsiders. Private situations give us zones of 
protection to do what we want to do within the limits of personal 
freedom. Again, note the crucial distinction between privacy and 
liberty. Privacy provides an umbrella under which to act freely, but 
there are limits. Child molesting, for instance, is not a freedom 
protected under the umbrella of privacy. Hence, although it is 
important not to conflate privacy with liberty, i t  is equally important 
not to underestimate the degree to which privacy, understood as 
normative private situations, provides a supportive environment for 
personal freedoms. 
Finally, the restricted access view is compatible with portions 
of the nonintrusion account. The restricted access view, as presented 
here, counts intrusions as violations of privacy only so long as they 
interrupt private situations. Intrusions on public streets are not 
invasions of privacy. But, unauthorized manipulations of computer 
databases by using personal computers and modems are intrusions 
into private situations, and therefore, these are invasions of privacy. 
Because invasions of privacy can involve more than intrusions, the 
restricted access view is more comprehensive than a simple 
nonintrusion account. 
A feature that is particularly attractive about the restricted access 
theory of privacy is that it gives technology the right kind of credit 
for enhancing privacy and the right kind of challenge for protecting 
privacy. Giving technology credit for enhancing privacy acknowl- 
edges that we owe a lot of privacy today to modern technology. 
Technology has generated the possibilities for many normatively 
private situations. This technology is so common that we take it, 
and its consequences for privacy, for granted. For instance, the 
technology for food production, distribution, and preservation 
enables us to be in private situations for extended periods of time. 
Central heating and better insulation allows rooms in houses and 
businesses to be enclosed and private. Modern water, power, and 
sanitation systems support lives of privacy. Even computer technology, 
which is often portrayed as the greatest threat to privacy, can enhance 
it. Withdrawing money from an automatic teller after banking hours 
is more private than talking to a human bank teller in the middle 
of the day. Without all of these modern technologies, our lives 
arguably would be much less private than they are now. 
The restricted access theory also suggests the right questions 
for keeping technology in check. As technology develops, we need 
to ask what kinds of restrictions should be put on the access to 
individuals and information about them in order to protect privacy. 
What kinds of restricted situations-zones of privacy-will give us 
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better lives? Rather than asking abstract questions about personal 
control of information or undocumented personal information, we 
should ask whether and how specific situations should have restricted 
access. For example, as library circulation records become more 
computerized, the resulting circulation databases ought to be regarded 
as zones of privacy. The issue is not whether a borrower should have 
control of his or her lending record in the database, but whether 
there is restricted access to the data so that borrowers feel the freedom 
to read what they please without scrutiny from the FBI or other 
outside organizations. One of the features of computers is that 
circulation records can be even more restricted than the traditional 
paper records. In a typical situation using computerized circulation 
records, a librarian need not have access to information about who 
has borrowed a particular item in the past. Computer technology 
can protect zones of privacy as well as invade them. 
Justi fying Priuacy 
Philosophers have offered a variety of justifications of privacy 
as an important value. Stanley Benn suggests that privacy is grounded 
in respect for persons. As Benn puts it: “To respect someone as a 
person is to concede that one ought to take account of the way in 
which his enterprise might be affected by one’s own decisions.” This 
type of justification for privacy is both popular and at least initially 
plausible. One problem with giving respect for persons as a 
justification for privacy is that it does not distinguish between times 
in which privacy is justified and times in which it is not. For instance, 
a mother might have respect for her baby as a person, conceding 
that she ought to take account of the way in which her baby’s enterprise 
might be affected by her own decisions and still not give her baby 
privacy. Now the mother might conclude that she will not give her 
baby any privacy just because she does respect her baby as a person! 
In general, A may have respect for B as a person and not grant her 
privacy, for A may conclude that, at least in certain circumstances 
i t  is in B’s best interest not to have privacy-e.g., A decides to save 
B’s life by rushing into her private home at night to save her from 
a fire. Respect for persons is at most a general background principle 
for justifying privacy and not a sufficient principle by itself for 
deducing the need for privacy in particular cases. 
Other philosophers have offered more straightforwardly 
instrumental justifications for privacy. Charles Fried (1984) says that 
privacy is necessary for love and friendship (pp. 207-09). James 
Rachaels (1984) suggests that privacy is needed to create diverse social 
relationships (p. 292). Deborah Johnson (1985) argues that privacy 
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increases personal autonomy (p. 67).All of these are certainly plausible 
justifications for privacy, for private situations do foster diverse kinds 
of relationships and autonomous decision making. 
These instrumental justifications of privacy are the overwhelm- 
ing philosophical favorites and may be adequate to ground the moral 
notion of privacy. However, I believe that for some people privacy 
may be valued intrinsically, that is, valued for its own sake. Of course, 
to claim that privacy may have intrinsic value is compatible with 
claiming that privacy is also instrumentally valuable. The possibility 
of intrinsic value is worth exploring. As a thought experiment, 
consider someone who has his entire life under surveillance by others. 
These others do not interfere with his life and he doesn’t know that 
the surveillance is taking place. In effect, all private situations for 
this person are invaded, but his life is no different with regard to 
making decisions and having diverse relationships than i t  would have 
been without the surveillance. The only thing different about his 
life under surveillance is that he has no privacy. This person seems 
morally wronged by the invasion of his privacy though no special 
harm comes to him other than the invasion of his privacy. This 
thought experiment suggests that privacy has an intrinsic justification 
as well as an instrumental one. If this is the case, then, philosophically 
speaking, privacy is that much more secure. 
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Philosophical Issues in Censorship 
and Intellectual Freedom 
DAVIDV. WARD 
ABSTRACT 
THISARTICLE SURVEYS A VARIETY of philosophical arguments 
concerning censorship and intellectual freedom in relation to specific 
contemporary events. T h e  paper argues that deontological 
considerations concerning censorship and intellectual freedom take 
precedence over consequen tialist arguments. 
Recent times have seen a startling variety of events involving 
issues of free expression. Salman Rushdie has been condemned to 
death for writing a book allegedly insulting to Islam; his publisher 
and bookstores carrying T h e  Satanic Verses have also been threatened 
with violence. A significant political battle has erupted following 
a Supreme Court decision which held that burning the American 
flag is a protected form of expression under the First Amendment. 
Some feminists have joined with those elements of the political Right 
wishing to ban pornography. The distribution and display of two 
recent films, Scorsese’s T h e  Last Temptation of Christ and Godard’s 
Hail  Mary, have been attacked as has the subsidy of a exhibition 
by publicly supported institutions of photographs by Robert 
Mapplethorpe and Andres Serrano. The University of Michigan and 
the University of Wisconsin, among the other colleges and 
universities, have adopted restrictions on speech deemed degrading 
or racist, and a number of school libraries have been pressured to 
remove books ranging from Cleaver’s Soul on Ice to Twain’s 
Huckleberry Finn alleged to be unsuitable for children because of 
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their political or sexual content. On national security grounds, the 
government of Great Britain attempted to block the publication of 
Peter Wright’s Spycatcher. 
The often confused nature of the public discussion of these and 
other events, as well as their increasing frequency, suggests that we 
are unclear about the underlying principles at stake, and shows the 
need for a re-examination of the philosophical underpinnings of 
freedom of expression, with careful attention to the distinction 
between what is, and what is not, properly regarded as a problem 
of intellectual freedom and censorship. That reexamination is the 
primary purpose of this article. 
The first task is to lay out the ethical theories under which issues 
of censorship and free expression can be evaluated. There are two 
basic types of moral theories: consequentialist theories and  
deontological theories. This discussion will regard utiltarianism, the 
pre-eminent consequentialist theory, and a variety of deontological 
concerns. 
Consequentialist moral theories are those which hold that the 
rightness of an action is determined solely by the degree to which 
it produces good consequences. Utilitarianism is a consequentialist 
theory which holds that the best actions are those which produce 
the greatest amount of good (understood as pleasure or happiness) 
for the greatest number of people. It is the moral theory underlying 
modern cost-benefit and risk-benefit analysis, according to which we 
are directed to choose the action with the most favorable ratio of 
cost or risks to benefits. 
Deontological theories, the most important alternative to 
consequentialism, hold that the rightness of an action depends upon 
factors other than the consequences of the action. These include such 
things as whether the intentions with which the act is done were 
good, whether the action is just, whether i t  respects the rights of 
those affected by it, whether the action is consistent with the demands 
of duty, and whether, whatever its consequences, something in the 
nature of the action makes i t  intrinsically wrong. There are a variety 
of deontological theorists, from the first deontologist, Immanuel 
Kant, to W. D. Ross in the twentieth century. This discussion is 
neutral among them for our interest is in the deontological form 
of argument rather that in the specifics of any particular deontological 
theory. 
Our first major problem is whether issues of intellectual freedom 
are to be decided primarily by appeal to utilitarianism or to 
deontological considerations. That is, we must determine which of 
the two ethical theories expresses the more fundamental and 
overriding moral concerns. 
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The classical objection to utilitarianism is that i t  makes 
insufficient provision for considerations of rights and justice. 
Utilitarianism, it is argued, would countenance, even mandate, 
actions which violated individuals’ rights or which were unjust in 
other ways, so long as those actions maximized utility. This objection 
is a sound one. Rights take precedence over utility; thus, deontological 
theories take precedence over consequentialist theories. 
This is not to say that utilitarian arguments are wrong or 
worthless, only that they do not express the most fundamental truths 
about ethical issues. In disputes in which injustice or violation of 
rights is not at issue, or in which equally balanced rights claims 
offset each other, i t  is often the case that utilitarian arguments 
determine the issue. Additionally, utilitarian arguments can be used 
in support of deontological arguments. The claim that deontological 
concerns take precedence over considerations of utility means only 
that in cases of conflict, rights and justice are more important than 
is maximization of utility. Deontological arguments cannot be 
answered by utilitarian counter-arguments, but need to be dealt with 
directly in deontological terms. This will prove of great practical 
significance when we begin to apply these ethical theories to a number 
of recent controversies involving freedom of expression. First, 
however, we must lay out the arguments concerning freedom of 
expression from both ethical perspectives. 
In Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative Government, J. 
S. Mill (1950), the leading proponent of utilitarianism, gives an 
elegant and detailed defense of freedom of expression. He offers four 
arguments against censorship. The first is that: 
the opinion which it is attempted to suppress by authority may possibly 
be true. Those who desire to suppress it, of course deny its truth; but 
they are not infallible. They have no authority to decide the question 
for all mankind, and exclude every other person from the means of 
judging. To refuse a hearing to an opinion, because they are sure that 
it is false, is to assume that their certainty is the same thing as absolute 
certainty. All silencing of discussion is an assumption of infallibility. 
(pp. 104-05) 
Second, even if the opinion some wish to censor is largely false, 
i t  may contain some portion of truth, a portion denied us if we 
suppress the speech which contains it. 
The third reason for allowing free expression is that any opinion 
“however true i t  may be, if i t  is not fully, frequently, and fearlessly 
discussed, ... will be held as a dead dogma, not a living truth” (Mill, 
1951, p. 126). Merely believing the truth is not enough, Mill points 
out, for even a true opinion held without full and rich understanding 
of its justification is “a prejudice, a belief independent of, and proof 
against, argument-this is not the way in which truth ought to be 
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held by a rational being. This is not knowing the truth. Truth, thus 
held, is but one superstition the more, accidentally clinging to the 
words which enunciate a truth” (p. 127). 
Fourth, the meaning of a doctrine held without the understanding 
which arises in the vigorous debate of its truth, “will be in danger 
of being lost, or enfeebled, and deprived of its vital effect on the 
character and conduct the dogma becoming a mere formal profession, 
inefficacious for good, but cumbering the ground, and preventing 
the growth of any real and heartfelt conviction, from reason or 
personal experience” (p. 149). 
Censorship, then, is undesirable according to Mill because, 
whether the ideas censored are true or not, the consequences of 
suppression are bad. Censorship is wrong because it  makes it less 
likely that truth will be discovered or preserved, and i t  is wrong 
because it  has destructive consequences for the intellectual character 
of those who live under it. 
Deontological arguments in favor of freedom of expression, and 
of intellectual freedom in general, are based on claims that people 
are entitled to freely express their thoughts, and to receive the 
expressions made by others, quite independently of whether the effects 
of that speech are desirable or not. These entitlements take the form 
of rights, rights to both free expression and access to the expressions 
of others. 
Natural rights theories, such as John Locke’s, grounded these 
entitlements in God-given natural rights. According to Locke, human 
rights are founded on “natural law,” and in Essays on  the Law of 
Nature he holds that natural law derives ultimately from God’s will. 
The concept of natural law is exceedingly vague, but in general the 
doctrine held that persons may come to know by reason the 
fundamental principles of morality which are otherwise known by 
Christian revelation. 
The view that human rights derive from Divine grant enjoyed 
only a brief flourishing in philosophy, from the middle of the 
seventeenth into the early eighteenth centuries, to be replaced first 
by utilitarianism and later by positivism. 
The idea that rights were granted by the Creator was rejected 
in part because it is unverifiable in principle. It introduces a 
particularly murky form of mysticism into political philosophy. Just 
which rights did God grant to humans? If one theorist’s claims about 
which rights humans possess by nature conflict with those of another 
thinker, how in principle could such a dispute be resolved? 
But the relatively brief life of natural rights theory occurred at 
just the right time to influence the political ideas of the American 
founding fathers, who built the doctrine of natural rights, now largely 
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regarded as a quaint philosophical curio, into the Constitution and 
Declaration of Independence. It is, for instance, the Lockean view 
of natural rights which impelled both Jefferson and Madison to their 
absolutist views of the First Amendment. Jefferson carried the view 
so far as to hold that: “Libels, falsehood, and defamation, equally 
with heresy and false religion, are withheld from the cognizance of 
federal tribunals.” 
Other rights theories eliminate the controversial theological step, 
claiming only that rights follow from the nature of human beings 
(whether God is responsible for that nature or not). Consider the 
following argument, which Kant did not make, but which I take 
to be implied by his views. Humans are ends in themselves, Kant 
says, and the most important fact about them is that they are 
autonomous, self-determining, rational agents. Restrictions on the 
transmission of information or ideas which interfere with the exercise 
of this rational autonomy are thus incompatible with a fundamental 
feature of human nature, and so are impermissible. 
In any case, whether grounded in Divine grant or not, a 
deontological theory of rights holds that individuals have them 
independently of the consequences of their possession and exercise. 
I turn now to comment on the relevance of these philosophical 
ideas to some of the recent disputes which are referred to in this 
article. The first issue is the recent attack by some feminists on the 
legal availability of pornography. Historically, the arguments over 
pornography pitted a deontological rights argument in favor of 
permitting freedom of expression and the legal distribution of 
pornography against a consequentialist one opposing its legal 
distribution. The major argument against pornography was its 
putative bad effect on the morals and behavior of those exposed to 
it. Pornography was alleged to result in sexual violence and other 
undesirable sexual behavior. Not surprisingly, the rights arguments 
protecting free expression usually won out over these consequentialist 
objections, for, as we have seen, rights take precedence over utility. 
The consequentialist opponents of pornography were in a very weak 
position, for not only were their claims about the effects of 
pornography contentious and controversial, but even if the alleged 
bad consequences were shown to result from pornography, it would 
not follow that is was permissible to ban it. The exercise of one’s 
rights does not depend on the felicitousness of the consequences of 
that exercise. 
The recent feminist arguments have introduced new elements 
into the debate. In addition to the traditional argument that 
pornography should be banned because it  causes harm (e.g., violence 
against women), we have the new claim that pornography violates 
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human rights because i t  is degrading to women. That is, the 
deontological rights argument in favor of free expression is now being 
challenged by an opposing rights argument, rather than by the pr ima  
facie weaker consequentialist objections to pornography. 
The argument is in some ways similar to objections raised by 
some Muslims to the publication of Satanic Verses. The claim was 
that publication of this book was wrong because the novel was 
insulting to Islam, that it degraded that religion. These are serious 
deontological objections, and in both cases require a straightforward 
response. 
Some have attempted to answer these objections by claiming 
that Satanic Verses is not insulting to Islam or that pornography 
is not degrading to women. But this strategy just misses the central 
point which is that neither a gender nor a religion have the right 
not to be insulted or degraded. 
I would argue that pornography, at least that depicting the violent 
subordination of women, not only degrades women but men as well 
by depicting them as enjoying the violent subjugation of women. 
But this just does not entail that such pornography should be banned. 
A good deal of protected speech is arguably unfairly insulting or 
degrading or demeaning to some identifiable group or other, but, 
excepting the cases of literal slander and libel (in which specific 
individuals are identified), people have no right not to be insulted 
or characterized in degrading terms. The cure for such bad speech, 
as often pointed out, is good speech, not prohibition. In fact, elevating 
the undesirability of the degrading nature of pornography to the 
status of a right not to be degraded is a danger to the power of 
rights to protect legitimate human autonomy. The broader our rights 
claims are, whether for education, welfare, employment, housing, 
or freedom from the insulting nature of some pornography, the less 
plausible those claims are, for the more frequent their conflict with 
other, equally plausible rights claims. In general, claims of so-called 
“positive” rights, such as a “right to a job” are less plausible than 
those of “negative” rights, such as the right to free speech. This 
is because the former require that others take positive steps toward 
providmg the right-holder with the object of the right (in the example, 
a job), while “negative” rights require only that others refrain from 
interfering in the actions of the rights-holder. The right to free speech 
is the right not to have one’s speech interfered with. Requiring that 
other members of society not interfere with a person’s speech in no 
way violates or even threatens to violate their rights. However, 
requiring members of society to take positive action to provide a 
job, or education, or health care, etc., may conflict with their rights. 
WARD/PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES 89 

The upshot of this is that the pornographer and the consumers 
of pornography (as well as the author and readers of Satanic Verses), 
are in an extremely strong philosophical position. They claim only 
the right not to be interfered with in their expression and consumption 
of expression. It would take a strong argument indeed to supersede 
this rights claim, an argument which has so far not been forthcoming. 
The second issue in this discussion is the controversy surrounding 
the grant of public money from the National Endowment for the 
Arts to support an exhibition of photographs by Robert Mapplethorpe 
and Andres Serrano. Several of the photographs in the exhibition, 
including Serrano’s Piss Christ (in which a crucifix is shown immersed 
in what the artist says is urine), and a number of sado-masochistic 
homoerotic images by Mapplethorpe (including one depicting one 
man urinating into the mouth of another, as well as erotic images 
of children), provoked great controversy. A number of federal 
legislators objected to the use of public funds for the support of 
artistic expression which they (or their constituents) found offensive 
or obscene, and they proposed legislation to prohibit the National 
Endowment for the Arts to subsidize obscene art in the future. 
Whatever the merits of exhibitions of Mapplethorpe’s or Serrano’s 
work, this case is not properly construed as a freedom of expression 
issue. No one (at least no responsible person) in the furor surrounding 
the exhibition of these photographs suggested that the artists had 
no right to produce them, or that anyone had the right to forbid 
the exhibition of these works. What was at issue was whether 
taxpayers’ money should be used to support these artistic expressions. 
Subsidy, not censorship, is the issue in this case. And failing to 
subsidize expression is not the same as suppressing expression. 
Freedom of expression is the right not to have one’s speech coercively 
interfered with; i t  is not the right to be provided with the resources 
necessary to produce and distribute speech. Freedom of the press, 
in other words, is not the right to be provided with a printing press, 
but only the right not to have others interfere with the operation 
of one’s press. 
No one’s rights are violated by failing to subsidize the exhibition 
of Mapplethorpe and Serano’s photographs. The artists had no right 
to such a subsidy, nor did the institutions which produced the 
exhibition, nor the prospective audience .for the exhibition. The 
legitimate claim of right here has to do with the right of the citizens 
in a democratic society to choose (through their legislators) which 
art they wish to support and which they do not. The mandate of 
the National Endowment for the Arts (and other such bodies) derives 
from an expression of the popular will through the legislature. This 
mandate therefore can also be modified or rescinded by popular will, 
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in the form of legislative act, as i t  was in this case. It would be 
hard to argue, in other words, that the taxpayers did not have the 
right to determine what they are and are not willing to support be 
i t  artistic expression or any other service or commodity. 
This is not the same thing, though, as arguing that the popular 
will is wise in what it chooses to support. One might argue that 
an enlightened electorate would choose to support artistic expression, 
even controversial expression, not because the artist or audience has 
a right to subsidy but rather on the sorts of utilitarian grounds 
provided by Mill. 
This line of reasoning has consequences for what I take to be 
a more important issue than the subsidy of controversial works of 
art. That is the issue of removal or banning of books from publicly 
supported libraries (including public school libraries) because of their 
political, sexual, racial, or ethnic content. What is the ethical position 
for the librarian in such cases? The libraries in question are publicly 
supported. Doesn’t this give the public the right to determine which 
books will and will not be included in the collection? Isn’t the 
librarian a public employee, obligated to carry out the public’s will, 
as expressed through the appropriate elected officials? 
The answer to these questions is “yes,” but an importantly 
qualified “yes.” It is true that no one’s rights are violated if the 
taxpayers remove Huckleberry Finn or Soul on Ice from a tax-
supported library. The taxpayers are exercising their acknowledged 
right to decide what they will and will not support, just as in the 
Mapplethorpe/Serrano case. And the librarian, i f  he or she is to remain 
in that position, must acknowledge the public’s rights to be selective 
about what i t  wants in libraries i t  pays for. 
This does not mean that we, or the librarian, must agree with 
the public’s position. What librarians can do in such cases is to 
articulate the important consequen tialist reasons for not removing 
books. In the passion of the moment, the public might rashly choose 
to ban what i t  regards as a particularly outrageous book from the 
public library with no thought to the difficult to discern and serious 
long-term costs imposed by a policy which allowed such removals. 
The librarian is in a special position to aid the public in understanding 
that, while i t  has the right to remove or ban books from publicly 
supported institutions, doing so is unwise. Such removals are wrong 
and constitute bad public policy just because the long-term 
consequences may be disastrous. 
The points of this article can be summarized in a few succinct 
ideas. Deontological rights-based arguments for intellectual freedom 
and against censorship are stronger than, and take precedence over, 
consequen tialist considerations. Utilitarian counter arguments fail 
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against arguments based on justice or rights. This precedence however 
must not serve as a motive for attempting to turn all that is desirable 
into a right. The inflation of rights, by conflating the merely desirable 
with the obligatory, dilutes the rights which protect us all. 
But when rights issues are not at stake, or when conflicting 
plausible rights claims produce a “deontological stand-off,” 
consequentialist arguments, especially those of Mill, are authoritative. 
To say that such arguments are secondary to deontological 
considerations in no way diminishes their validity in those situations 
where they correctly apply. 
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THEREIS AN INERADICABLE CONFLJCT between the First Amendment 
and even the narrowest copyright. Recent changes in copyright law 
have exacerbated the conflict by extension of rights over derivative 
works that could result in ownership of ideas, supposedly ruled out 
by copyright law. Minimal copyright in works of fact as opposed 
to works of fiction would reduce though not eliminate copyright 
interference with freedom of information. 
INTRODUCTION 
There is a basic, built-in conflict between intellectual freedom 
and intellectual property which is directly reflected in a conflict 
between the copyright law and the First Amendment to the 
Constitution. A property right is a right to exclude others from some 
use of something; giving property rights to one is at the same time 
putting limitations on the freedom of others, and expanding property 
rights means contracting others’ areas of freedom. Intellectual 
property is in this no different from other kinds of property, though 
the particular nature of some of the main “objects” of intellectual 
property leads to unique problems of drawing the line between 
excluded uses and permitted uses, and to problematical consequences 
no matter where the line is drawn. The justification for limiting 
the use of intellectual objects is presumably this: property rights 
in intellectual objects are granted as an incentive to the production 
of more intellectual objects; some freedom is given up as the price 
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for the future enjoyment of a larger pool of valuable objects. 
“American intellectual property law can be thought of as a bargain 
between individual creators and the public. In exchange for granting 
authors and inventors exclusive rights in their writings and 
inventions, the American public is to benefit from the disclosure 
of inventions, the publication of writings, and the eventual return 
of both to the public domain” (U.S. Congress, 1986, p. 188). The 
question about any such bargain is whether the terms are fair. The 
bargain is a bad one if i t  fails to enlarge the pool of valuable objects 
beyond what it would otherwise have been, or if i t  grants more 
exclusionary power than needed to yield the same increase in the 
size of the pool, or if i t  grants exclusions that should not be granted 
because the grant conflicts with more fundamental values. The extent 
of property rights granted under copyright appears to have been 
expanded considerably in the 1976 revision of the copyright law; the 
terms of the bargain have changed. Before discussing this expansion, 
let us take a fresh look at the basic restrictions that copyright law 
has, in the past, placed on the use of intellectual products; the bargain 
may be an odd one in ways not quite realized. 
COPYINGAND DESCRIBING 
The “writings” of an “author” are the objects subject to 
copyright, both “writings” and “author” being understood in 
unusual ways (17 U.S. Code, 5 102). The category of writings includes 
“literary works,” which are any works expressed in verbal or 
numerical symbols and not just works of “literature”; but i t  also 
includes musical, choreographic, pictorial, graphic, and sculptural 
works, motion pictures and other audiovisual works, and sound 
recordings. The notion of an author is correspondingly expanded. 
Here we will consider only “literary works” because they are arguably 
basic to any question of conflict between property and intellectual 
freedom and have special characteristics that make them uniquely 
problematical. 
To be protected, a literary work must be fixed in a “tangible” 
medium of expression-i.e., i t  must exist as a written-down sequence 
or array of symbols, a recorded text. And what i t  is protected against 
is, at the very least, unauthorized literal copying-i.e., reproduction 
by others, without permission, of the same sequence or array of 
symbols. This only begins to describe the extent of protection; but 
even this basic protection against literal copying raises a basic 
problem. 
The publication of the text of a literary work counts as a public 
event and sometimes a major event. One way of describing such events 
is that the event is the making of a public statement to the world. 
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This is accurate at least for works that claim to tell something true 
about the world. Such works say: This is the way things are or were, 
or, This is the way people should think of the world or this is the 
way things should be or should not be. Such public statements are 
particular kinds of extended speech acts with the speaker addressing 
an indefinite and unknown audience (Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969; 
Levinson, 1987, pp. 226-83). Such speech acts can be described in 
countless ways, but there is one particular, uniquely privileged, kind 
of description. We can describe the particular type of speech act, 
or its topic or subject matter, or its major thesis-for example, that 
i t  offers a plan for protection of tropical rain forests, that it expounds 
a new theory of irregular phenomena, and so on. We might summarize 
the things said briefly or at length. But any other description we 
give, if challenged or questioned, will ultimately be backed u p  by 
repeating some or all of what was actually said or written-i.e., the 
very words used in the very order in which they were used. The 
person to whom we report on others’ speech acts can always, and 
frequently will, press us by asking, “But what did they actually say?” 
and the standard response-the response called for-is to quote 
verbatim from the utterance or published text. This is basic to the 
description of speech acts; verbatim reproduction of the words used 
furnishes a unique standard description of the act which is an 
appropriate test of the accuracy of most other kinds of reports on 
speech acts. 
But of course the production of a verbatim repetition of the words 
used in performing a speech act is just what is controlled by copyright 
law. It is the production of a copy. If a published text is protected 
by copyright, it is protected against others reporting on it using the 
unique standard description of the text, but this is certainly odd. 
For whatever the bundle of rights associated with the ideas of freedom 
of speech and of the press, i t  surely must be thought to include the 
right to read and watch and listen, and the right to tell others what 
one has read, seen, and heard, and specifically the right to tell others 
as precisely and accurately as possible what one has read, seen, and 
heard. There are further rights such as to criticize, for example. But 
the further rights seem to presuppose a prior right to report. The 
right to criticize would be of little value if one were not free first 
to describe what one was criticizing. And it  is at least a bizarre rule 
that would allow reporting-but not reporting that was as precise 
and accurate as possible-that would allow reports of public 
statements to the world only so long as those reports were not “too 
accurate.” Yet this seems to be what basic copyright does-it forbids 
certain descriptions of speech acts as impermissibly accurate. 
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One might say that this odd property of copyright was of no  
practical importance whatever-i.e., that no one cares if reporting 
is done in private, and that there is no need to engage in such 
“maximally precise and accurate reporting” in public. Even if that 
were true, i t  would still leave us with a prima facie conflict between 
copyright and the First Amendment. By restricting the freedom to 
produce a certain kind of description of a certain category of public 
events, the copyright law certainly looks like a law that abridges 
freedom of speech and of the press. But the First Amendment of 
the Constitution says that Congress shall make no law that does 
this. 
Note that we cannot, by verbal description, produce copies of 
the other kinds of objects protected by copyright; “literary works” 
really are in a different category. A verbal description, no matter 
how detailed, never becomes a copy of a painting or motion picture. 
Only musical works-scores and not recorded performances-share 
this feature with literary works, that decribing (note by note) can 
amount to producing a copy, though a verbal description of a score 
is an unusably awkward sort of copy of the score (compare Goodman, 
1968). It is this special characteristic of symbolic systems that is at 
the root of the sharpest conflict between intellectual freedom and 
intellectual property. The very nature of symbolic systems guarantees 
the conflict. 
It might be argued that the story discussed earlier is mistaken 
about “making a public statement.” Publication should not be 
described that way. Publication is rather an invitation to the public 
to buy a copy of what the author has to say-i.e., not a public saying 
but a public offer to “say” privately. But this simply relocates the 
basic problem, for now what is forbidden is an overly accurate 
description of what is up  for sale. In other cases of goods for sale 
i t  would seem crazy to forbid a maximally accurate description of 
what was .for sale. Here, however, it  is explicitly forbidden. You may 
not be told what is being offered for sale except in general terms 
lest, by being told what is for sale, you come to acquire i t  and therefore 
lose interest in buying it (Arrow, 1971, p. 148). Copyright forbids 
certain kinds of description of public events. 
As defenders of copyright are quick to point out, copyright is 
far from being the only limitation on freedom of speech that the 
courts have permitted (Patry, 1985, p. 467; Pool, 1983, pp. 55-74; Stone, 
1983, pp. 1425-31; Levy, 1987, pp. 238-42; U.S. Congress, 1988). Laws 
against blasphemy, obscenity, seditious libel, fraud, deceit, 
misrepresentation, limitations on the rights of scientists to publish 
or even publicly discuss their research have regularly been enacted 
by legislatures and upheld or not overturned by courts. Almost no  
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one reads the “no” in “no law abridging freedom of speech and 
of the press” to mcan “not any at all.” The Constitution does indeed 
say “no law,” but the Constitution requires interpretation, and under 
judicial interpretation, “no law” is found consistent with many laws 
limiting intellectual freedom. Not being lawyers or judges, we may 
be permitted to wonder how this can be. 
IDEAAND EXPRESSION 
Legal scholars argue that two factors eliminate any real conflict 
between copyright and the First Amendment. The first is that 
copyright extends only to expression and not to ideas expressed; the 
second is that fair use allows some unauthorized use even of protected 
expression. 
The first of these factors was given statutory recognition in the 
1976 Copyright Revision Act; copyright protection does not extend 
to “any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, 
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which i t  is described, 
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such works” (17 U.S.C. § 102 
[1976]). It is generally understood that this means that information 
is not subject to copyright; facts, data, and pieces of information 
cannot be copyrighted (Francione, 1986). People cannot be prevented 
from borrowing and using the concepts and facts presented in a work, 
though they can be prevented from copying the text itself. If copyright 
did protect ideas, “there would certainly be a serious encroachment 
upon first amendment values,” said the chief authority on the subject, 
Melville Nimmer (1970), but since ideas are “free as air” (Brandeis 
cited in Gorman, 1982, p. 577), since copyright places no restriction 
on the use of the information contained in a work, i t  imposes no 
significant limit on First Amendment freedoms (Denicola, 1979; 
Nimmer & Nimmer, 1990). 
The idea/expression distinction is not, however, an easy one to 
make clear or to apply in practice. If the term expression referred 
to the text of a literary work-that is, the bare string or array of 
symbols-while the term idea referred to the meaning or content 
of the text, there would be a real distinction; one, moreover, that 
corresponds to commonsense notions of the relation between words 
and ideas, words being thought of as vehicles for the communication 
of ideas from one mind to another (Reddy, 1979). Copyright would 
protect the vehicle, not the ideas (concepts, propositions, notions) 
conveyed. 
But this cannot be the distinction. If i t  were, copyright would 
not protect against paraphrase or translation, both of which are 
attempts to express the same ideas but to express them differently, 
in the same or different language. A translation from English into 
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Hungarian may not share a single word with the original, and, if 
copyright protected only the original verbal surface, unauthorized 
translation would be no infringement, but i t  is. And “in Copyright 
law paraphrasing is equivalent to outright copying” (Nimmer & 
Nimmer, 1990, vol. 3, pp. 13-202 quoting Donald v. Meyer’s T V  Sales 
and Service, 426 F. 2d 1027 [Tex. Cir. 19701). Hence the idealexpression 
distinction is not a straightforward one between a text (string of 
symbols) and its content. Long ago, Judge Learned Hand wrote that 
“copyright cannot be limited literally to the text, else a plagiarist 
would escape by immaterial variations” (Nichols u. Universal Pictures 
Corporation, 1930).If expression is protected, but (expression) is more 
than the text of the protected work, what is it and how is it 
distinguished from unprotectable idea? 
The reigning view seems to be that idea and expression represent 
two poles of a continuum of overall similarity (Nimmer & Nimmer, 
1990, vol. 3, sect. 13.03). Surface verbal similarity is part, but only 
part, of the reckoning. Beyond verbal similarity, a work may be found 
to infringe on copyright because it resembles another work too closely 
in, for instance, the structure of character and action portrayed (at 
least if it is a work of fiction). Two stories might be held to be 
“impermissibly similar” though their texts had no words in common 
and though one was not a translation of the other, because the subject 
matter of the one tracked that of the other too closely-e.g., involving 
similar characters doing similar things, or “similarities of treatment, 
details, scenes, events, and characterization” (Reyher u. Children’s 
Teleuision Workshop,  1976, p. 91). Too much “borrowing” not only 
of verbal surface but of content counts as borrowing “expression” 
rather than “idea.” Judge Learned Hand’s “abstractions test” is 
usually referred to as expressing the distinction (Nichols  u.Uniuersal 
Pictures Corporation, 1930): a work can be described in terms of 
patterns or schemata of increasing abstractness, and two works may 
resemble each other by both instantiating a pattern at one level of 
generality or abstractness while differing at the next level of specificity. 
If they resemble each other only at a high level of abstractness, they 
resemble only in “idea,” while if they resemble each other at a low 
level of abstractness (high level of concreteness or specificity), their 
resemblance is one of “expression.” 
So how do we distinguish using “expression” (forbidden) from 
using “idea” (permitted)? The answer is discouraging: “Obviously, 
no principle can be stated as to when an imitator has gone beyond 
copying the ‘idea,’ and has borrowed its ‘expression’ ... the test for 
infringement of a copyright is of necessity vague ... [and] decisions 
must therefore be inevitably ad hod’ (Peter Pan Fabrics, Znc. u. Martin 
Weiner Corp., 1960, p. 489). This is not surprising if what is required 
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is not to distinguish uses of material from different realms (form 
versus content, symbols versus what they symbolize, words versus 
concepts) but to judge degree of overall similarity of form and content. 
It has the consequence that Judge Hand noted: “Nobody has ever 
been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can...the line, 
wherever i t  is drawn, will seem arbitrary” (Nichols u. Universal 
Pictures Corporation, 1930, p. 122). And no  general line can be drawn; 
each case must be considered ad hoc. What is allowed and what is 
forbidden cannot be told in advance; appeal to an idea/expression 
distinction simply amounts to asserting that copyright permits uses 
that result in works that are not too similar to the original without 
giving us any rule for telling how similar is too similar. It is hard 
to see how this distinction could guarantee that there will be no 
serious conflict between copyright and the First Amendment. It is 
not going to be comforting to be told that we are free to borrow 
the “ideas” expressed in a work i f  that means only “the most general 
ideas” and not the “specific details”; and can i t  be satisfactory that 
the boundary between the permitted and the forbidden cannot be 
described or predicted in advance even in principle? 
DERIVATIVERIGHTS 
“There has been a quiet revolution in copyright law and the copyright 
industries. Copyright, which once protected against only the 
production of substantially similar copies in the same medium as 
the copyrighted work, today protects against uses and media that 
often lie far afield from the original” (Goldstein, 1983, p. 209; compare 
Brown, 1984). The 1976 revision of copyright law has many notable 
features, some of which are well known and some not (for an extended 
review see Zissu, 1986). Copyright was made automatic upon the first 
production of a “tangible expression.” The term of copyright was 
extended to life plus fifty years. Protection was granted not just to 
works of specified kinds, but to “original works of authorship fixed 
in any tangible medium of expression, n o w  k n o w n  or later developed, 
from which they can be perceived, later reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device 
(17 U.S.C. 3 102 [1976]). Rules were laid out for library photocopying, 
and supplemented by guidelines on  interlibrary provision of 
photocopies proposed by the National Commission on  New 
Technological Uses for Copyrighted Works (CONTU). The “idea/ 
expression” distinction was formally incorporated into the law, as 
was the fair use doctrine. The  1976 act hedged on treatment of 
computer programs, and CONTU was charged with formulating 
proposals for subsequent action. The CONTU proposals, extending 
copyright protection to computer programs, were adopted by 
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Congress in 1980 as an amendment to the 1976 act (National 
Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works, 
1979). These changes are highly significant, but for our purposes 
the most striking change in the law is this addition to the list of 
exclusive rights conferred by copyright: “to prepare derivative works 
based upon the copyrighted work” (17 U.S.C. 3 106 [1976]). The act 
defines a derivative work as “a work based upon one or more 
preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, 
dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound 
recording, art reproduction, abridgement, condensation, or any  other 
form in wh ich  a work  may  be recast, transformed, or adapted” 
(emphasis added) (17 U.S.C. 3 101 [1976]). This is a long way from 
the simple right to make copies. It was not until 1880 that copyright 
law even recognized a copyright holder’s exclusive right to “dramatize 
or translate their own works,” a German translation of Uncle  Tom’s 
Cabin having been held noninfringing in 1853 (Goldstein, 1983, p. 
213). In 1909 the right to abridge was added, along with the right 
to “make any other version thereof, if it be a literary work” (Copyright 
Act of 1909, sect. 1). As the 1976 act extended the scope of copyright 
to works in any tangible medium of expression, n o w  k n o w n  or later 
developed, so i t  extended the rights of the copyright holder not just 
to make particular types of derivative works, but to produce works 
based on an earlier original and subjected to any  kind of recasting, 
transformation, or adaptation. Taken at face value, this represents 
a huge extension of proprietary rights, and a correspondingly huge 
restriction on others’ freedom to make use of a work. And it casts 
doubt on the claim that copyright protects only expression and not 
the ideas expressed. 
Let us try to imagine how we might proceed if we did want 
to grant ownership in the ideas expressed in a literary work (for 
a different view see Hopkins, 1982). To be at all plausible, our 
procedure would either have to require a proof of the novelty of 
ideas expressed (similar to the patent system’s requirement of novelty 
but sharply different from copyright’s minimal requirement of 
“originality” which is simply “not copied”), or else would have to 
give rights not to particular ideas but rather to a complex structure 
of ideas. A person who writes an article about copyright is not going 
to be given property rights in the bare idea of a work, or of a copy, 
or of a right; it will have to be either a demonstrably new idea or 
else a particular structure of ideas-say, the entire conceptual structure 
expressed in a written work (the “unique and protected mosaic” as 
Judge Kaufman puts i t  [Harper  pi7 Row Publishers u. N a t i o n  
Enterprises, 19831). Let us put aside the case of the “demonstrably 
new idea” (interesting though i t  be) and concentrate on the case 
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of the structure of ideas. How would we go about protecting the 
ideas, the conceptual structure, the intellectual content, of a literary 
work? The first things we would prohibit would be: translation, 
paraphrase, summarization, reorganization or rearrangement of 
content, making popularizations, writing expanded versions of the 
original, writing “imitations” of the original in which one tried 
to “translate” the original into a new subject area or apply i t  in 
a new way. One would try to prevent other uses as well-indirect 
uses such as doing other things that necessarily assume or presuppose 
the protected ideas. But prohibition of copying and of making 
derivative works would come first. To cover all bases, one would 
forbid not just a specific list of prohibited types of use but would 
include an indefinite omnibus clause prohibiting “any other form 
in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.” In other 
words, one would take one’s wording from the 1976 Copyright Act. 
The steps one would take, in what almost everyone would agree was 
an unconstitutional grant of property in ideas, are largely the same 
steps that have already been taken. The  more unauthorized 
transformations of a text we forbid, the greater the control we are 
giving the copyright holder over the content of the text; if we forbid 
all transformations of a text, we are giving, as nearly as we practically 
can, complete control over the content. When we remember that 
copyright forbids not only copying of whole works but of any 
quantitatively or qualitatively substantial part  (and what is 
substantial can be a couple of hundred words out of hundreds of 
thousands), we see that what is forbidden now looks like this: i t  
is forbidden to produce works containing “substantial” parts copied 
from or based on parts of an original or any transformation of the 
original. This cannot be compatible with any ordinary understanding 
of intellectual freedom. 
FAIRUSE 
If the idea/expression distinction fails to resolve the First 
Amendment conflict, and if new derivative rights appear to exacerbate 
it ,  the whole burden now falls on the doctrine of fair use which 
has, in the past, been seen as a “cure-all” for such problems (Francione, 
1986, p. 522). The 1976 Act, for the first time, codified the doctrine, 
saying that “the fair use of a copyrighted work, for purposes such 
as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching ...is not an  
infringementof copyright” (17 U.S.C. 3 107 [19761). There is no  precise 
rule for determining fair use; a non-exhaustive list of factors to be 
considered in  deciding fairness of use includes purpose, the nature 
of the work, the amount and “substantiality” of the portion used 
in relation to the whole work, and the effect of the use on the potential 
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market for, or value of, the copyrighted work. Other factors are taken 
into account at times (the public interest, “good faith,” “fair 
dealing”), but i t  is generally agreed, by commentators and recently 
by the Supreme Court, that the effect on the market for the copyrighted 
work “is undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use” 
(Harper Q R o w ,  Publishers u. Nat ion  Enterprises, 1985, 2233). The 
fact that only a small part of a copyrighted work is copied will not 
suffice to satisfy courts of fair use; in the important case of Harper 
Q R o w  u. Nation,  the majority of the Supreme Court found that 
the Nation had infringed the copyright in ex-President Ford’s memoirs 
by publishing an article that quoted 300 of the more than 200,000 
words of the original. Even a small amount of quotation and 
paraphrase can be found detrimental to the market for the original 
work. It is important to remember that there are two distinct elements 
in the question of market effect: potential (not necessarily actual) 
effect on the market for the work allegedly infringed, and potential 
effect on the market for derivative works based on that original. Courts 
have apparently not so far taken markets for derivative works much 
into account, but have “generally inclined to identify potential 
markets with the market in which the work was first introduced,” 
a “persistent error” according to Goldstein (1983, p. 233). Uses of 
copyrighted works that might be considered fair when only the effect 
on the original was considered could be thought unfair if they might 
have an effect on a derivative work that the author of the original 
has made, intends to make, or might sometime intends to make. 
The limitations of the fair use defense in resolving conflicts 
between intellectual freedom and intellectual property (application 
of the fair use doctrine being primarily concerned with protection 
of markets) is suggested not only by Harper & Row but also by the 
case of Wainwright  Securities u. Wall Street Transcript Corp. (1977). 
Wainwright produced reports on corporations, analyzing finances, 
profit expectations, strengths and weaknesses, etc.; the Transcript 
published abstracts of the Wainwright reports. Wainwright sued, 
alleging copyright infringement and unfair trade practices. The 
Transcript argued that its use of the reports was a fair use, that 
publication of the abstracts was simply “financial news coverage 
entitled to the protection of the first amendment” (wa inwr igh t  
Securities u. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 1977, p. 95). They pointed 
out that T h e  Wall Street Journal also reported the Wainwright 
publications as news events, including accounts of the analyses and 
conclusions of the original reports. Admitting that “the question 
of the first amendment protections due a news report of a copyrighted 
research report is a provocative one” (p. 95), the court held on appeal 
that “the Transcript appropriated almost verbatim the most creative 
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and original aspects of the reports” (p. 96), and that i t  had “the 
obvious intent, if not the effect, of fulfilling the demand for the 
original work” (p. 96). This was not legitimate news coverage or 
fair use but rather “chiseling for personal profit” (p. 97). 
It is clear (and emphasized in the Supreme Court decision on 
Harper & Row) that the fact that an abstract is offered as a news 
report is not sufficient to establish that it is fair use; “the fact that 
an article arguably is ‘news’ and therefore a productive use is simply 
one factor in a fair use analysis” (Harperclr Row, Publishers u. Nation 
Enterprises, 1985, p. 2231), and not necessarily a determinative one. 
T h e  Wall Street Journal had presumably not adversely affected 
Wainwright’s market even though it too quoted extensively from the 
originals and reported significant findings. Denicola (1979) thinks 
that the Transcript made “significantly greater use of plaintiff’s 
expression than was necessary” to report on the publication (p. 312. 
Compare with Gorman, 1982, pp. 576-78). This suggests that 
paraphrase would have been acceptable instead of direct quotation, 
but it was the reporting of significant findings (“the most creative 
and original aspects of the reports”) that produced the putative effect 
on the market, and paraphrase would have had the same effect (and 
paraphrase is equivalent to “outright copying,” though Gorman 
[19821 suggests that “even substantial paraphrasing” might have been 
tolerated if the abstracts had incorporated critical. assessments of 
Wainwright’s reports [p. 5781). 
Given decisions such as this, i t  is  clearly in the interest of 
producers and publishers of abstracts to claim that abstracts are not 
derivative works and do not substitute for the originals (see Lieb, 
1980; Cambridge Research Institute, 1973, pp. 164-65; Weil et al., 1983a; 
Weil et al., 1983b). This is, of course, clearly false in many cases. 
An abstract (an informative abstract at any rate, as opposed to an 
indicative or descriptive one) is a short abridgement, which implies 
either that it is a derivative work or that only length makes the 
difference between (derivative) abridgements and (nonderivative) 
abstracts, which is implausible. And for the user, abstracts, like review 
articles and syntheses, do indeed of ten substitute for the originals; 
that is their great merit (Bernier, 1968). If abstracts are derivative 
works and so forbidden unless authorized, or if they are not derivative 
works but may nevertheless be forbidden because they adversely affect 
a market, the conclusion seems inescapable that appeal to fair use 
will not suffice to avoid damaging limitations on the freedom of 
information. The system of communication that we depend on 
requires not only the production of original intellectual products, 
but of the communication of various forms of information about 
those products. The system of communication cannot be subject to 
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the limitation that nothing flowing through it  may adversely affect 
the market for any original work; if anything is an impermissible 
limitation on freedom of speech, this looks like it. As Denicola (1979) 
says, the fair use defense removes “those barriers to use that are not 
needed to preserve the economic incentive to produce,” but “the first 
amendment, however, demands much more ...when the objective of 
free speech requires access to the expression of another, the property 
interest created by copyright law must yield, regardless of the 
economic impact” (p. 303). It would be a mockery to say that free 
speech is protected just up to the point at which it  begins to affect 
commercial interests. 
There is a way of reconciling copyright and the First Amendment, 
however, at least for one great category of copyrighted works-i.e.,the 
“factual” as opposed to the “fictional.” 
FACT, FICTION, FUNCTION 
The development of new information technology has exacerbated 
the conflicts inherent in copyright law in ways described in a wide- 
ranging survey by the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), 
Zntellectual Property Rights  in an Age of Electronics and Information 
(1986). The vastly increased ability of private citizens as well as 
commercial and noncommercial organizations to copy, manipulate, 
and transmit vast quantities of information quickly and cheaply has 
changed the copyright environment in ways still not well understood. 
The ability of copyright holders to enforce their rights to copy is 
lessened by the widespread availability of computers and digitally- 
stored information. The ability and the incentives to create new 
information products have increased stupendously, but the copyright 
ban on unauthorized production of derivative works makes it  
dangerous to take advantage of the ability (Office of Technology 
Assessment [OTA], 1986, pp. 162-65. See also Warrick, 1984). These 
are central, but by no means the only, problems of copyright in the 
information age. 
The OTA report bravely raises the question of whether copyright 
should be thought of as proprietary at all, rather than as regulatory, 
confined to the commercial exploitation of intellectual products 
(Office of Technology Assessment, 1986, pp. 190-93. See also 
Zimmerman, 1986). (If regulatory, private use would not be limited 
by copyright while, if proprietary, private use would be subject to 
control.) It proposes that the time may have come to abandon a 
uniform system of copyright protection for all types of works, and 
suggests the need to consider different treatment for works falling 
into the three categories of works of “art,” works of “fact,” and 
“functional works”-i.e., those that describe procedures or, like 
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computer programs, both describe and actually implement a 
procedure (Office of Technology Assessment [OTA], 1986, pp. 64- 
88). This suggestion seems particularly appropriate in the context 
of First Amendment conflicts (though that was not one of OTAs 
concerns). 
The writers of the OTA report were thinking of a trichotomy 
of all the kinds of copyrightable objects, but let us confine our 
attention only to “literary works,” excluding computer programs 
from that category (to which they were assigned as a result of the 
CONTU recommendations, which may turn out to be a mistake), 
and consider only a dichotomy of works of “fact” and works of 
“fiction.” (The category of works of “fiction” is intentionally 
narrower than that of works of “literature”; historical works, for 
instance, may well be considered works of literature but will count 
as works of “fact.”) Let us suppose that works of fiction are given 
the full range of protection currently given them subject to the “idea/ 
expression” limitation in its incorrigibly vague form (and let us admit 
frankly that this amounts to protection of ideas in an everyday 
nonlegal sense). For works of fact, let us suppose that no protection 
is granted beyond protection against substantially complete and literal 
copying, thus returning to the earliest understanding of copyright 
protection. 
One might justify “thick” protection of works of fiction on the 
following grounds: the characters and incidents of a novel or play 
are (at least in prototypical cases) invented by the author, and the 
speech act i n  which they are presented to the world has the somewhat 
paradoxical characteristic of “bringing truths into existence” (this 
is not the orthodox view of speech acts. For that orthodox view, 
see Searle, 1979). That is, if the author writes that the character George 
murdered his brother, this is now a “fact” in the imaginary world 
created and populated by the author; i t  would make no sense for 
subsequent writers to try to show that George “really” did not commit 
a murder. That is a distinguishing feature of imaginative, as opposed 
to “factual,” works. If you can be said to have created a world, you 
might plausibly be given rights not only over the text of the work 
that presented that world, but over the “world” itself, the particular 
imaginary world of the work. Protection might thus be “thick,” 
extending not just to the verbal surface but to the “world” behind 
that surface. 
For works of fact, a new standard of infringement would have 
to replace the idea/expression distinction-say, a “fact/expression” 
distinction: the facts presented are not copyrightable, only the very 
words used to present or express them. (Here one could appeal to 
the “clear distinction” test of the case of Baker u. Selden, a test very 
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different from the idea/expression distinction [101U.S. 3 841. Compare 
the discussion in OTA, 1986, pp. 62-63].) On that understanding, 
if we take the facts presented in a work and use them to create a 
new work, we cannot infringe copyright, for the facts are not subject 
to copyright. Questions of fair use do not arise if what was used 
was factual matter rather than the verbal surface of the work. 
Infringement would be a matter of “substantial taking” of 
expression-i.e., verbatim text. The idea/expression distinction as 
usually understood would not apply: substantial similarity of overall 
content would not constitute infringement, since content (the factual 
matter itself) was not copyrightable at all. “Infringement of copyright 
must [in such cases] be based on a taking of literary form, as opposed 
to the ideas or information ...” (Harfler 6 Row, Publishers u. Nation 
Enterpises, p. 2242). Francione (1986) argues at length that “for 
logical and practical reasons the infringement standards for fictional 
and factual works must be different,” as “the distinction between 
fact and expression is simply different from the distinction between 
idea and expression” (p. 566). He may not be right in claiming that 
the standards must be different; the proposal here is that they should 
be different in order to avoid the conflict between intellectual property 
and intellectual freedom. 
To some degree, this distinction between “thin” protection for 
factual works and “thick” protection for works of imagination is 
already recognized by the courts, the protection afforded factual works 
being generally “thinner” than that afforded works of imagination 
(see especially Gorman, 1982). But protection for works of fact is 
far from the minimum proposed. Presumably the “thinning” of 
protection for factual works could come about by the evolution of 
judicial interpretation (on this subject, see Levi, 1949; Dworkin, 1986). 
But working against the recognition of only “thin” protection for 
works of fact are at least three distinct features. First, there is the 
courts’ apparent inclination toward a “labor theory of copyright,” 
affording protection to works of fact to compensate for the labor 
expended in their preparation even though their contents are, in 
theory, unprotectable. Despite their overt recognition that facts and 
information are not protectable, courts have of ten, explicitly or 
implicitly, decided for relatively “thick” protection of factual works 
as a way of recognizing the effort going into their production. There 
will be no copyright incentive to produce works like directories, the 
contents of which are preeminently pieces of unprotectable 
information if  others are allowed to take the information and 
rearrange it at will, but incentives must be protected. Francione 
describes in detail the strategies by which protection is granted to 
bodies of information that could not be granted to separate pieces 
106 LIHRARY TRENDWSUMMER & FALL 1990 
of the “body.” There is a fatal analogy between surface and content 
that may be at work here. Words are not separately copyrightable 
but strings of words are. Why not also say that, though individual 
pieces of information are not copyrightable, collections of such pieces 
are? So “Although individual facts and their unadorned expression 
are not protected by copyright, the law has chosen to ignore the 
dictates of algebra and affords to the summation of one hundred 
or one million such elements a significant measure of protection” 
(Denicola, 1981, p. 527). He thinks that is appropriate; but protecting 
a body of information against copying, reformulation, and 
transformation is protection of content, and it is clear to others that 
in many cases courts “have in a pragmatic sense afforded protection 
to simple ideas” (Hopkins, 1982, p. 405). 
Which leads directly to the second point, that of derivative rights. 
Standard copyright doctrine has it that “compilations,” which are 
collections of facts or pieces of information, are copyrightable but 
that only their arrangement and, at least in some cases, their selection 
is protected (Denicola, 1979; Francione, 1986, p. 593). The lay observer 
would conclude that rearrangement and reorganization of a 
compilation would not be infringing, and some court decisions lend 
support to this view. For instance, in the case of N e w  York T i m e s  
Co. u. Roxbury  Data Interface, Inc., Roxbury prepared a cumulated 
personal name index to the N e w  York T i m e s  Index and the Tames 
sued for infringement but lost (434 F.Supp 217. Compare Gorman, 
1982, pp. 574-75; Denicola, 1979, pp. 532-33). But could one count 
on such re-uses of data being regularly allowed? No, for another 
court might well find such an index to an index to be a derivative 
work, “and that the right to create that new index was within the 
plaintiff’s copyright monopoly” (Gorman, 1982, p. 575). The problem 
is a general one in that even if the content of a work consists of 
unprotectable facts or information, if there is a clear relation of 
transformation between an original work and another work, the other 
may be held to be an impermissible derivative work. It is futile to 
try to guess how judges are going to interpret the derivative right 
clause of the copyright act; but the prohibition against unauthorized 
derivative works stands, as Gorman (1982) notes about the First 
Amendment, as a “brooding omnipresence” over the copyright 
environment (p. 586). The idea of one work being a copyright 
infringement because it  is based on another, and hence a derivative 
work, is a rich potential source of conflict. 
The third and perhaps the major barrier to full recognition of 
a different status for works of fact and works of fiction is the copyright 
doctrine that paraphrase is equivalent to copying. Again the special 
nature of symbolic products complicates the picture; for if the text 
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of a factual work is protected against paraphrase, the ability to make 
use of the content of factual works is restricted. 
The way this works is as follows. Suppose one text presents a 
series of “facts.” Since facts are not copyrightable, it must be 
permissible to use them, in particular to communicate these facts 
to others. But if both the new text and the original text succeed 
in communicating the same facts, then the new text will look like 
a paraphrase of the first text. For the main test of a good paraphrase 
of a text is whether it serves as well as the original to communicate 
the information conveyed by the original; and conversely, if one text 
serves as well as another for that purpose, i t  stands in the relation 
of being a paraphrase to that other text. If the fact to be conveyed 
is that George murdered his brother, then any text that does convey 
that fact (directly at least, not just by implication) will do so because 
it is another way of saying that George murdered his brother. But 
then, by copyright doctrine, i t  is impermissibly similar to the original. 
But any text that managed to convey the fact in question would 
be impermissibly similar; if all impermissibly similar expressions 
are forbidden, i t  is not permitted to use the fact that George murdered 
his brother except indirectly or nonverbally. 
Copyright doctrine has long recognized, at least in a few cases, 
that there is no practical alternative to allowing direct quotation: 
idea and expression “merge,” and one must allow use of verbal 
expression on pain of granting monopoly ownership in a fact (see 
Francione, 1986, p. 573). But the generality of the problem seems 
not to have been acknowledged, though at least one court has come 
close, noting that: “Factual works are different. Subsequent authors 
wishing to express the ideas contained in a factual work often can 
choose from only a narrow range of expression” and noting, 
significantly, about one statement that “just about any subsequent 
expression of that idea is likely to appear to be a substantially similar 
paraphrase of the words with which Landsberg expressed the idea” 
(Landsberg u. Scrabble Crossword Game  Players, Znc., 1984, p. 488). 
But no one seems to have made the point in full generality (Francione 
comes closest but apparently cannot bring himself to talk bluntly 
in terms of paraphrase. See Francione, 1986, pp. 570-75).The court’s 
odd phrase “substantially similar paraphrase” is telling; for outsiders, 
the whole point of paraphrase is to convey the information of the 
original, and the idea of a paraphrase that was not in that sense 
“substantially similar” is the idea of a poor paraphrase. The better 
a paraphrase, the worse it is in copyright. But it has to be stated 
as bluntly and forcefully as possible: forbidding paraphrase, or 
forbidding good paraphrase, amounts to forbidding use of the fact 
or information conveyed by the text paraphrased. The ban on 
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paraphase is flatly inconsistent with the ban on copyright in fact 
or information. As long as the ban on paraphrase continues, copyright 
in factual works will continue to present conflicts with the First 
Amendment. 
CONCLUSION 
The extenion of derivative rights to apply to “any...form in which 
a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted” is potentially the 
means of drastic further curtailment on the freedom to use ideas 
and information presented in copyrighted works-only potentially, 
for all depends on how courts come to understand the new wording 
of the law. When it comes to works of art and entertainment, we 
may not find the expansion of property rights of much concern from 
the point of view of intellectual freedom; does it matter, from that 
point of view, that we are forbidden to make rock videos or interactive 
computer graphics based on someone’s short story or poem? When 
i t  comes to works of fact, however, the matter is different. The freedom 
to use and, in particular, to inform others about information is not 
one we can afford to see curtailed. 
But as we have seen, even the thinnest copyright does have that 
effect-i.e., the inability to quote prevents the most accurate 
description of others’ speech acts. The conflict between intellectual 
freedom and intellectual property is guaranteed by the basic character 
of linguistic communication-that accurate description produces a 
copy or a paraphrase of what is said. In the past, the fair use doctrine 
was held to provide the needed loopholes that would mitigate the 
conflict. Recent constricted applications of that doctrine reduce the 
number of loopholes (without closing them all, to be sure). As long 
as copyright in works of fact is granted, the conflict will continue. 
Since those with economic interests in copyright are certain to keep 
up  pressure wherever and whenever possible to preserve and extend 
the range of protection, those concerned with intellectual freedom 
have to face the prospect of perpetual struggle to preserve the freedom 
to communicate and to use publicly available information. 
It is inevitable that the question of incentives for the production 
of factual works should arise, however, whenever i t  is proposed that 
copyright protection for factual works should be thin and protect 
only against exact copying. The idea was, as we saw at the beginning, 
that copyright was a bargain made to increase production of 
intellectual products; but if copyright does not extend to factual 
information, it hardly provides incentives to the production of new 
factual information. And in fact this is so; scientists and scholars 
do not do original research they would otherwise not do in the 
expectation of making money by the sale of copies of their books 
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or journal articles (or of movie rights). Basic scientific research is 
directly subsidized, mostly by governments; scholarly research is 
subsidized too by academic appointments that allow time and provide 
some resources for research (of ten insufficient, but not seriously 
supplemented by sale of copies of books). Government itself collects 
basic economic and social information and supports applied research 
in agriculture and medicine. In these areas i t  is not research that 
is supported by copyright but the publishing industry. If the copyright 
bargain was made in the hope of thereby increasing the supply of 
new factual information, of new knowledge, it is a bargain that was 
badly made for i t  does not have that result. And if the result of the 
bargain is that rights to use information are restricted, i t  is doubly 
bad, giving away what should not have been given away without 
any return. 
Author’s Note: An earlier version of this paper was read at the 
session on “Information as Intellectual Property” at the 49th Annual 
Meeting of the American Society for Information Science, October 
2, 1986. 
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Freedom and Equality of Access to Information: 
The Lacy Commission Report 
NANCYL. EATON 
ABSTRACT 
THECOMMISSION AND Equality of Access to Information O FREEDOM 
was an independent commission appointed in 1983 by American 
Library Association President Carol A. Nemeyer to re-examine some 
of the basic tenets that determine how the American people gain 
access to information in order to enable them to function as citizens 
and as productive members of society, with the focus on future access 
to information. This article examines the recommendations of the 
commission which focus upon dissemination of and access to 
information (particulary the broadcast industry, electronic informa- 
tion, and government publications), reports the ALA membership’s 
responses to the commission report, and notes benchmark 
publications and activities since 1986. 
INTRODUCTION 
The democratic experience in the United States has depended 
heavily upon a free flow of information. First Amendment protections 
have, however, been oriented toward print distribution of information. 
There has been growing concern about the effects of technology upon 
access to information. In response to this concern, Carol A. Nemeyer, 
president of the American Library Association (ALA) in 1982-83, 
appointed the Commission on Freedom and Equality of Access to 
Information in April 1983. The commission’s goal was “to reexamine 
some of the basic tenets that determine how the American people 
gain access to information in order to enable them to function as 
citizens and as productive members of society” (ALA, 1986, p. xi). 
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The 1986 report that resulted from the commission’s deliberations 
has become known as the Lacy Report, a reflection of the leadership 
of the commission’s chair, Dan Lacy. 
The commission was charged to contribute its best thinking to 
the problem of future access to information. It was an independent 
commission composed of notable leaders with authoritative expertise 
in many different aspects of the issues of access to information with 
membership drawn from both the public and private sectors. The 
resulting report was, therefore, a reflection of commission members’ 
thinking, not a reflection of the American Library Association’s 
policies or positions. The commission presented its report to the 
ALA Council with the intent of stimulating further examination 
of the issues. The Lacy Report clearly succeeded in that regard as 
ALA membership debated vigorously the content of report drafts 
in various open hearings during the commission’s deliberations, and 
a variety of actions have resulted subsequent to the submission of 
the final report. In a number of instances, ALA positions do not 
agree with recommendations or statements in the Lacy Report. The 
debate within ALA generated by the commission’s report has generally 
been acknowledged as healthy, important, and timely. 
THELACYREPORT 
The Lacy Report is important to the discussion of intellectual 
freedom in that people must have access to information if there is 
going to be a free flow of ideas in a democratic society. The thrust 
of the commission deliberations was not on censorship but rather 
upon dissemination of, and access to, information. In that context, 
the commission looked at three aspects: (1) the appropriateness of 
First Amendment coverage to broadcasting and electronic information 
delivery systems; (2)the physical, financial, educational, and technical 
barriers which technologically based systems pose for citizens; and 
( 3 )  distribution of, and access to, government information, 
particularly in light of increasing government reliance upon 
electronic information delivery systems. These elements, as presented 
by the commission, are summarized in the following discussion. 
THEFIRSTAMENDMENTAND THE FEDERAL 
COMMUNICATIONSACT 
With the exception of film, which originally was viewed by the 
courts as an entertainment medium and therefore not covered by the 
First Amendment (but which now enjoys full First Amendment 
protections) (ALA, 1986, pp. 22-23), other new technologies have not 
been viewed as appropriate to First Amendment protections. Public 
policy in the United States veered from the First Amendment approach 
of an earlier paper communications environment and began to rely 
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instead on anti-trust law and licensing of channels, cables, or wave- 
lengths. While the various media allow for very broad public access 
at output, they also narrow access at the point of input, since those 
who control the channels, airwaves, and cables also control what 
is broadcast or transmitted. Rather than applying the First 
Amendment to radio, television, and telephony, as in the case with 
print and films, the United States has adopted a policy of licensing 
whereby licensees must observe a “fairness doctrine” which requires 
that they afford a reasonable opportunity for the presentation of 
differing points of view on important controversial issues. In addition, 
political candidates must be afforded equal time and reasonable access 
to station facilities, and licensees cannot censor the content of a 
candidate’s presentation. The Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) has no censorship authority over the content of programs, 
but i t  has the power to vacate or refuse to renew a license if the 
licensee fails in its responsibilities as a trustee. Those responsibilities 
include ascertaining issues that are important to the community and 
offering contrasting points of view. This approach invests the licensee 
with a public trust to use the licensed segment of the spectrum in 
such a way as to serve the public interest (ALA, 1986,p. 7). In addition 
to licensing, anti-trust law has become increasingly important by 
creating competition (p. 7). 
An argument can be made that the First Amendment i s  
appropriate to the broadcast environment. 
Any restraints the licensee placed on, for example, political access to 
the public through radio or television were in a sense restraints imposed 
by, or at best licensed by, the Government itself. Hence, the First 
Amendment could be considered not as enfranchising the station owner 
to determine program content, but rather as restraining the owner, as 
it restrained the Government itself, from inappropriately abridging the 
freedom of those who might wish to speak over the radio or television. 
Common carrier treatment of broadcasting is both conceivable and 
consistent with the First Amendment. (pp. 23-24) 
Broadcasters themselves and many civil libertarians have thought i t  
wrong that the First Amendment should not he applied to broadcasting 
in the same way it is to print and to films. They believe that licensees 
should be freed from the obligations of the fairness doctrine and the 
equal-time provisions of Section 315 [of the Federal Communications 
Act]. Their argument is that these requirements in fact narrow rather 
than enlarge access; broadcasters may decide to avoid controversial topics 
and political campaigns altogether rather than deal with these 
restrictions. The argument for not applying the First Amendment to 
broadcasting as i t  is to print has been based primarily on the scarcity 
of broadcast channels. That is, in a medium not inherently open to 
all, the Government must license the few. The Supreme Court has indeed 
stated that it is because of this scarcity argument that it has upheld 
the constitutionality of the content-regulatory provisions of the Federal 
Communications Act. (p. 25) 
The Lacy Report, in looking at technological developments broadly, 
concludes that new telecommunications developments (increased 
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numbers of channels, cable systems, and electronic information 
delivery systems such as teletext) are modifying the structure of 
broadcasting and enhancing the opportunities for access to the media, 
which argues for reconsidering the appropriateness of First 
Amendment applicability to broadcasting. 
in rvery city there is a far wider rhoice of television channels than of 
newspapers, and that there is no rrason why the rights of a television 
station owner should not be as fully protected by the First Amendment 
as the rights of a newspaper publisher. Moreover, it is argued that the 
journalistic ethics of accuracy, objectivity, and fairness are as fully 
recognized and adhered to by broadcast as by print journalists. (ALA, 
1986, p. 35) 
The report argues that requirements of equal time for all candidates 
for office may actually restrict, not extend, access to the medium, 
that broadcasters may simply avoid such topics or not make free time 
available to any candidate for fear of having to provide it for many 
candidates (p. 36). 
The commission acknowledges four arguments for regulation: 
(1) the exclusive use of a television channel still has a great scarcity 
value as evidenced by purchase prices of channels; (2) the public 
must have means of assuring the fulfillment of the station’s 
responsibility imposed by the use of a license in the public interest; 
(3)  the fairness doctrine and equal-time provision protect the First 
and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the public and are intended 
to assure access to information as well as diversity of viewpoints; 
and (4) that broadcast television is so pervasive that it requires special 
consideration, and precedents from the field of print should not be 
automatically extended to i t  (p. 36). Though acknowledging these 
arguments and recognizing areas in which broadcasters have not been 
responsive to the public good (children’s programming, programming 
for the information-needy poor, elderly, or non-English-reading 
populations), the commission comes down on the side of deregulation. 
There would thus be an end to the governmental effort to seek fairness 
on all issues, case by case, that represents such a deep intrusion into 
daily editorial processes. There is a “letting in” process driven by 
technology but commendably furthered by government policy that is 
resulting in an explosion of new services, commercial and pay, terrestrial 
and satellite. This process should be accompanied by a “letting go” 
of excessive governmental restrictions on broadcast journalism. (p. 38) 
An eloquent dissenting opinion by Ben H. Bagdikian (p. 19) was 
entered into the record, and it  became a focal point for critics of 
the commission’s report. In his minority opinion, Bagdikian states: 
I disagree with my colleagues on the deregulation of telrvision. I do 
not share their optimism that cancellation of equal-time provisions will 
result in a substantial increase in responsible public affairs programming 
on a local and national level. I believr that the main deterrent to such 
programming will continue to be the preference of commercial 
broadcasters for more profitable entertainment programs. There are other 
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methods to permit stations to hold political interviews and discussions 
while still being held to fair standards such as debates held by the League 
of Women Voters. I believe equal-time provisions should apply to both 
paid and unpaid programs. I do agree that fairness standards should 
apply to patterns over a license period rather than on individual programs, 
but this requires that license challenges should be practicable for citizen 
groups with serious complaints. (p. 115) 
Going beyond television and radio, the commission examined 
the question of whether the electronic transmission of data and texts 
should be governed by the regulatory requirements of the Federal 
Communications Act or have the First Amendment freedoms of print. 
Drawing heavily from Ithiel de Sola Pool’s (1983) Technologies of 
Freedom, the commission took the position that: “Much of the 
problem will be solved if this type of regulation is very largely ended 
for television itself; but if not, the commission believes that teletext 
and similar transmissions of text and data electronically should have 
full First Amendment protection (i.e., the same as print)” (pp. 41- 
42). As with broadcasting, the commission bases its stance on the 
proliferation of alternatives. 
Electronic Znformation Deliuery Systems 
Apart from the issue of First Amendment protection for electronic 
information discussed earlier, the Lacy Commission divided its 
concern for access to electronic information into three broad areas: 
(1) access to telecommunications systems; (2) impediments to users 
of electronic systems; and (3)need to create an infrastructure to support 
electronic information similar to that which exists for print resources 
such as defined publishing services, bibliographies, catalogs, 
organized distribution mechanisms, review services, and clear legal 
bases (p. 54). The concern about telecommunications networks are 
very much like those pertaining to publishers, broadcasters, or 
common carriers in the ability of the owners of such facilities to 
control access in a discriminatory way. 
Historically we have sought to assure equitable access by competition 
among numerous facilities for the dissemination of ideas, as among book 
publishers; by a sense of professional responsibility when there is 
imperfect competition among facilities for dissemination, as in the case 
of the Associated Press or dominant newspapers; by federal regulation 
when there is governmental licensing of scarce facilities, as in the case 
of broadcasting; and by a common-carrier requirement when there is 
a franchised monopoly, as in the case of telephone services. (p. 42) 
Like the analysis of First Amendment issues, few would argue with 
the description of the problem as provided in the commission report, 
but many do argue with the commission’s conclusions. The report 
identifies the fundamental changes as follows: 
Fundamental changes are now being made in public policy in this area. 

Competition is to be relied on in place of de facto regulated monopoly 
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for long-distance telephone service. Though local telephone service 
remains a franchised monopoly with common-carrier status, its 
monopoly is challenged by unregulated competition, particularly for 
data communication. New kinds of dissemination facilities, notably cable 
television networks, have arisen which have an unresolved regulatory 
status. Private networks of large corporations play an increasingly 
important role. (p. 42) 
The commission generally supports deregulation of the telephone 
industry and supports the resulting competition (p. 43). And yet, 
the commission took a quite different stance on cable systems that 
have the capacity to move data as well as video and thus potentially 
become information providers or joint venturers in information 
provision, giving cable systems the opportunity to discriminate 
against or exclude competitive information providers. Because the 
user of a cable network is tied to one specific cable system, the user 
is a captive to that system in a way that the user of satellite or telephone 
networks is not, since the latter user has multiple options. For this 
reason, the commission recommended that cable systems come under 
sufficient regulatory control to assure nondiscriminatory access to 
some reasonable extent, following the general approach of the Cable 
Act of 1984, which generally eschews broadcast-type regulation of 
cable in favor of a combination of print and broadcast approaches 
(pp. 44-45). 
Whereas the discussion of First Amendment protections for radio, 
television, and cable systems referred little to the library as a major 
factor in access, the portions of the report which deal with information 
delivery, as opposed to broadcast journalism, recognize the central 
role that libraries will play in making electronic information available 
to the public. In this respect, i t  equates access to electronic information 
with that of print, in which public policies at the federal, state, and 
local levels have been enacted to overcome or reduce barriers to print 
resources, primarily through educational and library programs. The 
commission sees print and electronic information as analogous in 
terms of policies on what to provide, librarians acting as 
intermediaries to help patrons using these and other resources. 
It should be emphasized that these policies and practices [of providing 
access to databases] are not departures from but continuations, in another 
medium, of the policies and practices governing access to printed 
materials and that they have the same basic objectives: not to exclude 
users or narrow access, but to broaden access and make it more equitable 
and in particular to maintain the library’s services to those most in 
need of them ...keeping in mind always that the objective is to provide 
the broadest and the most equitable access possible within resources that 
are or can be made available. (p. 50) 
The commission points out that user fees imposed by libraries to 
offset costs of electronic database access are “inherently discriminatory 
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in publicly supported institutions and may constitute, for some 
individuals, a significant barrier to access to the best available or 
most appropriate information technology” (p. 50). Thus chapter 6 
of the report deals with recommendations for sources of funding which 
would not pass the costs on to the library patron. 
The one area in which the commission recognizes access to 
databases as being different both in degree and kind from access 
to print is in the lack of an infrastructure to support that individual 
access or interlibrary cooperation. 
We have indicated in other sections of this report our sense of the urgent 
necessity of the library profession, in cooperation with others, 
undertaking to create a bibliographical, cataloging, and institutional 
infrastructure for electronic data bases comparable to that for print. As 
a part of that infrastructure an arrangement will be badly needed that 
will allow state or regional libraries or networks to supplement the service 
of private online vendors in brokering access to national data bases; 
these might be analogous to the arrangements by which regional networks 
facilitate local library access to the Online Catalog Library Center 
(OCLC). (p. 51) 
The report goes on to discuss the capital investment needed for 
libraries to have the necessary equipment required to provide access 
to databases, the need to upgrade librarians’ skills in provision of 
electronic information services, and the need for user education in 
learning to use such systems; i t  describes roles for public, academic, 
and school libraries in these areas. The overall tone of the report 
continues to stress the need to balance legitimate private sector 
products and services with the need for public access. 
Marketplace forces that are propelled by the exotic and expensive new 
information technologies must be tempered by consideration for public 
interest and public need. Of course the free enterprise system must be 
allowed to function, indeed to flourish, but it must be understood that 
an information need is not always synonymous with the existence of 
an information market. Neither is it in the national interest to permit 
the development of a two-tier society incorporating a permanent 
underclass of print and information illiterates. As noted before, those 
who are denied access to information resources in either traditional or 
electronic formats are in a very real sense denied thereby the opportunity 
for full and effective participation in modern democratic society ....In 
particular...some major categories of government information are already 
accessible only electronically. This has profound consequences for 
libraries which have long served a social function to assure at least 
minimum citizen access to government information by means of the 
depository library program. (p. 100) 
An important suggestion of the report regards extension of the concept 
of postal subsidies for higher education and libraries to telecommun- 
ications networks, including the possibility of a dedicated satellite 
network or subsidy of telecommunications costs. (p. 114) 
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Access to Government Information 
The Lacy Commission dwells at some length on the role of the 
federal government in collection, availability, and hssemination of 
its own information, taking the position that access to government- 
controlled information-that created and collected by the govern- 
ment-is essential to the public understanding of national issues and 
often to the conduct of private business. The analysis is from four 
perspectives: (1)policy issues having to do with increasing restrictions 
to government information, particularly under the Reagan 
Administration; (2) policy issues pertaining to public versus private 
roles in packaging and distributing information gathered by the 
government; (3)  increasing use of security labeling or classification 
of documents to restrict the flow of scientific information and the 
publication of information by former governmental employees; and 
(4)increases in access costs under the Freedom of Information Act 
via administrative interpretation. The commission cites a study issued 
by the Committee on Government Operations of the U.S. House 
of Representatives which identified two potentially conflicting 
policies regarding federal statistical services, one which maintains 
that wide and ready access to basic information is essential to a 
democratic society and free market economy and thus supports the 
importance of a federal role, versus a second policy which maintains 
that federal data collections can be justified only to meet specific 
federal administrative or policy needs. The latter, narrower, policy 
has governed recent cuts in statistical services and suggested policy 
modifications in OMB Circular A-130 (p. 57). 
The commission tries to set out guidelines for public versus for- 
profit roles in dissemination of electronic information. In particular, 
i t  tries to distinguish what role the private sector plays in enhancing 
government electronic data through value-added software for retrieval 
and manipulation of information and data. While the commission 
concludes that “it is the responsibility of government to formulate 
and apply principles in the dissemination of government information 
that preserve a broad and balanced mix of public and private channels 
of access and hstribution, and that enhance rather than diminish, 
citizen access” (p. 79), the specific list of seven principles which the 
commission sets forth in hopes of providing a basis for policy decisions 
created much controversy upon release of the report to the ALA 
Council with many ALA members feeling that the principles (listed 
below) were biased toward the private sector: 
1. 	 The federal government should take a leadership role in creating 
a framework which would facilitate the development and foster 
the use of information products and services. 
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2. 	The federal government should establish and enforce policies and 
procedures that encourage, and do not discourage, investment by 
the private sector in the development and use of information 
products and services. 
3. 	The federal government should not provide information products 
and services in commerce except when there are compelling reasons 
to do so, and then only when i t  protects the private sector’s every 
opportunity to assume the function(s) commercially. 
4. 	 The federal government, when it uses, reproduces, or distributes 
information available from the private sector as part of an 
information resource, product, or service, must assure that the 
property rights of the private sector sources are adequately 
protected. 
5. 	The federal government should make governmentally distributable 
information openly available in readily reproducible form, without 
any constraints on subsequent use. 
6. 	The federal government should set pricing policies for distributing 
information products and services that reflect the true cost of access 
and/or reproduction, any specific prices to be subject to review 
by an independent authority. 
7. 	The federal government should actively use existing mechanisms, 
such as the libraries of the country, as primary channels for making 
governmentally distributable information available to the public. 
(pp. 79-80) 
The commission stressed that: “More than change in any particular 
law or regulation, we need a consistent policy to maximize the 
availability of information from the Government to its citizens” (p. 
80). Specifically, the commission suggested that: “The National 
Commission on Libraries and Information Science and the American 
Library Association and its allies should set up a means to give steady 
and continuing attention to the development and achievement of 
public policies in the light of the goals this report has tried to state 
(pp. 114-15). 
ALA RESPONSE 
The Lacy Commission Report, in its final form, was submitted 
to the ALA Council at its 1986 Midwinter Meeting. After much 
discussion, which centered around the concern over the disparity 
between philosophical views of members of the library community 
and some of the positions represented in the Lacy Report, the 
following resolution was passed by the Council: 
VOTED, that the report of the Commission be received with thanks, 
printed with a statement about ALA policy in this area and explicit 
clarification in the preface and cover layout that this is a report TO 
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ALA, not a statement of ALA policy, and refer i t  to all units of the 
Association for review and discussion at the 1986 Annual Conference. 
(AL’4. Special Committee, 1987, p. 2) 
The ALA Executive Board, at its spring 1986 meeting, authorized 
the formation of a committee to coordinate the review of the 
Commission Report; the seven member committee was charged to: 
(1) define and clarify access to information, resources, and service; 
(2) recommend appropriate actions to the ALA Executive Board and 
Council relative to “access” specifically in terms of ALA committees, 
divisions, and other units, ALA programs and policy; (3)  review the 
Lacy Report and other documents which may pertain to that report 
for implications for ALA programs and policy; (4) coordinate the 
review by all ALA units of the Lacy Report; and ( 5 ) submit a final 
report to the Executive Board (p. ii). A rigorous two-year review 
was undertaken by the Special Committee, which included interviews 
with ALA staff, open hearings, written reactions to the Lacy Report 
from ALA units, a review of the ALA planning process and ALA 
priorities as they pertained to access issues, a revirw of the ALA 
structure, and a review of ALA policies. 
A summary of unit responses was presented to the ALA Council 
in an Interim Report (June 28, 1987; 1987-88 Council Document #37). 
The Special Committee found that a significant majority of the 
recommendations in the Lacy Report were in alignment with current 
ALA policies. ALA units responding to these recommendations 
usually supported the recommendations and current ALA policy. 
Three of the Lacy Report recommendations appeared to be in conflict 
with ALA policy: (1) its recommendation for telecommunications- 
broadcast deregulation; (2) copyright and the cost of access to 
electronically stored information; and (3)  availability of government 
information. Seven areas were not specifically addressed in ALA policy 
(p. 4). Because the ALA Legislative Committee was in the process 
of revising its Federal Legislative Policy, these areas were referred 
to that unit for development of appropriate policies. Most of these 
areas are now reflected in the new A L A  Federal Legislatiue Policy 
(ALA, 1987). Unit responses included appreciation to the Lacy 
Commission for its role in bringing important issues to the forefront 
for discussion, but also expressed concern with the lack of consistency 
in some instances between the text of the report and the final 
recommendations in the appendix. There was also serious concern 
expressed about the text drifting into subjective and undocumented 
style, with conclusions not supported by analysis or fact (ALA. Special 
Committee, 1987, p. 4). 
In reviewing ALA unit activities, the ALA Intellectual Freedom 
Committee and the Executive Director of the Office of Intellectual 
Freedom expressed the opinion that all access issues were a subset 
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of intellectual freedom issues. However, the Special Committee 
eventually interpreted intellectual freedom as a subset of access issues 
as illustrated in the following definition and Figure 1: 
Library users are central to ALA’s concern about access. To focus attention 
on this centrality, the Special Committee developed a model which 
graphically conveys the multiplicity of factors and activities related to 
serving the users’ needs. At the center are “users” and various political, 
economic, and social constraints which affect the individual’s ability 
to access information. Surrounding the users are institutional and 
environmental factors impacting access. The outer circle represents the 
impact that laws, regulations, public policies, standards, and ALA 
policies have on the access issue. The diagram illustrates the complexity 
and interrelationship of issues that fall within the domain of “access 




Figure 1. Intellectual freedom as a subset of access issues 
Further, the Special Committee found that: 
Historically, intellectual freedom and federal library legislation have 
been major and compelling issues for the Association. Although we have 
forged strong action-oriented programs in these two areas, the attention 
paid to access by the units and offices interested in intellectual freedom 
and legislation has been necessarily bound by their particular focus. 
Other units have addressed some specific access issues such as standards, 
bibliographic instruction, and library automation. However, to fulfill 
its mission statement, ALA needs an infrastructure to allow an 
association-wide concern and ability to respond rapidly and more 
extensively than the current primary focus on federal legislation and 
intellectual freedom allows. (p. 5 )  
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The Special Committee recommended formation of a standing 
committee of the ALA Council as an initial step in developing an 
association-wide infrastructure for confronting access to information 
issues (pp. 8-9). This recommendation was approved by Council at 
its annual conference in June 1988. That standing committee has 
since been activated. In addition, recommendations were also accepted 
for an annual inventory of ALA activities pertaining to access issues, 
for a periodic survey of national access issues by the Office of Research, 
for an annual “town meeting” forum for ALA members to discuss 
access issues, and for an annual article on access in the A L A  Yearbook. 
SUBSEQUENT PUBLICATIONSBENCHMARK AND ACTIVITIES 
The Lacy Commission was astute in identifying the elements 
of the national debate pertaining to access to information which has 
continued to occupy the library profession. Those issues have received 
intensive scrutiny since 1986, resulting in a number of important 
subsequent publications which are summarized below: 
1. 	 1987 A L A  Federal Legislative Policy. The ALA policies were 
updated to include sections on public access to federal information, 
equal access to library service, and a new section on policies 
surrounding information technologies. Specific references are 
made to national library and information networks, technical 
standards and copyright protection, telecommunications and 
broadcast media, and information technology education. 
2. 	 Electronic Collection and Dissemination of Information by Federal 
Agencies: A Policy Overview. This report by the Committee on 
Government Operations of the U.S. House of Representatives 
(1986) identifies problems raised by electronic information systems 
and suggests how the new technology can be employed without 
undermining the objectives of government information policy. The 
report recommends that: 
Agencies use the new information technology to broaden and improve 
public use of government information; more administrative guidance 
on the development and use of electronic information systems be 
provided; agencies consult regularly with those affected by electronic 
information systems; competitive procurements be used for the 
acquisition of automated information products and services; and laws 
that have been interpreted to allow agencies to maintain exclusive control 
over electronic data bases be modified. (p. 2) 
3. 	Technology 6 U S .  Government Information Policies: Catalysts 
for New Partnerships. This report of the Association of Research 
Libraries Task Force on Government Information in Electronic 
Format (1987) focuses on the issue that technology, moving faster 
than policy development, has left U.S. government information 
programs resting on uncertain foundations. The report tries to 
develop a framework for understanding philosophically, function- 
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ally, and fiscally the patterns that exist for government information 
and the shifts in those patterns resulting from the introduction 
of government information in electronic formats. It presents a 
taxonomy to acknowledge distinctions and categorize the 
characteristics of government information in electronic format and 
a model that identifies potential value-added processes for an 
information system. It urges studies on the budgetary mechanisms 
that support government information creation, delivery, and usage 
and the impact of different electronic formats on these mechanisms, 
which should contribute to a clearer picture of present and 
prospective public and private financing of government 
information programs (p. v). This report draws heavily on concepts 
in Robert S. Taylor’s (1986) Value-Added Processes in Information 
Systems. 
4. Informing the  Nation: Federal Information Dissemination in a n  
Electronic Age. This critical work published by the U.S. Congress, 
Office of Technology Assessment (1988), surveys a wide range of 
governmental issues including the Government Printing Office, 
the National Technical Information Service (NTIS),  the 
Superintendent of Documents, and depository libraries. It provides 
an overview of federal information dissemination, key technology 
trends relevant to federal information and dissemination, 
alternative futures for the Government Printing Office, alternative 
futures for the Depository Library Program, electronic dissem- 
ination of congressional information, and an analysis of the 
Freedom of Information Act in an electronic age. In the words 
of the report: 
OTA has concluded that congressional action is urgently needed to resolve 
Federal information dissemination issues and to set the direction of 
Federal activities for years to come. The government is at a crucial point 
where opportunities presented by the information technologies, such 
as productivity and cost-effectiveness improvements are substantial. 
However, the stakes, including preservation and/or enhancements of 
public access to government information plus maintenance of the fiscal 
and administrative responsibilities of the agencies, are high and need 
to be carefully balanced by Congress. (p. 3) 
5. 	A R C S  Executiue Briefing Package, “L ink ing  Researchers and 
Resources: T h e  Emerging Informution Infrastructure and the  
N R E N  Prolbosal.” This packet describes the National Research 
and Education Network (NREN), a proposed advanced computer 
network that would link universities, research libraries, national 
laboratories, nonprofit institutions, government research 
organizations, and private companies engaged in government- 
supported research and education. The NREN would consolidate 
and build upon existing interconnected telecommunications 
networks, commonly known as the Internet. It presents material 
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on the evolution of the proposal, pending legislation through July 
1990, and benefits which would accrue to researchers and to the 
U.S. competitive position vis-A-vis other countries through 
development of new technologies. 
6. 	Coal i t ion  fo r  Ne tworked  In format ion .  This voluntary coalition 
was initiated in 1989 and is composed of member institutions that 
belong to the Association of Research Libraries, CAUSE and 
EDUCOM. Its mission is to promote the creation and utilization 
of information resources in network environments by formulating 
and promulgating policies and protocols that enable powerful, 
flexible, and universal technical infrastructures (ARL, 1990, p. 1). 
This mission addresses the concern for lack of an infrastructure 
similar to that for print which was addressed in the Lacy Report. 
7. 	H e l p i n g  America  Compete:  T h e  R o l e  of Federal Scienti f ic (1. 
Technical In format ion  ( S T I ) .  According to this report by the U.S. 
Congress, Office of Technology Assessment (1990), electronic media 
offer the only way to manage the massive volume and complexity 
of federal scientific and technical information, but state that the 
transition to electronic formats will be difficult for many users. 
It goes on to say that: 
Progress on STI also depends on resolving governmentwide information 
dissemination policy issues. During the 1980's, OMB [Office of 
Management and Budget] used its authority under the Paperwork 
Reduction Act to favor private-sector responsibility for Federal 
information dissemination. The OMB view was controversial and sent 
mixed signals to the Federal R&D agencies about whether electronic 
STI should be aggressively pursued. Legislation pending before Congress 
would rebalance government policy to emphasize that Federal agencies 
(including the R&D agencies) have the primary responsibility for 
hssemination of information generated for agency missions, with an 
important supplementary or complementary-rather than preemptive- 
role for the private sector. This legislation also addresses information 
management, pricing, public access, due process, and other policy matters 
that would directly affect STI. (pp. 2-3) 
CONCLUSIONS 
The issues raised by the Lacy Report provided the library 
profession with a full agenda for years to come. The issues are very 
complex, and the technology is changing faster than the profession's 
ability to grapple with the legal and policy implications which come 
with each new product or advance. While the federal deficit will 
continue to restrict availability of public funding and therefore 
encourage contracting out and privatization of information, the 
release of I n f o r m i n g  t h e  N a t i o n  indicates an increasing awareness 
that the policy issues cannot be ignored. New approaches to copyright 
of electronic information to protect intellectual property rights must 
still be sought, and experimentation with new definitions of public/ 
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private roles in information production and dissemination suggested 
by the Association of Research Libraries’ study and Robert Taylor’s 
value-added models await the concerned librarian. 
REFERENCES 
American Library Association. (1987). A L A  federal legislative policy. Chicago, IL: 
ALA. 
American Library Association. Commission on Freedom and Equality of Access to 
Information. (1986). Freedom and equality of access to information. Chicago, IL: 
ALA. 
American Library Association. Special Committee on Freedom and Equality of Access 
to Information. (1987). Interim report (1987-88 CD#37). Chicago, IL: ALA. 
American Library Association. Special Committee on Freedom and Equality of Access 
to Information. (1988). Final report and recommendations (1987-88 CD#46). 
Chicago, IL: ALA. 
Association of Research Libraries. (1990). ARL/EDUCOM/CAUSE Network Coalition 
Formed. ARL:  A Bimonthly Newsletter of Research Library Issues and Actions, 
143(4 May): 1. 
Association of Research Libraries. (1990). Link ing  researchers and resources: T h e  
emerging information infrastructure and the NREN proposal. Washington, DC: 
ARL. 
Association of Research Libraries. (1987). Technology 6.U.S. Gouernment information 
policies: Catalysts for new partnerships. Report of the Task Force on Government 
Information in Electronic Format. Washington, DC: ARL. 
Taylor, R. S. (1986). Value-added processes in information systems. Norwood, NJ: 
Ablex Publishing Corporation. 
U.S. 	Congress. Office of Technology Assessment. (1990). Helping America compete: 
T h e  role of federal scientific Q technical information (OTA-CIT-454). Washington, 
DC: USGPO. 
U.S. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment. (1988). Informing the nation; Federal 
information dissemination in an electronic age (OTA-CIT-396). Washington, DC: 
USGPO. 
U.S. 	House of Representatives. Committee on Government Operations. (1986). 
Electroniccollection and dissemination of information by federal agencies: A policy 
oueruiew (Twenty-Eighth Report). Washington, DC: USGPO. 
Resolving Conflicts between Information 
Ownership and Intellectual Freedom 
YALEM. BRAUNSTEIN 
ABSTRACT 
THETENSION BETWEEN information ownership and intellectual 
freedom emerges both from the balancing of economic and political 
interests and as a result of the underlying structure of communications 
and information industries. This theme is addressed in the context 
of a review of the articles by Eaton, Milevsky, and Wilson which 
appear in this issue of Library  Trends. 
INTRODUCTION 
The current legal and economic view of the statutory mechanisms 
by which we establish and enforce ownership rights in intellectual 
property-copyright and patent-is that they seek to balance the 
incentives for authors, artists, and inventors to create new works with 
the benefits to society from having such works available freely 
(Braunstein et al., 1977; Bush & Dreyfuss, 1979). But the origins of 
copyright are not based in this balancing approach nor does this 
logic necessarily carry over to other forms of protection-e.g., trade 
secrecy rights, in the commercial context, and national security 
restrictions such as “classification.” 
The tension between ownership of (the exercise of property rights 
in) information and the concept of intellectual freedom arises from 
two foundations: The first is the perceived need for state power and 
the desire of the state to exercise control-and sometimes limit the 
control of others-over communications media and messages; the 
second is the underlying economics of the production and distribution 
of information, especially the interplay of communications 
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technology and economics. This article describes the nature of this 
tension and, in so doing, analyzes several of the points raised in 
the articles by Eaton, Milevski, and Wilson which appear in this 
issue of Library Trends. 
THEROLE OROF THE STATEIN DISSEMINATING 
RESTRICTINGINFORMATION 
The potential for conflict that Wilson sees between intellectual 
freedom and ownership rights in intellectual property is not new. 
One can go back to the original meaning of “copyright”-the 
privileges granted to certain printers by the Crown. In England, prior 
to the Statute of Anne in 1710, copyright referred to the exclusive 
rights given to members of the Stationers’ Company and was seen 
as a legal means of restricting unbridled use of the new printing 
technology. Starting with the Statute of Anne, copyright in Europe 
was transformed into a means of protecting the rights of authors. 
That this transformed notion of copyright is meant to provide 
incentives for the creation of literary and scientific works can be 
seen in the provision in the United States Constitution: “The Congress 
shall have power to ...p romote the progress of science and useful arts, 
by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive 
right to their respective writings and discoveries” (U.S. Sect. 8, Para. 
8). 
But the tension between dissemination and control has never 
been eliminated. We currently consider i t  to be mostly between 
competing economic interests-rewards for authors versus benefits 
to society. Wilson shows that the recognition of “derivative” rights, 
the right “to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted 
work” (17 U.S.C., 5 106, 1976) in the revision of the U.S. Copyright 
Law moves the conflict between property rights and intellectual 
freedom from merely an abstract concern to reality. 
Wilson believes that a uniform system of copyright (across all 
levels of originality and all technologies) is a primary factor in the 
tension between rights in intellectual property and intellectual 
freedom. He draws on an Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) 
analysis of the difficulties in applying copyright law to new 
technologies to support his view. The OTA report distinguishes 
between works of art, works of fact, and functional works, and argues 
that different degrees of protection may be appropriate across these 
three classes (U.S. Congress, OTA, 1986). 
In that the OTA report focuses on the technological origins of 
the distinctions across the classes, i t  owes much to John Hersey’s 
(1979) dissent from the software recommendations of the National 
Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works 
(CONTU). Hersey primarily distinguishes communications which 
128 LIBRARY TRENDUSUMMER & FALL 1990 
have human beings as both sender and receiver from those with 
machines, but i t  is clear that he sees further problems raised by the 
existence of “adaptations.” In this, his concerns parallel many of 
those raised by Wilson. 
We are reminded by Milevski (in this issue of Library  Trends) 
that governments continue to restrict the flow of information. One 
might question her contention that the need for national security 
controls on the flow of information is noncontroversial and wish 
for the debate to be put in the broader context of restrictions in 
the flow of information. Nevertheless, her discussion of the changes 
in the approach to, and methods of, implementation provide a useful 
overview of the topic. 
THEROLEOF ECONOMIESOF SCALE 
IN MEDIASTRUCTURE 
The major economic factor influencing both the structure of 
communications and information industries and the pressure for 
government regulation of many of these industries is economies of 
scale. Loosely speaking, economies of scale is the low cost of serving 
another user given one has made the investment in production and/ 
or distribution facilities (or both); its presence or absence is, at least 
partially, determined by the underlying technology. Scale economies 
are of ten known by industry-specific names such as high “first-copy 
costs” in printing and publishing, and “network economies” in 
point-to-point telecommunications. The presence of economies of 
scale, even if unchecked by government action, does not immediately 
lead to monopoly production or distribution. Among the factors that 
influence the number of competing entities in  a given market are 
the distribution of tastes of the consumers, the relationship between 
the size of a firm with low production costs and the overall size of 
the market, and the viable technologies utilized and the mix of 
products and services produced (see Baumol et al., 1988; Scherer, 1980). 
Economies of scale and related phenomena have been cited as 
the primary reasons for the need for a single ubiquitous telephone 
network, the death of competing large city newspapers, the growth 
of newspaper chains, and the dominance of the three commercial 
television networks. Ignoring for the moment that the technologies 
in many of these areas are changing, the traditional policy responses 
generally include licensing and public utility regulation. For example, 
Eaton states in this issue of Library Trends: 
With the exception of film, which originally was viewed by the courts 
as an entertainment medium and therefore not covered by the First 
Amendment (but which now enjoys full First Amendment protections) 
(ALA, 1986, pp. 22-23), other new technologies have not been viewed 
as appropriate to First Amendment protections. Public policy in  the 
United States veered from the First Amendment approach of an earlier 
BRAUNSTEIN/RESOLVING CONFLICTS 129 
paper communications environment and began to rely instead on  anti- 
trust law and licensing of channels, cables, or wavelengths. (Eaton, this 
issue of Library Trends). 
But this statement ignores the significant differences between 
common carriers on the one hand and broadcasters on the other. 
This is the fundamental choice as to whether the medium is to serve 
primarily as a conduit for messages and programming provided by 
others or whether the owners of the medium are to be able to exercise 
editorial control. Furthermore, i t  leads one to an erroneous dichotomy 
as illustrated in Eaton’s next statement: 
While the various media allow for very broad public access at  output, 
they also narrow access at the point of input since those who control 
the channels, airwaves, and cables also control what is broadcast or 
transmitted. (Eaton, this issue of Library Trends) 
In other words, while the limits on access (at the point of input) 
and control appear to be determined by technology and economics, 
they are fundamentally determined by the policy choice of how a 
given communications medium is to be organized. The Commun- 
ications Act of 1934 has two major sections, one relating to 
broadcasting and the other to common carriage (47 U.S.C., 3 151, 
1970). Although the policy choice to view and regulate radio (and, 
by extension, television) as other than a common carrier was made 
prior to the 1934 Act, this question was partially reopened with the 
emergence of cable television. Cable television, i t  has been argued, 
has characteristics of both a broadcaster and a common carrier, and, 
as a result, was considered by the FCC to “fall between the cracks.” 
Without legislative guidance, the ultimate decision on which regime 
to apply was left to the courts (see FCC u. Midwest Vzdeo COT@., 
1979). 
The distinction between broadcasting with its editorial control 
and common carriage can define the terms of access. This is true 
both of access by program producers to the means of distribution 
and of access by the public to a diverse mix of programming (see 
Owen, 1970). However, i t  has been shown that while mandated access 
by programmers at rates fixed by regulation may increase access by 
programmers, i t  has the potential of reducing the diversity of offerings 
available to viewers (Besen & Johnson, 1982). 
VERTICALRELATIONSHIPS 
Analyses of economies of scale focus on the appropriate size and 
number of entities at only one level in the production-distribution-
usage chain. But often we find a single entity that operates at more 
than one stage on this chain, possibly through common ownership 
of divisions that operate at two or more levels. Furthermore, it is 
possible that exclusive relationships might keep a supplier at one 
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level from selling to a distributor at another level (or vice versa). 
While these vertical relationships have the possibility of restricting 
access, it is also argued that they enable new material to be produced. 
This can be the result of the financial resources that the multidivi- 
sional organization can bring to the market or the reduction in risk 
and transactions costs that result from having a guaranteed source 
of supply (or guaranteed market, depending on one’s perspective). 
The Lacy Commission argued for dropping any restrictions on 
the entry of American Telephone & Telegraph (AT&T) into the 
information services market (ALA, 1986). Eaton, on the other hand, 
worries about the risk of competitors being overwhelmed by AT&T 
(this issue of Library Trends). The divestiture of the Bell System 
may have reduced any need for concerns about bigness per se; however, 
the specific issues that are raised by vertical integration are still present 
in a world where the “Baby Bells” (the former Bell System local 
operating companies and their seven regional holding companies) 
are mounting a new drive to provide a variety of information services. 
Unfortunately, these more complex issues are not covered well in 
either the Lacy Report or Eaton’s article. 
WHATDOESFREEACCESSMEAN? 
Both Eaton and the Lacy Commission appear to move between 
two different concepts when discussing “free access” to information 
(see Eaton’s article in this issue; ALA, 1986). This is most likely 
due to the dual meaning of the word free in the English language. 
We use the same word to mean “unhindered” and “without charge” 
while many other languages use two different words for these separate 
concepts (compare “liber” and “gratis” in French, for example). This 
problem of dual definition appears in the discussion of government 
user fees restricting access to federal data sources and in the notion 
that i t  is “inherently discriminatory” for a library to charge for access 
to electronic databases. (Eaton, this issue. See also, ALA, 1986). 
The Lacy Commission seems implicitly to be aware that the 
imposition of fees can, under certain circumstances, improve access 
by encouraging entry of additional information providers and by 
providing libraries with funds that are of ten otherwise unavailable 
(ALA, 1986). Eaton points out, however, that such views are in conflict 
with stated ALA policies. 
CONCLCJSION 
As Eaton points out, the Lacy Commission argues for “a 
consistent policy to maximize the availability of information from 
the government to its citizens” (Eaton, this issue. See also, ALA, 
1986). But this consistency should be limited. If we accept the premise 
that, at least in some instances, user fees can generate revenues that 
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allow producers of information to expand or at least continue their 
operations, it is reasonable to support the imposition of such fees 
so that more information is made available. But should this policy 
be extended to fees charged by public libraries? If not, is the rationale 
based on sound logic or simply on a bias toward having a base level 
of service provided without charge? 
Similarly, should the desire for consistency prevent us from 
having different forms of property rights for different types of 
information even if, as Wilson shows, maintaining consistency can 
lead to a reduction in intellectual freedom? It may be time to reconsider 
the notion of a single form of copyright which is applicable across 
works that may have far different levels of originality and that are 
produced in a variety of technologies. 
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Federal Policy-Making and National Security 
Controls on Information 
SANDRAN. MILEVSKI 
ABSTRACT 
[Author’s Note: The views expressed in this article are those of the 
author and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. National 
Commission on Libraries and Information Science.] 
THISARTICLE REVIEWS the roles of the three branches of government 
in making policy for national security controls on information. It 
reviews legislative actions (statutes, appropriations, hearings) and 
executive actions (executive orders, regulations, contract provisions) 
in the post-war era with a focus on developments during the Carter, 
Reagan, and Bush presidencies. 
INTRODUCTION 
All three branches of the federal government-legislative, 
executive, and judicial-have a role in making information policy 
and, more specifically, in making policies governing national security 
controls over information. Such controls are most frequently exercised 
over technological data, data of a sensitive military nature, or 
information critical for trade considerations. In providing the various 
controls in effect today, the three branches have acted within the 
broad operational bounds provided by the Constitution-i.e., the 
legislature makes laws which are then interpreted and enforced by 
the executive with the judciary having powers of final oversight. 
HISTORY 
A brief review of major national security actions since World 
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War I1 traces the development and expansion of the concept. In the 
period immediately preceding and including the war, national 
security considerations were strictly limited to military affairs. The 
year 1940 marked the first in a series of Executive Orders (E.O.) issued 
by the president to establish policies and procedures for classifying 
information; E.O. 8381 (Roosevelt) served as the basis for all later 
executive revisions of the national security information classification 
system. In 1946, Congress took a more extreme stance than the 
president with enactment of the Atomic Energy Act, which was born 
of the secretive wartime Manhattan Project. This law provided that, 
unlike other military information which was to be reviewed and then 
classified, all nuclear-related information was automatically classified 
from its creation, regardless of its ownership and whether i t  was 
created in the public or private sectors. The 1950 Espionage Act 
provided for communications secrecy, including cryptography, and 
certain patent applications were to be delayed to protect them from 
public disclosure under the Invention Secrecy Act. 
In 1947 the omnibus National Security Act revamped the 
organization of the entire defense establishment. It established the 
National Security Council (NSC) and the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) and gave the latter responsibility for intelligence operations. 
In 1951 President Truman issued E.O. 10290 which stirred some 
controversy because i t  included in the national security classification 
system, for the first time, nonmilitary as well as military agencies. 
The emphasis was slowly changing from a wartime to a post-war 
mentality, and by 1954 the Atomic Energy Act was revised to meet 
the needs and concerns of private enterprises involved in the nuclear 
industry. 
Over the next two decades, four Executive Orders refined the 
classification system: E.O. 10104 and 10501 (Eisenhower, 1953); E.O. 
11652 (Nixon, 1972); and E.O. 12065 (Carter, 1978). The Nixon E.O. 
marked an expansion of the concept of national security by adding 
“foreign relations” (a vague term exceeding policy considerations 
to include diplomacy and operations) to the national defense formula 
to comprise national security. The Carter E.O. limited the extent 
of classification by introducing two new criteria for classification: 
(1) damage to national security had to be identifiable and not just 
potential, and (2) when deciding whether to declassify a previously 
classified document, officials were to apply a “balancing test” of 
whether the value of the information to the public exceeded the threat 
to national security. 
The executive has perhaps more leeway in establishing national 
security controls than the other two branches of government because 
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of its dominance in the foreign relations domain, its many agencies 
writing regulations that interpret the laws of Congress, and its ability 
to act quickly and seize the initiative when compared with the 
legislature and the judiciary. Harold C. Relyea (1987) has said that 
“national security remains a largely ambiguous concept of ten 
appearing but otherwise undefined in Federal statutes, given 
considerable deference and latitude by the judiciary, and affording 
the executive enormous power and broad discretion regarding its 
application” (p.22). 
The federal agencies most frequently involved in national 
security controls include the Departments of Commerce (export ’ 
controls), Defense (contract provisions), Energy (nuclear informa- 
tion), and State (immigration). National security considerations have 
prompted these agencies, as well as components of the Executive 
Office of the president such as the National Security Council, the 
Central Intelligence Agency, and the Office of Management and 
Budget, to classify information and impose other secrecy restrictions, 
limit the export of goods and information, delay or prevent the 
issuance of patents, and attempt to censor the communications of 
certain classes of citizens, such as scientists and federal employees 
and contractors. 
Over the past decade in particular, the content and manner of 
implementation by the executive branch of various national security 
controls over information have engendered controversy because of 
their circumscription of national traditions of intellectual freedom 
and international traditions of open scientific communication. This 
trend began in the late 1970s during the Carter Administration when 
various scientific, educational, and other types of exchanges between 
the Soviet Union and the United States were curtailed; when the 
administration sought to forestall publication of the (unclassified) 
memoirs of a former CIA operative and of information on assembling 
a hydrogen bomb, and when the unprovoked Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan in December 1979 brought detente to a crashing halt. 
A series of “spy scandals,” unfolding over several years, followed. 
During this time the first attempts by the government to limit 
scientific communication were begun, and the Supreme Court in 
h e @ @v. United States (1980)decided that secrecy agreements imposed 
upon the intelligence community are constitutional. 
Concern over the outflow of U.S. technological information was 
genuine and widespread among those knowledgeable in the area; 
i t  was not a creation of overzealous government censors. In the late 
1970s commercial competitors and hostile military parties stepped 
up  their efforts to acquire such data. The Soviet Union in particular 
shifted from an exclusively military focus to an all-inclusive one, 
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targeting the civilian sector and universities as well. These efforts 
prompted Admiral Bobby R. Inman (1982) to utter his famous remark 
about the “hemorrhage of the country’s technology.” Various 
professional societies reviewed the situation, and the American 
Council on Education recommended voluntary prepublication review 
for sensitive manuscripts in the field of cryptography. A 1976 
Department of Defense task force chaired by J. Fred Bucy, president 
of Texas Instruments, had already emphasized the need to hold back 
the technology but not the basic science. It was the Bucy Report 
(Dept. of Defense, 1976) which introduced the concept of “critical 
technologies” which was the basis of the 1979 Export Administration 
Act. Thus controversy surrounding national security controls stems 
not from their need, but  from the degree and methods of 
implementation. 
The federal government’s statutory authority to impose national 
security controls is elaborated by executive branch administrative 
regulations, contract provisions stemming from them, and 
presidential directives. Pertinent statutes include the aforementioned 
Atomic Energy Act, the Invention Secrecy Act, the Arms Export 
Control Act, the Export Administration Act, the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (McCarran Act), plus the federal agency-generated 
regulations governing their implementation. The well-known 
Freedom of Information Act does not apply to national security 
considerations as explained later. 
STATUTESAND COMPANIONREGULATIONS 
Enacted in 1946 and amended in 1954, the Atomic Energy Act 
establishes a category of data-“restricted data”-dealing with atomic 
weapons and nuclear materials over which the federal government 
has exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of the creator of the data. Private 
individuals or enterprises creating such data with private funds as 
well as federally funded contractors and federal employees are equally 
liable under this law, which was the authority cited in 1979 when 
the Carter Administration opposed The  Progressive, which published 
directions for assembling a hydrogen bomb. In 1981 Congress further 
amended this act to allow the Secretary of Energy to halt the 
dissemination of unclassified information if i t  could have a negative 
effect on the common defense or on public health and safety. In 
April 1985, the Department of Energy completed work on and issued 
the final regulations accompanying this amendment which prohibits 
the unauthorized disclosure of “Unclassified Controlled Nuclear 
Information” (UCNI). 
The Invention Secrecy Act (1951) is designed to allow the federal 
government to control private technological data revealed in patent 
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applications if it might harm national security. Developed for wartime 
situations and made permanent in 1952, i t  charges the Patent 
Commissioner with reviewing patent applications and if, in his 
opinion, their disclosure might be detrimental, passing them on to 
the defense agencies for review. The agencies may decide for secrecy, 
in which case the Patent Office may withhold any given patent for 
one year. This period of time may be extended, but the applicant 
may also appeal to the Secretary of Commerce and make claims for 
damages and compensation through the court system. 
The Arms Export Control Act (1976) controls the export of goods 
and materials from the United States and the access which foreign 
citizens may have to the same within this country. Such controls 
have been in place for over fifty years, first under a joint resolution 
of Congress (1935), then under the Neutrality Act (1937-39) and the 
Mutual Security Act (1954). The International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations (ITAR) that accompany the act include certain scientific 
information-“technical data”-as a category of exportable (or 
nonexportable) good, and, in addition, define the term “export” so 
broadly as to encompass release of the informatien within the United 
States. The Department of State, with the assistance of the Department 
of Defense, maintains the companion list of embargoed goods-the 
U.S. Munitions List. The term “list” is a misnomer since its size 
approximates that of the Manhattan telephone directory. 
The more recent Export Administration Act (1979, as amended 
in 1981, 1985, and 1988) has a similar function and is implemented 
through the Export Administration Regulations. The Department 
of Commerce maintains the accompanying Commodity Control List 
for dual use items, while Commerce along with Defense and Energy 
compile the Militarily Critical Technologies List. The latter list, over 
700 pages long, is itself a classified document. 
The original Export Administration Act was due to expire 
automatically during the 98th Congress. As the Congress progressed 
and lawmakers realized that they would not be able to complete a 
full reauthorization before the act lapsed, they twice passed legislation 
temporarily extending it  from September 30, 1983to October 14, 1983 
(PL 98-108) and again from February 29, 1984 to March 30, 1984 
(PL 98-222). However, Congress failed to pass a permanent law before 
its expiration on March 30 and before the conclusion of the 98th 
Congress, and President Reagan issued an Executive Order (E.O. 
12470) on that same day, just as he had in the interim period between 
October and February. Both Executive Orders declared a state of 
national emergency and invoked the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act to continue the export controls. When the 
99th Congress finally passed the Export Administration Amendments 
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Act of 1985 (PL 99-64), the president revoked the state of emergency 
with another E.O. (12525). This seesaw serves to illustrate the superior 
speed and flexibility which the executive enjoys over the relatively 
lumbering pace of Congress. 
As of this writing, the most recent revisions to the rules governing 
the Commodity Control List were published by Commerce’s Bureau 
of Export Administration in the February 28, 1989 Federal Register. 
Amendments made to the Export Administration Act by the 1988 
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act (PL 100-418) called for 
changes that include enhancing multilateral controls over technology 
exports, easing exports to the People’s Republic of China, simplifying 
licensing requirements, reducing processing times, reducing the size 
of the list, and defining the roles of the various agencies involved 
(the act also provided penalties for Toshiba Machine Company and 
Kongsberg Vaapenfabrik, which sold controlled technology to the 
USSR). Other changes in the regulations stemmed from recommen- 
dations of the Secretaries of State and Energy and from multilateral 
strategic controls reviews held by the United States and allied 
countries through the coordinating committee (COCOM). 
A recently enacted law expands the two export control acts 
explained earlier. The Department of Defense Authorization Act for 
fiscal year 1984 (PL 98-94) allows DoD to withhold technical data 
under its control from domestic public disclosure if those data fall 
under nonexportable categories on any of the lists or if they require 
a license or approval for export. Two DoD directives issued in 
November 1984 elaborate on the law. This provision reinforces the 
earlier regulations’ broad interpretation of the definition of “export,” 
which includes the domestic dissemination of information to be kept 
from foreign nationals. The key terms within the context of these 
three statutes are “technical data” and “export”; any data or 
information falling under these terms need not undergo the 
classification process for dissemination to be prohibited. The 1985 
regulations provide for a system of seven levels of markings 
(unclassified/unlimited; DoD; DoD and contractors; federal 
government; federal government and contractors; special class; subject 
to export control) on documents to identify the type of source and 
to expedite release of the information without the need to trace the 
originating organization (Young, 1985). 
A final statute providing authority for the application of national 
security controls within the United States is the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (“McCarran Act,” 1952) which allows the Department 
of State to deny entry to this country to foreign nationals because 
of their political and ideological beliefs. Upheld by the Supreme 
Court in Kleindienst u. Mandel (1972), this act serves as the basis 
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for actions started in the late 1970s by the Department of State, 
sometimes in conjunction with Commerce in its export control 
capacity, to prevent foreign scientists, students, and others from 
acquiring sensitive information through participation in conferences, 
attending classes in certain subjects, or performing laboratory 
research. 
The first well-known incident occurred in February 1980 when 
the American Vacuum Society was forced to rescind invitations to 
its international meeting. Early in 1981 the State Department informed 
Cornell University that certain East European foreign visitors would 
be limited to classroom activities. In the fall of that year, the State 
Department advised university administrators to exclude students 
from the People’s Republic of China from studies and/or research 
in certain fields. 
The limitations on scientific communication and academic 
freedom which these visa conditioning and campus policing 
requirements represented mobilized the science and academic 
communities, which have released a series of reports on the matter. 
Early examples are the landmark September 1982 National Academy 
of Sciences (1982) report “Scientific Communication and National 
Security,” based on findings of a panel chaired by Dale R. Corson 
and the April 1984 American Association for the Advancement of 
Science compilation of all visa and import control incidents affecting 
professional societies and their meetings. In September 1985, the 
presidents of twelve scientific and engineering societies sent a letter 
to the Secretary of Defense to state that their organizations would 
no longer allow restricted meeting sessions. The government has 
responded to these concerns through a number of mechanisms-such 
as a 1982 Defense Science Board Task Force on University 
Responsiveness to National Security Requirements report, a 1983 
statement by the State Department on applying appropriate McCarran 
Act restrictions when denying or restricting visas, an ad hoc DoD- 
University Forum chartered in 1984 as a permanent advisory 
committee to the DoD. Later presidential directives do not indicate 
a change of direction. 
Although this listing indicates major laws from which the 
executive agencies derive authority to promulgate national security 
controls regulations, it is not exhaustive. Some narrower statutes, 
in turn, elaborate on actions derived from the president’s authority. 
One example is the Classified Information Procedures Act which 
governs the introduction of classified information in open court and 
was recently an issue in the Oliver North trial (Lardner, 1989). 
Although the Freedom of Information Act (1966) is the best 
known vehicle for obtaining from the federal government what 
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otherwise might be closely held information, it does not apply in 
cases with national security considerations. Thus national security 
information is excluded from FOIA requests as a category. The FOIA 
codifies the citizens’ right to know as based in the First Amendment 
right to petition; previously, the release of federal information was 
at the agencies’ discretion, which frequently operated on a need-to- 
know basis. However, the law specifies nine categories of information 
which may be (but do not necessarily have to be) protected from 
disclosure. These include.categories: (1 ) information already properly 
classified as secret under an executive order; (3)  information excepted 
from disclosure by a statute which specifies withholding in either 
a nondiscretionary manner, or according to particular criteria, or 
by broader categories or types; and (4)trade secrets or privileged 
or confidential commercial or financial information (most FOIA 
requests are from commercial enterprises seeking information about 
their competitors). Thus national security information is excluded 
from FOIA requests as a category. 
The FOIA was amended and strengthened in 1975 to provide 
the same kind of court review for national security information as 
for other information, but in the 98th Congress an exemption from 
FOIA requests was granted for certain CIA operational files. Because 
the FOIA applies exclusively to the executive branch of the 
government (Congress having exempted itself from FOIA require- 
ments, as it frequently does with other legislation), i t  sets up  a 
situation of ongoing tension between the people’s right to know 
and the exercise of the chief executive’s executive privilege, a doctrine 
of refusal to divulge state secrets practiced by every president since 
George Washington. 
CONTRACTPROVISIONS 
A third source of authority within the federal government for 
instituting national security controls stems from its power of the 
purse. The ultimate power to allocate funds lies with Congress, which 
can, however, authorize a program but in effect kill i t  by not providing 
an appropriation of funds for its operation. For national security 
applications, however, this power is most often exercised on a daily 
basis by the Department of Defense through its spending in support 
of research and development and on various commercial contracts. 
Thus the department may impose secrecy requirements on the results 
of research conducted not only by federal employees but also by private 
parties in industry or academe whose projects are even partially 
federally funded. According to, experts at the American Physical 
Society, some 75 percent of all federally funded research and 
development performed in this country is DoD-sponsored, and the 
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DoD share of basic research and academic science, where i t  is not 
dominant, is steadily increasing (R. L. Park, Director, Office of Public 
Affairs, American Physical Society, to author, personal communi- 
cation, November 1987). Even when the agency does not impose its 
own restrictions through contract provisions or cannot invoke the 
export licensing requirements or security classification, a contractor 
who fails to comply with agency wishes in such matters decreases 
his chances of being awarded subsequent contracts. 
PRESIDENTIALDIRECTIVES 
The series of executive orders mentioned earlier established and 
developed the classification system and identified seven categories 
of information which could be classified. These are listed in E.O. 
12065 (1978) as: (a) military plans, weapons, or operations; (b) foreign 
government information; (c) intelligence activities, sources, or 
methods; (d) foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States; 
(e) scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national 
security; ( f )  U.S. government programs for safeguarding nuclear 
materials or facilities; or (g)other categories of information which 
are related to national security and which require protection against 
unauthorized disclosure. 
In April 1982, the Reagan Administration issued the latest 
presidential revision of the classification system as E.O. 12356 to take 
effect that August. This executive order reversed the previous trend 
toward greater openness by introducing a number of changes. The 
executive order: 
-removed the presumption in favor of a less restrictive classification 
or no classification in cases of “reasonable doubt”; 
-removed the “identifiable damage” criterion and replaced it  with 
a reasonable expectation of damage; 
-cancelled the automatic declassification of documents after six years 
and provided for classification as long as required by national 
security considerations; 
-removed 	 the requirement to balance public interest with the need 
to protect national security (“balancing test”); 
-provided new authority for officials to reclassify after a document 
had been declassified or was already in the public domain; 
-added the option, at agency discretion, of classifying privately 
funded basic research, which was previously excluded. 
Developed without the opportunity for public comment and the 
object of extensive Congressional criticism in oversight hearings (U.S. 
Congress, 1982), this E.O. now defines the classification process and 
serves as a basis for further executive branch agency actions. 
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In December 1982, the administration extended its nondisclosure 
efforts from classified to unclassified information by establishing an 
interagency task force to review the vulnerability of sensitive 
information which did not meet classification guidelines. The 
following March, the administration issued National Security 
Decision Directive (NSDD) 84, which targeted federal employees as 
potential sources of sensitive information but also included federal 
contractors in its scope. In its original form, NSDD 84 mandated 
lifelong nondisclosure agreements for federal employees with security 
clearances, prepublication reviews of works written by employees with 
the highest security clearances (i.e., access to “Sensitive Compart- 
mented Information” [SCI]), polygraph examinations in the course 
of investigations, and strictures on contacts between employees and 
the media. 
That same fall, Congress placed over a dozen limitations on 
NSDD 84 including prohibition of polygraph examinations and 
limitations on several SCI provisions. Undaunted, the administration 
tried again in November 1985 with NSDD 196, itself a classified 
document. This directive, administered by the CIA, required all agency 
personnel with access to SCI (estimated at over 182,000 federal 
employees and contractors) (ALA, 1986) to submit to polygraph 
examinations. The controversy aroused was sufficient to prompt the 
administration to rescind the directive in September 1986. (Congress 
followed up by passing PL 100-347 which the president signed into 
law in June 1988. The law restricts the use of polygraph examinations 
by private sector employers, but federal and state governments as 
well as national security agencies and their contractors are among 
the exemptions.) 
In the meantime, Standard Form 4193, a lifelong prepublication 
agreement for those with access to SCI, had been introduced to 
supplement the much more common Standard Form 189, the result 
of NSDD 84. This pledge not to reveal classified or classifiable 
information applies to all federal employees with security clearances 
and introduced the concept of “sensitive but not classified 
information.” The definition of classifiable information provided in 
the Federal Register ( 1987a) elicited sufficient negative comment to 
be later revised (1987b) to eliminate currently unclassified information 
which might, at some future time, become classified. By December 
1987, Congress had taken temporary action to bar the use of both 
of these standard forms (language in 1987 and 1988 appropriations 
bills prohibiting the use of appropriated funds to produce or 
disseminate SF-189), but many previously signed pledges are still 
extant. 
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Under President Bush, SF-312, developed in 1988 to succeed SF- 
189, defines classified information as including written and oral 
communications that, if they were written, would be classified or 
in the process of being classified. It provided for punishment of federal 
employees who divulge information that they know or should know 
is classified or is in the process of being classified. In the 1990 Treasury, 
Post Office, and General Government Appropriations bill, Congress 
again prohibited the use of federal funds to print or disseminate 
SF-312; President Bush protested that language but signed the bill 
into law nevertheless. 
Another presidential directive of September 1984, NSDD 145, dealt 
only with information in electronic format and focused on security 
safeguards for telecommunications, computer systems, and other 
automated information systems handling sensitive but unclassified 
government information. It promoted a comprehensive, coordinated 
approach on the assumption that isolated items of unclassified 
information, when aggregated with other such items, could, in sum, 
reveal sensitive matters. However, the directive did not define what 
such sensitive but unclassified information is. 
An October 1986 memorandum signed by then-National Security 
Adviser John M. Poindexter (NTISSP #2 “National Policy on 
Protection of Sensitive but Unclassified Information in Federal 
Government Telecommunications and Automated Information 
Systems”) implemented NSDD 145 and “defined” sensitive but not 
classified information by leaving what was deemed sensitive to the 
discretion of each federal department and agency. This Poindexter 
memorandum also gave the National Security Agency the preeminent 
role in federal computer/communications security matters. 
Government agency representatives soon started acting on NSDD 
145 and NTISSP #2 provisions. In 1986, Mead Data Central and other 
database creators and vendors were reporting visits by DoD, FBI, and 
CIA representatives seeking to limit foreign access, through legal 
and technological means, to databases which might contain easily 
aggregated sensitive information. Widespread protests against this 
practice and the Poindexter memorandum resulted in the rescission 
of NTISSP #2 by Poindexter’s successor, Frank Carlucci, in March 
1987 (it is commonly believed that the rescission was largely decided 
by a desire to disassociate the Poindexter name from further 
controversy in the wake of the Iran-Contra scandal). Congress also 
responded definitively with the Computer Security Act of 1987 which 
limits the National Security Agency’s role in federal computer security 
to military agencies and assigns the National Bureau of Standards 
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(now National Institute of Standards and Technology) responsibility 
for computer security in all civilian agencies. However, NSDD 145 
still remains in effect. 
FUT~JREPROSPECTS 
The administration’s continuing concern with national security 
and its increasing control over related and potentially related 
information during the past decade appear to be continuing from 
the Carter to the Reagan and now into the Bush presidencies. Two 
days before his departure from office, President Reagan signed E.O. 
12267 which establishes “policies and procedures governing the 
assertion of Executive privilege by incumbent and former Presidents 
in connection with the release of Presidential records ...” (U.S. Office 
of the President, 1989, p. 1). The order sets up  procedures to review 
records of the present and former presidents and to invoke the 
executive privilege of secrecy by either if “disclosure...might impair 
the national security (including the conduct of foreign relations), 
law enforcement, or the deliberative processes of the Executive 
branch” (p. 1). According to this E.O., only a final court order can 
override an incumbent president’s claim of privilege. 
Press reports early in the Bush presidency state that the 
administration is circulating a draft executive order on classified 
information which would establish uniform standards for granting 
security clearances throughout the executive branch. It would also 
eliminate the requirement that agencies provide a reason for denial 
and the chance to respond for those federal employees and government 
contractors who are denied such clearances. This would remove all 
rights of due process in such instances. 
Congressional reaction to the draft proposal has been negative. 
Representative Don Edwards, chair of the House Judiciary 
Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, urged Bush not 
to sign the draft version: “a person denied a clearance on the basis 
of erroneous information ...would never have an opportunity to correct 
i t  (Marcus, 1989, p. A4). The chairmen of six major House committees 
wrote to Bush to express their concern over the potential violation 
of civil rights and promised legislative action to counter that threat. 
Subsequently, in a March 24 memorandum, Bush authorized a 
complete review of the proposal by an interagency working group 
of lawyers who had not previously worked on the issue (Devroy & 
Marcus, 1989, p. A13). However, the final word on this question may 
be spoken by the judiciary. In Department of t he  Navy u. Egan, the 
Supreme Court decided that no one has the “right” to a security 
clearance and therefore “procedural safeguards derived from the 
common law may not be appropriate in security-clearance cases.” 
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However the saga of national security controls over information 
continues to unfold, the mechanisms for policy-making in this field 
at the federal level remain unchanged: Congressional statutory 
authority and supplemental “pressure” through oversight hearings, 
appropriations, and histories of legislative intent; executive initiatives 
such as presidential directives, executive agency development of 
regulations to accompany statutes, and contract provisions; and the 
relatively rarely applied powers of review of the judiciary. It remains 
for the interested citiLen, both proponent and opponent of the many 
forms of control now in existence, to monitor the actions of 
government and lobby in appropriate places to effect an optimal 
balance of needed security controls with freedom of information. 
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THENATURE AND HISTORY of peer review are described and its positive 
and negative effects considered. It is concluded that although peer 
review tends to penalize innovation and nonconformity, i t  is 
indispensable to scholarly publishing. 
INTRODUCTION 
“Peer review” connotes genteel collegial cooperation, while 
“refereeing” suggests the boxing ring, the football field, the objective 
mediator pressured by impassioned opponents. Yet the terms are of ten 
used synonymously as they will be in this discussion. Though both 
collegial and objective in theory, in practice the process is corruptible 
by ignorance, timidity, envy, greed, bias, and other common sins. 
It is this gap between the ideal and the real, coupled with peer review’s 
extraordinary impact on scholars’ professional futures and immediate 
feelings, that makes i t  so controversial. Yet the real danger, and 
strength, of peer review lies not in its consequences for the authors 
reviewed but for prospective readers of their work. Can peer review, 
which should help protect access to sound ideas, actually impede 
access? If so, under what conditions, and how can these be prevented? 
Before tackling these questions, we must understand the nature 
of the process. 
HISTORY OF PEERREVIEWAND NATURE 
Essentially peer review means what i t  says: the review of a person’s 
work by one or more people qualified to be called professional peers. 
When restricted to the evaluation of research and writing, peer review 
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involves the scrutiny of grant proposals, or of article or book 
manuscripts, by two or more people with suitable subject and 
methodological expertise. These people, individually, then 
recommend acceptance, revision, or rejection to whomever controls 
the process-usually a grants administrator or editor. T h e  
recommendations are handled in various ways: from automatic 
adoption of the majority’s view to careful study of each recommen- 
dation as advisory only, followed by a relatively independent final 
judgment. I t  all depends on the particular journal’s or publisher’s 
or agency’s selection policy, which isn’t necessarily clearly 
communicated to the public. 
Here the focus will be on peer review in journal publishing, 
which differs in its details, though perhaps not in the broad issues 
raised, from peer review in grant funding and book publishing. 
Several scholars have described the history of scholarly journals, 
including, with admirable concision, sociologists Harriet Zuckerman 
and Robert K. Merton (1971). According to them, seeds of the peer 
review process were sown with the founding in 1665 of the first 
English-language scientific journal, Philosophical Transactions. The 
Council of Britain’s Royal Society, which instituted the journal, 
stipulated that prior to publication, each monthly issue should be 
“reviewed by some of the [Council] members.” The purpose, then 
as now, was to guard quality (p. 69). Over the centuries, journal 
peer review was systematized but never made uniform and was 
widespread but never universal. It is used in all disciplines, though 
with considerable variation in underlying assumptions, implemen- 
tation, and results. And, despite the long history supporting peer 
review, its value continues to be debated. 
Several journals, most of them in science and medicine, have 
published detailed explanations of their peer review practices (e.g., 
see Editorial staff, 1988, pp. 412-14; Enos, 1987; Carney & Lundberg, 
1987, p. 87; Lundberg & Carney, 1986, p. 3286; Stossel, 1985, pp. 658- 
59; Rubin & Carroll, 1981, pp. 103-04; “The Refereeing System ...,” 
1978, pp. 9-10). In a succinct monograph, Stephen Lock (1985) 
synthesized every substantial publication through the early 1980s 
dealing with peer review in medical journals. And in 1978, Michael 
Gordon (1978) reported his thorough survey, based on interviews with 
editors, of peer review methods used by thirty-two London-based 
research journals in several disciplines. Title by title, he set forth 
his findings. The validity of many of these data depends, of course, 
on the honesty, clearsightedness, and comprehensiveness of the 
editors’ presentations. Still, a good deal of anecdotal information 
and some solid research findings have appeared in print. 
To summarize: manuscripts are checked in; are usually screened- 
cursorily or carefully-in-house; and some percen tage-ranging from 
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less than half to nearly all-is sent on to two or more referees. They 
are selected according to information gathered through every 
conceivable means, from personal knowledge to “invisible college”- 
generated referrals to literature reviews to broad-scale questionnairing 
that enables “profiling” and the building of a formal referee database. 
And the information is stored in every possible way, from the editor’s 
memory to a card file to a computer. Accompanying each review 
request may be detailed evaluation guidelines, a referee’s report form 
to fill out, both, or neither. Some sort of review deadline is likely 
to be specified, though i t  may not be enforced. The time allowed 
to the referee varies. Authors’ names may or may not be disclosed 
to referees. Referees’ comments may be passed on to authors whole 
and unrevised, excerpted, paraphrased, or not at all. When deciding 
on the final disposition of a manuscript, the chief editor may work 
alone or in consultation with other editors or a board; may or may 
not feel constrained by referees’ judgments; and may or may not work 
closely with authors of basically sound, but not yet publishable, 
manuscripts. This will depend to some extent on the age, the prestige, 
the depth of the manuscript pool, the number of staff, and the sheer 
size of an annual volume of the particular journal. It will depend 
even more on the editorial understanding of the journal’s purpose- 
that is, whether i t  exists to vent all serious work of any potential 
value or to exclude all but the very best manuscripts, thereby 
guaranteeing the highest possible quality in what is published and 
the certain rejection of some worthy but middling work. Rejection 
rates, which range from less than 10 percent to more than 90 percent, 
vary in response to all of those factors-but equally influential, and 
especially interesting, is the impact of a journal’s subject matter. 
Generally speaking, humanities journals reject the largest 
proportions of submissions, social sciences the next largest, and hard 
sciences the smallest. There is, of course, great variation, and a 
particularly prestigious scientific journal, especially one of fairly 
broad subject scope, may reject most of the manuscripts i t  receives. 
For example, in 1978, The Lancet claimed a rejection rate of 83 percent 
and Nature a rate of 65 percent, which were remarkably high for 
scientific journals. However, such rejection rates are standard in even 
the less distinguished social sciences journals and would be quite 
low for any humanities journal. In the same year, Economicu and 
Mind were rejecting 90 percent of submissions and Philosophy 92 
percent (Gordon, 1978, p. 37). 
One obvious reason for these differences is the much larger 
number and size of scientific journals. But the reason for that is 
the sciences’ different attitude toward research and publication. For 
anything to remain unpublished if i t  has the slightest chance of 
contributing to the advancement of knowledge is anathema- 
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publication must occur and quickly. This attitude is shared to a 
considerable extent by social scientists, especially those in the more 
self-consciously scientific disciplines such as psychology; but it makes 
much less sense to humanists who tend to be more concerned with 
arriving at illuminating interpretations than with unearthing facts. 
John S. Rigden (1986), editor of the American Journal of Physics, 
has pointed out that: 
the humanist brings subjective criteria to the review process. The quality 
of the writing, the perceived significance of the thesis developed, the 
inherent interest of the subject, the appropriateness of the context chosen 
for the subject, and the treatment of the subject-context interaction all 
influence a recommendation ....A review that baldly states, “This looks 
all right to me,” would be unacceptable in the humanities. (p. 491) 
Also, of course, timeliness may matter less, and book publishing 
more, to the humanist. While humanists build on one another’s work, 
the procedure is usually not so linear, the link not so direct, and 
the related evidence not necessarily so exhaustively assimilated. At 
the same time, and for the same reasons, absolute factual accuracy 
and full description of methodology, while expected in the 
humanities, are far more critical in the sciences, as readers assess 
the authors’ accuracy and often plan costly research projects that 
build on the authors’ work. So, although less is screened in the 
sciences, the effectiveness of screening may be thought to matter more. 
Not surprisingly, most critiques of peer review have been written 
by scientists, with fewer by social scientists, and only an occasional 
published comment by humanists. 
Many of these critics have focused on the question of anonymity 
in peer review, or as it is typically called, using a peculiarly inapt 
metaphor-“blindness.” 
THE“BLINDNESS”CONTROVERSY 
As we shall see, peer review is censured for, among other things, 
its alleged corruption by referees’ personal loyalties and biases 
favoring well-known authors and prestigious institutions. Put 
another way, i t  is said to penalize women, minorities, the young, 
the obscure, and those affiliated with third-string colleges and 
universities (to say nothing of “independent scholars”). To solve this 
problem, or simply to forestall any suggestion that i t  exists, some 
journals “blind” their referees-that is, conceal from them the identity 
of manuscripts’ authors. When combined with the much more 
common practice of hiding referees’ names from authors, this is called 
“double-blind” peer review. Both stages of blinding have been 
questioned. 
Referees’ names are concealed allegedly to assure that their 
judgments will not be compromised by reluctance to alienate their 
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peers or, in the case of younger scholars reviewing the work of those 
older and better-known, by a natural desire to protect their 
professional futures. Manfred Kochen (1978) has pointed out that 
an eminent author who knew his work to have been substantially 
criticized by his junior might take offense (p. 241). Quite possibly 
he would dismiss both the criticism and the journal, to no good 
effect and to everyone’s detriment. Indeed, any author able to shift 
focus from the soundness of the criticism itself to the person behind 
it  may do so. 
Jean D. Wilson (1978), of the American Society for Clinical 
Investigation, has suggested that known referees might be subjected 
to “face-to-face or telephone encounters with irate authors (p. 1700). 
See also, Manheim, 1973, pp. 534-35). Michael Gordon (1978, p. 240), 
and Norval D. Glenn (1976, p. 182) are among those who have warned 
that, ordered to sign their reviews, some prospective referees would 
refuse to write any, which could create serious problems for the many 
journals that find i t  difficult to attract and retain competent reviewers. 
Payment for their service ranges from token to none with none 
prevailing, so the journal peer review system depends upon referees’ 
sense of professional obligation, generosity, and good humor. 
However, several commentators insist that, if forced to sign their 
names, referees would be more thorough and responsible and could 
be challenged directly by authors, with often fruitful results for both 
specific manuscripts and general scientific discourse (see, for example, 
Mirman, 1975, p. 837; Lindley, 1984, p. 59; Raza & Preisler, 1985, 
pp. 470-71; Nield, 1985, p. 65; Bardach, 1988, pp. 516-17); some have 
gone so far as to recommend that referees’ reports be published 
alongside the papers in question much more often than is permitted 
by the occasional symposia seen now (see, for example, Armstrong, 
1982, p. 87). Also, authors may be best able to evaluate and profit 
from criticism if they know the background of the critic (Newman, 
1966, p. 980). And if reviews were to bear their signatures, high-status, 
over-committed referees would presumably be less likely to hand off 
the chore of writing them to subordinates, unacknowledged 
(Douglas, 1985, p. 270). 
Perhaps the most eloquent opponent of referee anonymity has 
been scientist-activist Barry Commoner (1978). He sees reviewers’ 
mistakes as equal to authors’ errors in their ability to impede scientific 
progress, and, because they reflect publicly on no one’s name, as 
less likely to be corrected (p. 26). And R. Douglas Wright (1970), 
an Australian physiologist, demands: “Why should the wish to 
publish a scientific paper expose one to an assassin more completely 
protected than members of the...Mafia?” (p. 404). Still, virtually all 
journals blind authors to referees’ identities or at least leave the matter 
up to the referees if only to avoid offending them and losing their 
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service. For example, the new Journal of General Internal Medicine 
disapproves of anonymous reviews, yet only encourages-does not 
require-referees to sign them (Editorial Staff, 1988, pp. 412-14). 
Whether authors’ names should be concealed from referees is 
a question less firmly settled in practice, though surveys across a 
variety of disciplines have found that more journals do not conceal 
names than do (see, for example, Budd, 1981, pp. 77-81; Miller & 
Serzan, 1984; pp. 683-84; Weller, 1987, p. 34; Cleary & Alexander, 1988, 
pp. 1001-02). It may be difficult given authors’ tendency to self-cite 
and drop other identifying clues. And it is often asserted that in 
very small fields or “cut ting-edge” research areas, qualified referees 
will be able to guess whose work confronts them. However, Moossy 
and Moossy’s (1985) study, which found that referees for the narrowly 
focused Journal of Neuropathology and Experimental Neurology 
correctly named authors of submitted manuscripts only 34 percent 
of the time, casts doubt on this “truism” (pp. 225-28). It can also 
be argued that an author’s status and experience are not irrelevant 
to assessing the authority of his remarks, and it  is best that the referee 
know his name. 
The National Enquiry [Committee] into Scholarly Commun- 
ication (1979), formed with some fanfare over a decade ago, was 
skeptical of whether benefits accrued from authorial anonymity but 
concluded that i t  might be desirable even if i t  served only to reassure 
young, or female, or poorly “connected” authors that peer review 
was fair: “The credibility of the process is of great importance” (p. 
,48. For an opposing viewpoint, see Evans, 1986, p. 158). This is true, 
of course, because the development of new knowledge must proceed 
from what is already known, which is most widely disseminated 
through journals authenticated by peer review systems. Forward 
movement of research and analysis requires well-founded faith in 
these systems: faith that what they include has merit and what they 
exclude does not. 
THEPOSITIVEIMPACTOF PEER REVIEW ON 
INTELLECTUALFREEDOM 
Standing, theoretically, between scholarly editor and author are 
the author’s expert “peers’’-though actually few referees are perfect 
peers, having rather more or less knowledge than the author. 
Beholden, again in theory, to no one and caring about nothing but 
the value of the author’s work, referees form a defense against 
carelessness and corruption. Whether or not the editor is obliged 
to heed their advice, he certainly tends to be influenced by it. Thus 
referees protect authors from editors-from their whims, biases, and 
ignorance-and protect readers from both. This is most true, of course, 
i f  there is little editorial screening of papers to be refereed (few journals 
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send out all submissions), if referees are chosen well and objectively, 
and if they then perform well and objectively. An e l t o r  managing 
submissions alone or with the help of a small staff would soon crash 
against absolute limits of time and knowledge, with the likely result 
that, when screening manuscripts, she would seek easy cues such 
as trendmess of subject, author’s status, even hidher own friendship 
with the author. D. A. Pyke (1976), a London physician and referee, 
points out that even within his specialty of diabetes, there are vast 
areas about which he knows little-which leads him to speculate 
that the editors of Diabetes and Diabetologia use referees partly 
because, despite the narrowness of their journals’ scope, they simply 
do not know enough to evaluate all the manuscripts they receive 
(p. 117). Geneticist James V. Nee1 (1988), concerned about the effects 
of an editor’s not knowing what she or invited editorialists do not 
know, called for the extension of peer review to editorials (p. 981). 
Offering, as a group, not only diverse knowledge but wide- 
ranging backgrounds and alliances, referees are thought to inhibit 
the development of a “charmed circle” around an editor. Although 
some repetition of authors published and commonality of style and 
research approach can enrich a journal, shaping its identity, too small, 
tight, and dominant a circle of like-thinking scholars may stifle it, 
thereby closing off fresh ideas and methodologies. 
Most obviously, however, referees are employed to prevent readers 
from being damaged (and editors from being embarrassed) by the 
lssemination of untruth as fact. The most egregiously harmful results 
may be seen in professional practice-when, for example, a physician 
misdiagnoses or mistreats a patient (for examples of harmful medical 
misinformation, see Knapp, 1988, pp. 371-72; Robin 8c Burke, 1987, 
p. 253), or an educator selects the wrong approach to teaching a 
learning-disabled child. But equally essential is the prevention of 
futile, costly attempts to replicate faulty research. And, ideally, the 
peer review process sifts out what would become the trivial, useless, 
and misleading components of “information overload’’-a pheno-
menon which, in our time of proliferating publication, forms a 
peculiarly insidious constraint on intellectual freedom. Trying to 
detect which few items in the onslaught are true and crucial, readers 
may become captives to an impossible intellectual task, d t  knowing 
how to proceed, where to stop, what they are missing, or how or 
when or whether to act on what they learn. They lack confidence 
in their ability to access scholarship effectively, and, lacking 
confidence, cannot assert control, cannot be free. 
On the other hand, conscientious peer review may release ideas 
and information that would otherwise languish in an author’s desk, 
or be published with such severe deficiencies in presentation as to 
discourage or even mislead most readers. While referees are sometimes 
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criticized for demanding pointless changes, they are also lauded for 
helping authors shape poorly written manuscripts with worthy 
content into readable, persuasive, important journal articles (see, for 
example, McCartney, 1973, p. 440; Nowell, 1978, p. 844; Bailar & 
Patterson, 1985, p. 654; Last, 1985, p. 455; Spodick, 1986, p. 3862). 
Through his survey of 361 statisticians and psychologists, James V. 
Bradley (1981) discovered much discontent with referees but general 
approval of their work as advisors on revision. Seventy-two percent 
of his respondents thought they had improved their writing by 
following referees’ recommendations, while only 5 percent claimed 
to have had work degraded by referee-induced changes (pp. 32-33). 
Peer review, then, is intended to open doors and clear pathways 
for authors and readers, liberating them from editors’ biases and 
limitations; pre-screening inaccurate assertions, silly interpretations, 
and data drawn from unsound research; and facilitating the exposure 
of material that can advance their knowledge. The system ensures 
that work will be accepted based only on its merit, objectively 
determined, and guards against decisions influenced by fashion, 
friendship, and reputation. These, at least, are the justifications for 
peer review. In practice, quite different things may happen. 
NEGATIVEIMPACT REVIEWOF PEER ON 
INTELLECTUALFREEDOM 
Minor Factors 
First, peer review adds days, weeks, or, if poorly managed, even 
months to the period between manuscript submission and acceptance 
or rejection. Though publication delays are not the greatest threats 
to intellectual freedom, they become significant to authors when 
timeliness of research and the establishment of priority-that is, of 
“ownership” of a discovery-weigh heavily. The related authorial 
desire for rapid publication to support bids for promotion, tenure, 
or grants, would not, in an ideal world where research and writing 
were pursued for only their inherent satisfactions, affect the journal 
or, indeed, exist at all. However, the academic world is no closer 
to ideal than any other, and extreme delays in publication can jettison 
chances for grant funding for young scholars or even cost them their 
job; either result will, of course, greatly undermine their freedom 
to pursue their intellectual interests. 
To reader-researchers positioned outside scholarly networks or 
working in areas tangential to their usual specialties, any delay in 
publishing the new findings of others may inhibit their progress 
and place them at a disadvantage relative to colleague-competitors 
in their fields. Any constraint on access to needed information fetters 
intellectual freedom. When the constraint is perceived as unnecessary, 
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it becomes intolerable, and many critics believe that peer review takes 
far longer than it  must. The number and time span of published 
discussions of this straightforward issue are surprising (see, for 
example, Newman, 1966, p. 980; Rodman, 1970, pp. 351-57; McCartney 
& Leavy, 1973, pp. 146, 287-88; Meadows, 1977, pp. 787-93; Azbel, 
1978, p. 82; Stieg, 1983, pp. 106-07; Sattelmeyer, 1989, pp. 173-77), 
as are some time-lag study findings. For example, authors of 
manuscripts published in Physical Review in the early 1980s received 
acceptances in anywhere from 16 days to 666 days, or nearly two 
years after submission; mean time lag for all manuscripts accepted 
by Physical Review and Physical Reuiew Letters (1979-1980) was 125 
days, or more than four months (Dehmer, 1982, p. 96). Brackbill and 
Korten’s (1970) survey of psychologists, taken more than ten years 
earlier, presented respondents with a list of twenty-two suggestions 
for revising journal review procedures and asked them to indicate 
agreement or disagreement with each. Strongest agreement (4.55 on 
1-5 scale) was with: “Measures should be taken to insure speedier 
review of articles” (p. 938). But John Budd (1988) found that seventy- 
four humanities journals took an average of three months to decide 
on acceptance or rejection but twelve months from acceptance to 
publication (p. 183). A second Budd (1988) survey of library and 
information science journals repeated his earlier finding that 
producing takes longer than deciding (p. 127). Still, time to acceptance 
may be especially important to the author, though not to prospective 
readers. Some journals seek ways to reduce review time-e.g., by 
computerizing selection of referees and enforcing short deadlines for 
their reports. However, as long as the number of submitted 
manuscripts remains at its present almost overwhelming level or 
(more likely) continues to grow, qualified reviewers will be in short 
supply and will continue to be so burdened that even the most 
cooperative may sometimes delay sending reports. 
Posing a more serious threat to intellectual freedom when it  
occurs, but apparently occurring only rarely, is outright referee bias. 
Though editors may be biased, too, they are carefully screened for 
their jobs, and they are known and answerable to authors and readers, 
which tends to make them avoid overt discrimination on bases other 
than quality. So while peer review may correct for editors’ biases 
as suggested earlier, it is not itself a bias-free process. At journals 
where editors accept reviewers’ recommendations more or less 
unquestioningly, there may be no corrective for their biases except, 
of course, other reviewers’ opinions. 
Often alleged, though rarely if  ever proven, is prejudice against 
women and minorities (few research projects purporting to explore 
this question have gone beyond simple tabulations of authors’ sex. 
One that did, a study of manuscript reviews for Rural Sociology, 
154 LIBRARY T R E N D U S U M M E R  & FALL 1990 
“did not indicate that gender was related to editorial decision 
outcomes....” See, Warner et al., 1985, p. 618). One of the several 
reasons for “blinding” referees is to avoid this. Partly, perhaps, to 
disarm criticism of its treatment of women authors, P M L A  instituted 
blind review in 1980 (Showalter, 1984, p. 851). But even this does 
not, of course, eliminate prejudice against women- or minority-
focused research topics, which is sometimes thought to be a greater 
problem. For example, P M L A  has also been assailed for printing 
few articles about women authors (Gale, 1987, p. 8). To help right 
both inequities, special efforts have been urged to recruit female and 
minority referees (APA Committee on Women in Psychology, 1980; 
Exum, 1983, pp. 127-28). 
Also more of ten claimed than documented is clear-cut political 
bias-that is, against research or analyses obviously generated by a 
“left” or “right” viewpoint. Systematic research on this question, 
as on other questions raised by peer review, is scant. An experiment 
conducted by Abramowitz, Gomes, and Abramowitz (1975) found that 
referees, especially liberals, tended to favor work that dovetailed with 
their political sympathies. However, the evidence was not extremely 
strong, and the United States of the early 1970s may have been 
insufficiently typical of other times and places to permit 
generalization. 
Biases favoring the referee’s own institution, alma mater, or 
country have sometimes been hypothesized and would seem to be 
quite likely outgrowths of natural human weaknesses. But again, 
direct evidence is lacking, and positiue biases stir less ire than negatiue 
biases except when competition for page space is very fierce and grossly 
inferior work i s  finding print. 
Of much more concern are instances of bias describable as idea- 
based. These arise from intellectual and commercial conflicts of 
interest that compromise the referee’s objectivity and could even 
extend to “stealing” the author’s work: Steven H. Gale (1987) warns, 
“sometimes experts are the worst people to ask to serve as referees” 
(p. 12). That is, they almost invariably have strong opinions, 
sometimes quite emotionally held, about what should be studied and 
how, which findings and interpretations are plausible, who should 
be cited, how the writing should be styled, and conversely, what is 
impermissible. D. A. Pyke (1976) finds i t  necessary to caution his 
colleagues “to resist the temptation to advise acceptance of a paper 
merely because it  makes frequent (and favourable) reference to your 
own work” (p. 1118), though one would expect a sharp-eyed editor 
not to select a cited authority as a referee. In any case, references 
to a reviewer’s friends, mentors, or co-authors can easily show u p  
and may be seductive to him if the author is approving, or infuriating 
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if the author is negative. Of course the referee may also be influenced 
by affection or animosity toward the author himself if he is not 
“blinded” or is able to guess the author’s name. 
Physicists Henisch and Roy (1977) point out that in the ever 
more specialized world of the sciences, few people may be capable 
of understanding any given piece of work, so: “The chances are 
overwhelmingly that a submitted paper, handled along traditional 
lines, would go to a direct professional rival” (p. 105). And a rival 
can, if he wishes, attempt to torpedo even the strongest argument. 
In his send-up of peer reviewers’ behavior, psychologist Richard 
Nisbett (1978) writes: 
If the study engages the subjects’ interest and deals with matters that 
are important to them, then assert that the findings were obtained only 
because of the motivations or defenses that were aroused by the 
procedures ....If the study does not engage the subjects’ interest, then so 
much the better. It may be claimed that the phenomenon under study 
would not hold up  under any but the barren laboratory situations 
studied ....If the instructions to subjects were long and complicated, assert 
that the subjects probably didn’t understand them. The same criticism 
may be applied if the instructions were brief ....any reviewer worth his 
salt can think up as good a theoretical position as the author’s in a 
few minutes’ time. The author may then be criticized for failing to take 
this position into account .... (pp. 519-20) 
In the darkest scenarios painted by peer-review critics, a referee- 
rival may advocate rejection of sound work either because it disagrees 
with his preconceptions or to gain an advantage by undercutting 
the author’s career (see, for example, Wilson, 1978, pp. 1699-1700; 
Wright, 1970, p. 404; Goidon, 1977, pp. 342-43; Oppenheim, 1980, 
p. 7). In gross ethical violations, the referee may procrastinate or 
demand trivial revisions in order to delay publication until after the 
appearance of his own article on the same subject (see, for example, 
Rodman, 1970, p. 355; Meadows, 1977, p. 791). Or, if involved in 
related research, he may take unfair advantage of having early access 
to the author’s findings. He may even plagiarize the manuscript, 
a hilarious happening in Kingsley Amis’s college satire, Lucky  Jim, 
but deadly serious when it occurs in real life. “Who has not heard 
of or been the victim of a review in which a view that was ...antithetical 
to the reviewer’s preconceived notions or prejudices was suppressed 
merely by giving the article a bad review?” Harry C .  Nottebart, Jr. 
(1982), a physician, once demanded. “Who does not know of situations 
in which a reviewer has used data from someone else’s work that 
was being reviewed” (p. 480)? Finally, and perhaps most egregiously, 
a referee may turn the still-confidential information contained in 
a manuscript to immediate financial advantage, an increasing 
possibility in areas like biotechnology where many researchers have 
undisclosed links with business (see Maddox, 1984, p. 497; Vevaina, 
1987, p. 958). 
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All of these potential problems, however, from sex and race 
discrimination to conflict of interest, are reassuringly straightforward 
and probably very infrequent compared to the more subtle and 
pervasive controls imposed by peer review. Before we consider those, 
however, a simpler issue presents itself: are valid, reliable judgments 
even possible under peer review? 
Major Factors 
In any gathering of scholars where the conversation turns to 
peer t eview, stories will be told of incompetent reviews-careless, 
cursory, uninformed, uninformative-used to assault manuscripts 
representing months or even years of painstaking work (for examples 
of such stories, see Lindley, 1984, pp. 56-58; Commoner, 1978, p. 25; 
Wright, 1970, pp. 403-04; Glenn, 1976, pp. 179-80; Raza & Preisler, 
1985, p. 470; Sommers, 1983, p. 92; Engler et al., 1987. For a pointed, 
amusing satire of referees’ tactics, see, Remus, 1980). Astute reviews, 
which are rarely discussed, are probably more numerous. But the 
fact remains that, even allowing for authorial egotism, some very 
poor judgments seem to be made by referees and presumably cause 
at least occasional rejections. According to Robin and Burke (1987): 
“For some [medical] journals, even one unfavorable review may 
diminish the priority and result in disapproval” (p. 254). In James 
V. Bradley’s (1981) aforementioned survey of statisticians and 
psychologists, 74 percent asserted that for the most recent of their 
articles published in a refereed journal after compulsory revision, 
at least some factual errors were made by the referees; 42 percent 
of all respondents had found errors in important facts while another 
32 percent found only trivial errors. In addition, 67 percent claimed 
that at least some of the referees appeared not “to be at least as 
competent and sophisticated” in the article’s subject area as they, 
the authors, were; 40 percent said that at least some referees did not 
seem “to have read the article carefully” (p. 32). 
Editors try to avoid such problems by inviting high-status 
scholars to serve as referees in the belief that they know the most 
and will render the best reports. Thomas P. Stossel (1985), editor 
of the Journal of Clinical Investigation, carried out a fascinating 
experiment that stands this assumption on its head. Stossel counted 
review requests, analyzed the professional status of those to whom 
requests were sent, and evaluated the quality of completed reviews. 
He found that the highest-status scientists were the most likely to 
refuse his requests and, when they did comply, were the most likely 
to provide low-quality reviews. Conversely, the lowest-status scientists 
were likeliest to grant his requests and to write high-quality reviews 
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(pp. 658-59). His conclusions raise some alarm as high-status people 
routinely referee and their reports are routinely accepted and not 
scrutinized and assessed. 
Striking signs that something is amiss with peer review are the 
low levels of agreement among referees and, after publication, between 
referees and readers. That is, just about as often as not, those refereeing 
the same paper make different recommendations, and there seems 
to be no correlation between strength of referee endorsement and 
numbers of times cited after publication. In their survey of 138 refereed 
education journals, Smith and Gough (1984) asked editors to estimate 
“the percentage of manuscripts that provoked significant disagree- 
ment among the referees” and received answers ranging from zero 
to 90 percent with seventeen declaring that their referees rarely agreed 
(pp. 638-39). 
Nor are the social sciences unique. For instance, biological 
scientist-referees are said to show a rate of agreement about the same 
as would be reached through chance alone (Wilson, 1978, p. 1698). 
William C. Roberts (1987), editor of the American Journal of 
Cardiology, who uses two referees per submission, observes that i t  
is unusual for both to write “definitely accept” or “definitely reject,” 
and occasionally, perplexingly, one will write the first recommen- 
dation and one the second (p. 922). In the physical sciences, referees 
are much more consistent, presumably because their methodologies 
and rules of evidence are more firmly fixed, their research material 
by its nature more stable, and true objectivity is more easily attainable. 
However, even physicists and mathematicians tell of startling conflicts 
among reviewers (e.g., Lindley, 1984, pp. 57-58; Wallace, 1983, pp. 
11, 13; Thompson, 1983). 
In what is probably the most famous and controversial study 
ever conducted of peer review reliability, Douglas P. Peters and 
Stephen J. Ceci (1982) randomly selected one prestigiously-authored 
article published recently in each of twelve major psychology journals. 
They then changed the title and author’s name (but not gender) of 
each article, invented a low-prestige institutional affiliation, altered 
the abstract slightly, retyped the article, and submitted i t  to the journal 
where i t  had appeared. All were journals that made i t  a practice 
to reveal authors’ names to reviewers. In only three cases did any 
editor or referee recognize the article as previously published, and 
in eight of the remaining nine cases, the article was rejected. This 
suggests, of course, not only stunning unreliability in editorial 
decision-making, but the failure of referees to keep up  with the 
literature, the failure of editors to read even their own journals, and 
probably institution-based discrimination-though it is unclear 
whether authors from low-prestige institutions were being wrongly 
penalized or authors from high-prestige institutions wrongly favored. 
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Controversy swirled around the method, ethics, and significance of 
the Peters-Ceci study, but at the very least it raised questions about 
peer review that were difficult to dismiss. 
Two reasons are most often hypothesized to explain the system’s 
weaknesses-unmanageably heavy demand for referees and lack of 
concrete guidelines. Stossel’s ( 1985) study mentioned earlier, 
correlating reviewer status with review quality, suggests the first of 
these. The numbers of journals, journal pages, monographs, and grant 
proposals seem to have been growing faster than the number of experts 
with ample time to referee. A few of these numbers suffice to sketch 
the problem: Fifteen years ago, American Sociological Review was 
receiving about 800 manuscripts each year, American Journal of 
Sociology about 700, and together they needed 3,000 referees’ reports 
in order to dispose of the load (Glenn, 1976, p. 180). Eleven years 
ago, Physical Reuiew Letters was soliciting approximately 8,000 
referees’ reports each year (Adair, 1979, p. 101). In 1985, the Journal 
of the American Medical Association received 3,446 manuscripts, all 
of which were screened by the editors, 1,413 of which were refereed 
(Lundberg & Carney, 1986, p. 3286). Five years ago, Jay H. Lehr 
of Ground Water assured his readers that the journal’s referees were 
not overburdened: “No referee receives more than two papers a month 
[or] more than eighteen papers a year” (p. 148). One assumes that 
the readers were not reassured. It seems to take close to a full working 
day for thorough review of an exacting paper (see, for example, Carney 
& Lundberg, 1987, p. 87; Curtis, 1982, p. 9), and capable reviewers 
may have their opinion solicited regularly by more than one journal. 
On first consideration, the lack of written standards to serve as 
review guidelines seems much easier to rectify, and indeed many 
journals do supply them. However, they are hard to win agreement 
upon; hard to word specifically yet flexibly enough to cover all 
submissions; hard to formulate so as to yield valid judgments; hard 
to enforce; and almost certain to be variously interpreted (for examples 
of guidelines, see, Forscher, 1980, pp. 166-67; Bishop, 1984, pp. 59-
67). 
If, as seems true, substantial numbers of peer reviews are 
compromised by prejudice, ignorance, carelessness, hurry, or 
uncertainty or misapprehension about the journal’s values, many 
authors and many more readers are being arbitrarily denied 
opportunities to be heard and to learn. This, however, is not the 
greatest threat of peer review to intellectual freedom. Even when 
the system seems to work smoothly-perhaps especially when it does- 
i t  may subtly and harmfully control not only what is published and 
read but what phenomena are investigated and what ideas pondered. 
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RESISTANCE AND UNCONVENTIONALTO THE NEW 
The peer review process is inherently conservative because of 
the way reviewers are selected. Chosen by, and answerable to, an 
editor or editorial board (sometimes after consultation with colleagues 
or other reviewers), they are most often scholars with research degrees, 
affiliations with well-known academic or research organizations, and 
publishing histories of their own. The more famous and established 
they are, the more likely they are to be asked for reviews. Zuckerman 
and Merton (1971) discovered, for example, that: “Relative to their 
numbers, lower-ranking physicists do little refereeing altogether and 
also referee far fewer papers by the intermediate and highest ranking 
physicists than would be the case under a populistic allocation” (p. 
89). This is understandable, of course, but it guarantees that the vast 
majority of reviewers will have many years’ experience as students 
and employees of mainstream learned institutions, and probably as 
writers for refereed journals and as successful grant applicants. They 
will have absorbed the associated values and norms, acquired distinct 
theoretical and political perspectives, and formed opinions about the 
appropriate credentials for researchers and directions for research- 
they will have become, in other words, what Peter Gibson (1987) 
has called “the Enid Blytons of the scientific fraternity” (p. 63). 
However open-minded they strive to be, their judgments are bound 
to be shaped by powerful past influences and present expectations. 
That is, they not only have certain backgrounds but share them with 
those who request and receive the reviews, because scholarly editors 
are drawn from the same general population (though perhaps slightly 
more elevated ranks of it) as reviewers are (on referee selection, see, 
Stieg, 1983, pp. 102-05; Gordon, 1978). An interesting assertion was 
made by the editor of Journalism Educator when he initiated a 
refereeing system: “Manuscript reviewers will be chosen from the 
ranks of established scholars and professors who are likely to offer 
innovative ideas about the field” (Crook, 1988, p. 56). 
When consensus among reviewers, or even a majority “vote,” 
is required for acceptance of a manuscript, the tendency toward safe, 
unexceptionable decisions and avoidance of intellectual risk-taking 
is likely to be especially marked. And in high-rejection journals where, 
to use Zuckerman and Merton’s (1971) terms, the “decision-rule’’ is 
“when in doubt, reject” (p. 78), adventuresome manuscripts must 
be anathema. As a result, unconventional subjects and ideas, novel 
research designs, findings that challenge long-standing beliefs, and 
anything con troversial-even when persuasively presen ted-may find 
the road to print rough and darkened by shadowy obstacles. “Novelty,” 
states Dennis V. Lindley (1984), “is always on dangerous ground with 
referees” (p.57). Physicians Robin and Burke (1987) observe: “Almost 
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every expert reviewer has a conflict of interest; he or she represents 
their discipline as it now exists and unconsciously tends to defend 
i t”  (p. 254). And Barry Commoner (1978) warns: 
The peer review system threatens not so much the bulk of more routine 
research, but precisely those sweeping, novel advances that are thr 
growing points of science. Thr  real danger in the system is that it thrratens 
to blunt the cutting edge of scientific progress. (p. 29) 
Also, of course, this blunts progress and path-breaking exploration 
in the social sciences and humanities. Convincing research on the 
subject is difficult to plan and carry out since so many variables 
may affect what is finally a qualitative decision, but some investigators 
have made the attempt with provocative results. For example, 
Zuckerman and Merton (1971) found that high-status physicists were 
likelier than their intermediate- and low-status colleagues to have 
manuscripts submitted to Physical Review accepted at all, to have 
them accepted immediately, and less likely to have them rejected 
immediately (p. 91. See also, Crane, 1967). Of course, high-status 
authors may simply do better work than others, hcrice their high 
status. 
Steven H. Gale (1987), a literary critic with an axe to grind, 
subject analyzed twenty-two consecutive issues (1978-83) of the 
Publicat ions of t h e  M o d e r n  L a n g u a g e  Associat ion ( P M L A ) ,  
containing 146 scholarly articles, and concluded that, “the referees 
tend to look for the same kind of material that has already appeared 
in the journal ...” (pp. 4-9). (It is not irrelevant that Gale’s specialty 
is the contemporary English dramatist Harold Pinter and that his 
Pinter articles were rejected by P M L A ) .  There were, for example, 
disproportionate numbers of articles on pre-twentieth century 
English literature, on French literature, and specifically on 
Shakespeare and Chaucer. Largely neglected were drama and 
American literature-and only eight articles dealt with women writers 
of any country or period (Gale, 1987). The issue is not clear cut, 
of course: in an earlier P M L A  editorial, English Showalter (1984) 
had emphasized that what he published simply reflected what was 
submitted (for example, 46 percent of manuscripts received in 1973- 
83 dealt with English literature) (pp. 851-53)-though it does seem 
odd that, in the period Gale studied, so few manuscripts about 
women’s writing would have been submitted to one of the field’s 
most prestigious and broadly subject-defined journals. 
Michael Mahoney attracted considerable attention with his 
studies of social science journals which showed that experimental 
data and conclusions that supported conventional theory were much 
likelier to win referees’ approval than those that conflicted with it- 
and that articles citing work “in press” from the author were more 
often accepted than those that did not. “Even in science,” Mahoney 
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(quoted in Joyce & Pearce, 1986, p. 23) lamented, “nothing succeeds 
like success. Publication begets publication, recognition begets 
further recognition, and the rich get richer” (p. 23). It is the 
phenomenon that Robert K. Merton (1973) famously labeled “the 
Matthew effect.” 
In the American Council of Learned Societies’ 1985 survey of 
3,835 humanists and social scientists, 77 percent of the respondents 
asserted that the “peer review refereeing” systems in their fields were 
at least sometimes biased in favor of “scholars who use currently 
fashionable approaches” and “established researchers in a scholarly 
specialty.” Seventy-three percent believed that “scholars from 
prestigious institutions” were of ten or sometimes favored, and 37 
percent felt that “males” were favored. Women were likelier than 
men to detect “frequent” bias of any type (Morton & Price, 1989, 
pp. 69-71). (What was not asked was whether respondents saw the 
biases as justified. In a follow-up study of educators in ALA-accredited 
programs, 67 percent, 71 percent, and 67 percent of respondents 
perceived at least some bias favoring authors in the first three 
categories respectively, but several added marginal notes to the effect 
that discrimination in favor of the established and prestigiously 
employed makes sense [Biggs & Biggs, 19901.) 
Suffering most in such circumstances will be younger scholars 
without influential mentors, substantial bibliographies, or impressive 
institutional ties; writers in developing fields and new interdiscipli- 
nary specialties; intellectual innovators and rebels of all stripes; and, 
some suggest, authors reporting applied or apparently “simple” 
research. (See, for example, Grassman’s [19861 amusing critique of 
mathematical journals. Based on rejections of his articles on queueing 
theory, Grassman formulated “Joe’s theorem”: “Nothing is published 
in the area of queueing theory unless it is mathematically interesting. 
Nothing is applied in industry unless i t  is mathematically trivial. 
Since trivial results are not interesting, and since results that cannot 
be applied are not useful, nothing useful will ever be published in 
queueing theory” [p. 441.) 
Some may respond that there is no problem, that most papers 
rejected by prestigious journals will still find print, if their authors 
are persistent, through less-known, perhaps unrefereed, outlets. This 
is true (see, for example, Stieg, 1983, p. 115; Yankauer, 1982, p. 239 
[footnote]; Slater, 1984, p. 455; Rennie, 1986, pp. 2391-92). But i t  may 
be that in this age of bewilderingly prolific publication, to appear 
in an obscure journal, especially one that is not refereed, is to remain 
invisible and not really to “appear” at all. Unable to read every journal 
in their fields, scholars seek external clues to aid selection; among 
the most prominent are the related factors of a journal’s reputation 
and whether i t  is peer reviewed. Peer review is assumed to ensure 
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adherence to scholarly standards. When i t  doesn’t work well, readers 
are misled, as are academic search committees and tenure and 
promotion review groups. And authors who publish in unrefereed 
journals may suffer wrongly by comparison with their counterparts 
who publish in refereed, but not better, journals. 
IMPACTOF PEER REVIEW FREEDOM:ON INTELLECTUAL 
SUMMARY 
Through referee procrastination, carelessness, ignorance, or 
cupidity, peer review may deny authors the chance to publish in 
the most appropriate and widely read journals. And when authors’ 
names are revealed to referees or when referees can guess them, such 
essentially extraneous factors as authorial fame (or lack thereof), 
institutional affiliation, and sex may affect publication decisions. 
Even the most vocal defenders of peer review concede that i t  
penalizes innovation and nonconformity. Of course, this harms 
individual scholars, authors, and readers who are interested in the 
new. More broadly, it retards the advancement of knowledge, not 
only impeding progress but undermining hope of progress. For 
thoughts that cannot be voiced will less often be thought; subjects 
that cannot be published will virtually cease to be explored; and 
research approaches scorned will be abandoned. Self-censorship is 
necessary for the scholar wishing to succeed in academe. That this 
is so can largely be laid to the account of the peer review system. 
CONCLUSIONSAND RECOMMENDATIONS 
But what would we do without peer review? Unrestrained 
publication of everything, which is quite possible in the computer 
age and is advocated by some, would probably result in true 
publication of little. That is, as the flood of supposedly available 
information increased, ever less would actually be accessed and read. 
And a prestige ranking would surely emerge-probably based on 
criteria even less valid than presence of peer review-because scholars 
would have to find some way to differentiate among publications 
in order to choose which to read and how to assess colleagues’ 
credentials. 
In most unrefereed periodicals, manuscripts are screened but by 
an editor rather than referees. To substitute unaided editorial 
judgments for referee-assisted judgments in scholarly journals seems 
not an improvement and essentially absurd in an age of extreme 
specialization. Another possibility is to limit reviewing responsibil- 
ities to an editorial board of scholars in necessary specialties; they 
would be compensated, their names known, and their expertise and 
conscientiousness proven. At many journals, however, they would 
soon be overwhelmed by the volume of submissions, and the inherent 
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conservatism of peer review would only be enhanced if a small circle 
of people took charge of all decisions. Alternatively, such a board 
might divide responsibility, according to specialty, for screening 
manuscripts and selecting reviewers. Each specialist would then 
carefully read and evaluate the reviewers’ reports and make the 
decision to accept, reject, or request revisions. Constructive 
suggestions drawn from the reports could be conveyed to authors, 
with editors committing themselves to helping authors improve their 
manuscripts. 
Reviewers’ competence and care are crucially important and of ten 
criticized. Computerized referee files, which now are easy to set up, 
allow editors to store and retrieve large amounts of information on 
thousands of potential referees, thus drawing on the opinions of a 
far wider range of people than personal acquaintances and “invisible 
college” referrals can provide. Also, their performance can be 
monitored closely, with careless, uninformed, and dilatory referees 
identified at once and removed from file. Some editors have created 
huge databases of prospective referees through questionnaires and 
literature searches. Editorial involvement is the key: to selecting good 
referees, using their reports well, and guiding and controlling the 
entire process. 
Guidelines for peer review are probably necessary, though they 
are tricky to write and may shape and constrict referees’ thinking, 
thereby closing off spontaneous reactions and novel ideas. Certainly 
deadlines should be imposed on reviewers and self-imposed on editors. 
Though judging the authority of an anonymous manuscript can 
be difficult, the arguments for “blinding” referees are persuasive. 
And while people may indeed devote more care to reports that bear 
their names, revealing referees’ identities seems likelier to cause 
problems than to solve them. Younger and more vulnerable scholars, 
in particular, would either decline invitations to review or avoid harsh 
judgments of their seniors. This would only strengthen the grip of 
established scholars and ideas. Intelligent, sensitive editorial use of 
referees’ reports would circumvent most of the problems associated 
with reviewer anonymity. 
Among interesting possibilities are to encourage voluntary 
signing of reviews; to ask that authors suggest appropriate referees 
for the articles they submit as well as referees to avoid; and to publish 
symposium-style, immediately following an article, any particularly 
insightful referees’ reports (with their writers’ permission). 
Finally, though, editors and readers should realize that peer review 
is fundamentally hostile to intellectual invention and rebellion. It 
is the price we pay for reliance on established expertise-a necessary 
price, but a high one. 
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Impact of Collection Management Practices 
on Intellectual Freedom 
CHARLESB. OSBURN 
ABSTRACT 
THEPURPOSE OF THIS ARTICLE is to identify practices of collection 
management that either impede, or have the potential to impede, 
the freedom of access to information. An underlying assumption i s  
that such impediments are inadvertent or at least so subtle to the 
librarian perpetrator that they are not intended. This hinges on a 
further assumption, perhaps equally naive, that the librarian’s 
responsibility is, as Asheim (1983) reminds us, “the defense of access 
to ideas, to information, esthetic pleasure, to recreation in its literal 
sense of re-creation, and to knowledge or at least to the process that 
leads to knowledge” (p. 184). Decisions made by agents beyond the 
control of collection management, such as by publishers and the 
government, define the domain in which collection management 
practices are engaged, and this article will address itself to that domain 
only. In any event, the relationship between collection management 
and intellectual freedom surely is a most complex and often 
ambiguous one. Yet the two are so inherently and inextricably 
intertwined that intellectual freedom cannot be discussed meaning- 
fully as a discrete consideration in collection management. 
PREMISESAND DEFINITIONS 
As used in this article, the term collection management is defined 
as a process of information gathering, communication, coordination, 
policy formulation, evaluation, and planning that results in decisions 
about the acquisition, retention, and provision of access to 
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information sources in support of the intellectual needs of a given 
library community. It is treated as a positive process, functioning 
as a social system that is influential on its environment and that 
is also influenced by its environment. The term information as used 
in this context is highly generic, having a great many ramifications 
in collection management, especially in consideration of the range 
of involvement of collection management throughout any library 
and also in consideration of the ways in which technology and 
electronic services are changing our understanding of collections and 
collection management. That collection management is both central 
in library operations and pivotal in library relations with the 
surrounding community is a fundamental consideration in exploring 
the impact of collection management practices on intellectual 
freedom. 
Information is essential to human evolution, as are, consequently, 
the information systems that put it to human service (Osburn, 1986). 
Censorship, the antithesis of intellectual freedom, is a logical attempt 
to gain possession of, and control over, that force that is vital to 
life and its continued evolution. Like other social influences, 
censorship evolves and survives through successful selection and 
adaptation. As a negative force i t  can be seen as the antithesis also 
of collection management. But censorship creates a dialectic in 
humanity’s information system and in the system of collection 
management that stimulates the positive thrust of both in the long 
term. For dialectic leads to choices upon which evolution is dependent, 
and the need for the broadest information in making choices at all 
levels of the information hierarchy-from biological and individual 
to social and institutional-is fundamental to the human condition. 
By far, most of the literature on the subject of collection 
management and intellectual freedom focuses on book selection. Book 
selection is the nucleus of collection management and is the purest 
manifestation of collection management. In that context, most of 
the literature on collection management and intellectual freedom 
has to do with overt public pressure that is either experienced or 
expected, and a lot of it treats specific censorship cases. This article 
attempts to examine all aspects of collection management in terms 
of the principle of intellectual freedom in order to determine where 
present and potential problems reside. 
The purpose of collection management is contained in the 
mission of the parent library or agency and that varies broadly by 
the type of library in question. Their area of commonality seems 
to lie in the notion of service to an identifiable community, a principle 
that can fairly safely be interpreted as positive and good. The 
supporting principles, however-those that guide daily management 
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of collections-vary by type of library and constitute the areas in 
which the principle of intellectual freedom is either enforced or 
assailed. Before proceeding with the discussion of how in practice 
these principles are rendered vulnerable to attacks on intellectual 
freedom, it may be useful to examine them more closely. 
PRINCIPLES MANAGEMENTOF COLLECTION 
The basic principles behind collection management present 
themselves as sets-that is, as a continuum of ideals about the purpose 
of the collection that extends from one pole to the other. It is not 
just the point along that continuum that determines whether or to 
what extent the principle of intellectual freedom has been violated, 
for that does not necessarily occur even at the poles; i t  is not that 
simple. The principle of intellectual freedom can be violated at any 
point along the continuum of the sets of collection management 
principles, depending upon the motive of the individual collection 
manager and the way in which that individual invokes the applicable 
set of collection management principles. 
Guiding collection management are three sets of principles, the 
weight of each being determined by the type of library and its mission. 
The one that is evidenced most often as the area for violation of 
intellectual freedom is the set of principles that can be expressed 
as the value set. Here the continuum extends from a decision based 
on an internally derived judgment of the general good a title is 
anticipated to contribute to the community, to a decision based on 
an externally derived expression of community demand, either 
positive or negative. No matter the basis for the decision, i t  ultimately 
is made by the collection manager. And, on whichever basis the 
collection management decision is made, i t  reflects a judgment of 
value; in the one instance an assertive judgment and in the other 
a responsive judgment. 
Because collection management functions as a social system, with 
all the systems implications, most collection management decisions 
are made at some point along the continuum from one pole to the 
other, not usually at either pole. Along that continuum are a number 
of questions whose answers can help assess the quality and nature 
of judgment being applied: To what extent is the internally derived 
judgment of value just speculation? To what extent does it reflect 
a preconceived notion of the ideal collection that is formed more 
by technical preparation than by knowledge of the community? To 
what extent does the judgment of value based on explicit demand 
take into account the implicit values and needs of the community? 
The second set of principles guiding collection management is 
also frequently the terrain on which the struggle for intellectual 
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freedom is waged, and that is the set of principles that can be expressed 
as the diversity set. Here the continuum extends from a decision that 
a particular title contributes to the overall diversity of subjects and 
views represented in the collection, to a decision that a particular 
title will help in the balance of a collection’s equal representation 
of diverse subjects and all views. Balance can be achieved without 
special regard for the extent of diversity, while broad diversity can 
be achieved without attention to balance. The concept of diversity 
in a collection is relatively easy to comprehend because it is single 
dimensional, unlike the concept of balance, which, being relative 
and multidimensional, requires many qualifiers. In practice, balance 
is a limiting factor for diversity, just as the reverse can also be true, 
and the implementation of the principle of balance always brings 
with it the potential to violate the most pure interpretation of 
intellectual freedom, which says that i t  “promotes no causes, furthers 
no movements, and favors no viewpoints” (ALA, 1983, p. 36). Balance 
tends to be an ideal that is difficult to describe and impossible to 
achieve except in the most narrow of situations, yet it is a very 
traditional notion in the discussion of all but special libraries because 
i t  suggests a rich combination of breadth and depth. By nature i t  
is highly susceptible to successful challenge, however, and is therefore 
a field on which intellectual freedom is unsteady. By contrast, the 
principle of diversity in a library collection offers a simple and 
straightforward goal, yet i t  is, for all practical purposes, unachieveable 
because implementation is endless; almost anything that is published 
conceivably offers something new, however slight, thereby 
contributing to diversity. 
The primary problem with the principle set of balance and 
diversity is that it tends more than most other collection management 
principles to be a platitude. As these terms are not defined for practical 
use-and they almost never are-so the principle of balance 
encourages the most subjective exclusion just as the principle of 
diversity encourages the most subjective inclusion. Left undefined, 
these principles focus on the collection rather than on the community, 
for which provision of access is the purpose of collection management. 
The third set of principles guiding collection management is 
the set of principles that can be expressed as the conservator set. 
Here the continuum extends from a decision that a particular title 
contributes to the cultural continuity and intellectual stability of 
society (as personified by the community) as i t  evolves, to a decision 
that a particular title contributes to individual self expression and 
realization, which in the aggregate is required to advance social 
evolution (as personified by the community). It is in conjunction 
with this set of principles that is used the term library of record, 
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meaning a collection that incorporates as great a sample as possible 
of the record of human expression and achievement, both past and 
present. 
This set of principles represents only an ideal, of course, one 
whose realizability has diminished steadily since the days of the famed 
Alexandrian Library. Since then, the problem increasingly has been 
the division of the simple, comprehensive principle of the library 
of record into two competing principles. One occupies itself with 
tradition and the other with innovation-it is the break of the present 
and future from the past. As manifested in its collections, the 
conservator role of the library conflicts increasingly with the 
innovator role, and in this tension, library collection management 
most closely mimics the society that surrounds it. Embedded in this 
situation is the struggle of old and new, of the individual and the 
masses, of conformity and nonconformity. 
Each of these three sets of principles behind collection 
managemen t-value and demand, diversity and balance, conservator 
and innovator-is invoked on a sliding scale, moving from one 
extreme to the other in practice. Many variables, influences, and 
considerations are involved in determining the point on the scale 
at which a decision will be made. Making matters even more complex 
is the fact that these three sets of principles are almost certain to 
be brought to bear at once on any collection management decision. 
For these reasons, and always bearing in mind that the basic principles 
present themselves as polarized sets, practical implementation of the 
very best principles of collection management can be considered 
hazardous to intellectual freedom. 
ORGANIZATIONAND STAFFING 
Practical implementation of collection management principles 
is affected by a staff of librarians whose organization and its structure 
are, therefore, quite relevant to the maintenance of intellectual 
freedom. It may be useful at this juncture to recall that, regardless 
of the process through which a collection management decision is 
reached, i t  is in the end made d e  juris or de fucto, by a collection 
management librarian. Generalizing the organization and staffing 
of collection management for the purpose of discussion is made 
difficult by the fact that collection management is organized and 
staffed in almost as many different ways as there arc libraries. For 
that reason we will suppose that someone in the library is formally 
assigned overall responsibility for that function and that if others 
are involved the person responsible overall is the coordinator of at 
least the collection management efforts of those individuals. This 
model is general enough to apply both to a small library situation 
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where the head librarian is solely responsible and to a large research 
library where an assistant director for collection management 
supervises a large hierarchical staff dedicated to collection 
management. 
Organizational structure may at first not appear to have much 
impact on intellectual freedom in collection management, but 
structure can either facilitate or impede communication and, 
therefore, the influence of organizational ideals and principles. There 
are two fundamentally different structures for collection management: 
one wherein the chief collection management officer also bears 
responsibility for other library functions, and one wherein that 
individual’s sole functional responsibility is collection management. 
In the former model, problems reside in goals of the other areas 
of the collection management librarian’s responsibilities that may 
very well be in conflict with the goals of collection management. 
For example, the difficulty of cataloging certain items may dissuade 
that individual from pursuing an intended acquisition; or, being 
responsible for reference, that individual may be dissuaded from either 
a positive or negative decision on any collection management matter, 
knowing only too well the manner in which certain critical patrons 
manifest their dissatisfaction on a daily basis at the reference desk. 
The most serious consequence likely to follow from the model of 
mixed responsibilities that leave insufficient time for full consid- 
eration of options is the decision simply to permit all and only those 
recommendations for collection management action that come 
forward from any source. The decision not to make a decision is 
still a decision. 
The alternative structure of collection management-wherein 
collection management is the single responsibility of the chief 
collection management officer-presents the potential conflict with 
intellectual freedom in a slightly different light. For here the issue 
is one of determining the appropriate level of authority for the 
individual within the organization and the function, and therefore 
the appropriate influence, of collection management ideals and 
principles throughout the library. For example, the development of 
those ideals and principles, as well as the influence upon the extent 
to which they are realized in practice, may differ considerably if the 
collection management officer reports to the library director, or to 
the head of public services, or to the head of technical services. In 
this model, collection management is by design not integrated into 
library operations with the result that it can be viewed as separate 
and apart and, therefore, as a meddler or even an intruder in the 
affairs of other functional units. In that environment, the ideals and 
principles of collection management often are not understood but 
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instead are undermined. All these concerns apply as well to 
subordinates whose collection management activities are coordinated 
through one or the other of these structures. 
Few if any collection management librarians are formally 
prepared to manage the ideals and principles of collection 
management. Few if any are formally prepared to interrelate those 
basic principles with local collection management needs and criteria 
and with the subtleties of intellectual freedom. What they tend to 
have some preparation for is defense against the censor in specific 
kinds of cases. In short, the profession is confronted with the 
unfortunate combination of inadequate preparation i n  the 
fundamentals of collection management and inadequate preparation 
in the considerations of the positive thrust of intellectual freedom. 
In the absence of such firm grounding, the trends toward 
specialization and professionalization are not well channeled. 
Specialization and professionalization thus serve as distractions from 
attention to the full significance of intellectual freedom, tending in 
the case of specialization to foster proclivities toward certain subjects, 
treatments, or views and, in the case of professionalization, to 
emphasize ideals of a technical nature. Like others in the profession, 
collection management librarians have not yet fully recognized that 
their job is the management not just of people, dollars, stock, and 
technology, but of more than that; it is the management of ideas. 
COLLECTION POLICYMANAGEMENT 
Policy on collection management is intended to regulate the 
management of ideas in the best interests of the community served 
by a given library. Traditionally, i t  has applied to only the selection 
function of collection management, although more recently i t  seems 
to be intended to have broader application, as the range of collection 
management responsibilities becomes better understood. Whether 
written or not, collection management policy is the theoretical basis 
for the relationship between the community and the library, €or it 
summarizes the goals, priorities, criteria, principles, and, in general, 
the institutional mind of the library. In practical terms, policy guides 
the nature, breadth, and depth of community access to information, 
the more so as technology occupies a larger part in the provision 
of access. 
The presence of policy, especially when written, makes the 
collection management librarian accountable and therefore 
responsible. This i s  crucial in maintaining the principle of 
intellectual freedom because it is the sense of a larger responsibility- 
engendered also in less formal ways, of course-that creates the 
intellectual context in which specific elements of the policy are 
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interpreted in and applied to daily collection management decisions. 
Consequently, the more the policy genuinely does represent the 
institutional mind, and the more widely that is understood, and the 
more closely policy is followed by the collection management 
librarian, the more influential will be the principle of intellectual 
freedom. The converse is equally true. 
The chief problem with collection management policy at present 
is that it focuses almost entirely on an intangible, albeit a developing, 
assemblage of information sources, rather than on the whole, which 
is a living social organism. Too often we neglect, in planning policy, 
to incorporate substance as suggested earlier in generating policy, 
to engage a process through which attendant process values will 
benefit both the library and the community, and, in adopting policy, 
to establish the means by which to enforce it. Our penchant seems 
to be toward making of the collection management policy an internal 
code rather than a channel of communication between the library 
and the community. Therefore, we look to written policy as a defense 
against specific instances of censorship rather than as an instrument 
of process through which bias and prejudice both within and outside 
the library can be addressed in a more general context, in advance 
and in the positive spirit of intellectual freedom. 
As selection is at the heart of collection management and policy 
is at the heart of selection, the criteria for selection are the heart 
of policy. Whether implicitly or explicitly, most policies incorporate 
very similar considerations in matters of criteria, common among 
them being: format, treatment, author, publisher, national origin, 
age or date of publication, language, and relationship to the existing 
collection or to the wider accessibility of information. One can easily 
imagine the rich variety of bias or prejudice that could be applied 
to any of these categories of criteria in a number of different settings. 
In fact, if one were to list the bases upon which information sources 
could conceivably be subjected to censorship, this would be the list. 
Here lies the delicate balance between collection management 
and censorship. The differences are subtle, because although 
polarized, they are polarized on a scale; for the tone of one is positive 
while the tone of the other is negative; the goal of one is to be inclusive 
while the goal of the other is to be exclusive; the motivation of one 
is to enhance access while the motivation of the other is to prescribe 
access. Motivation is the pivotal difference between collection 
management (which implies the principle of intellectual freedom) 
and the influence of censorship. Collection management is motivated 
by the goal of implementing policy as a whole with each decision 
made in that total context. Censorship is motivated by the goal of 
implementing a specific part of the policy, and decisions so influenced 
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are made in disregard of the policy as an integral whole. The delicate 
balance between intellectual freedom and censorship in collection 
management decisions is tested every day as motivation converts 
policy into practice. 
PRACTICE 
Before “collection management” was “collection management,” 
a term that did not come into use until the latter 1970s, i t  was called 
“collection development,” which now is considered a part of the 
former set of responsibilities. And it was only for the period of about 
one decade preceding that thr term collection development was used. 
The evolving perceptions within the profession of a coherent set of 
functions led to the use of these terms, each more explicit yet more 
comprehensive than its predecessor. The functions that now routinely 
are counted among collection management responsibilities number 
about two doien, many of which as recently as two decades ago were 
not recognized formally or were taken for granted (for a list of nineteen 
responsibilities accepted by the profession, see, Bryant, 1986, p. 154). 
In any case, it is a major step forward and an advantage for vigilance 
over intellectual freedom that, generally, throughout the profession, 
a range of collection management responsibilities is addressed directly. 
Where it is not, the principle of intellectual freedom is at greater 
risk. 
In a wholly rational situation, the fundamental principles and 
purposes of collection management would pervade policy, which in 
turn would translate them into criteria for selection decisions, while 
serving as an essential tool of communication binding together the 
library and its community. Thus, in a rational setting, both the letter 
and spirit of that policy would be implemented in daily practice. 
But a hazardous journey is traveled from principle to practice. We 
have discussed the perils inherent in  collection management 
principles and policy, and there is ample documentation of the 
psychology and sociology behind professional decisions that may be 
influenced by either personal bias or prejudice. It may be useful at 
this point, then, to identify eight of the most common categories 
of decisions in collection management and indicate the types of threat 
to intellectual freedom held by each. 
Budget justification and allocation are plans for action related 
to, but separate from, policy, stating the parameters surrounding 
implementation of policy. There is not a clear correlation between 
policy criteria and dollars, although there is what easily appears to 
be a correlation between dollars and priority, and this special kind 
of ambiguity opens the way to manipulation of policy. The situation 
is further skewed by differentials in the distribution of the information 
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universe among formats and subjects and by differentials of cost, 
both extremely complicating factors. Coordination of collection 
management decisions, another responsibility of collection 
management, enables censorship through laxness. For only overt 
action expressly in defense of intellectual freedom-and this is most 
extraordinary in the course of daily events-can correct censorship 
that devolves from a situation in which no one bears assigned 
responsibility for a particular area and all involved are negatively 
predisposed toward it .  
Liaison with the community is probably the single most 
important function of collection management for it is through this 
medium that a variety of decisions are made, ranging from those 
required by the creation of policy to its daily interpretation. Because 
there are few librarians to undertake this responsibility relative to 
the size of the community, the collection management librarian must 
of necessity be highly selective in communicating. This selectivity 
suggests the likelihood that that person will choose the path of least 
resistance, thereby gathering information, tastes, perceptions, and 
proclivities from kindred spirits holding one world view. 
Deselection of materials, which amounts to cancellation and 
weedmg, comes the closest of any collection management function 
to acting in the negative spirit associated with censorship. So 
premised, the invocation of collection management principles and 
the application of its policies to this function clearly place the 
principle of intellectual freedom at risk. The same is true of decisions 
on transfer of materials to remote or storage locations, although the 
effects of such decisions made for inappropriate reasons at least are 
not of definitive consequence. In that connection, it should be noted 
that collection management decisions on the preservation-either 
intellectual or physical-of information sources very likely are the 
decisions with greatest potential impact on the principle of 
intellectual freedom. 
Collection evaluation is a very significant function of collection 
management because it can lead to revision of policy and of financial 
planning, and because it can become a useful tool of communication 
with the community. The basis of the evaluation is of some concern 
in consideration of intellectual freedom because that very basis could 
reflect bias or prejudice. Two of the most common bases for evaluation 
are standard lists and use studies. It is obvious that great care must 
be taken in choosing the list that is to serve as the basis for evaluation. 
Perhaps less obvious but equally important as an unobtrusive 
influence on intellectual freedom is the relationship between a 
collection’s use and its potential value to the community. For, at 
best, collection use may only reflect convenience in the community, 
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while at worst it may reflect only the biases and prejudices of a small 
minority of the community. Of direct concern to the interests of 
intellectual freedom is the fact that collection evaluation can be very 
influential in matters of policy, finance, and community relations. 
As observed earlier, the selection function is the nucleus of 
collection management, just as i t  is the nexus of intellectual freedom 
concerns in the library. Because a great deal has been written on 
that subject, and because everything in this article addresses in one 
way or another the selection-censorship issue, comment here will 
be limited to a few specific issues. First are the extraordinary 
implications for intellectual freedom that can accompany gifts, 
whether financial gifts or gifts in kind. While, in theory, decisions 
about gifts in kind should be screened through the same policy 
considerations as are any other acquisitions, there is no ignoring 
the fact that they present themselves quite differently, and in some 
cases must be treated differently, thus attenuating the forces for 
intellectual freedom. The same can be said for financial gifts for 
restricted acquisitions, which circumvent the collection management 
system and which must be treated specially. 
The other aspect of selection that is noteworthy in its connection 
with intellectual freedom is  the influence of selection tools. 
Depending upon what is included or excluded in the media employed 
by collection management to scan the information universe, and 
depending upon how those tools classify or label their contents, and 
depending upon the nature of explicit judgments they may include 
in the form of reviews, annotations, or advertising, the librarian can 
unwittingly become a collaborator in subtle expressions of censorship. 
This is but one of the many environmental influences on collection 
management that have potential to restrict intellectual freedom. 
ENVIRONMENTAL OF COLLECTIONCONCERNS
MANAGEMENT 
As a system, collection management can be expected to influence 
and be influenced by its environment. In  a general sense, 
environmental forces include all aspects of civilization and all do 
exert influence, but some have a very direct and immediate effect 
on collection management. Chief among these are: the publishing 
industry, which we can refer to more generally as the information 
and knowledge universe; technology, which at the present time is 
a powerful enough influence to be considered a separate environ- 
mental factor, although that should not always be the case; economics; 
and the community. From a systems perspective, one system is not 
neatly distinguishable from another or from its environment, but 
for purposes of discussion here a system will be treated as a discrete 
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entity. Of those four primary environmental concerns just listed, the 
last two, economics and the community, are of most constant concern 
in the relationship between collection management and intellectual 
freedom. 
The influence of economics on collection management is rooted 
in the simple fact that no library can financially afford all the 
materials and all the accessibility implied in the extreme interpre- 
tation of the principle of intellectual freedom. That always has been 
true, and i t  surely will continue to be true for a long time. In recent 
decades this condition has been aggravated by a universal increase 
in the production of information, in the broadest sense, and by 
concomitant surges in cost. If cost were of no consideration in 
collection management there would still be issues of censorship to 
deal with, to be sure. But consideration of cost is a basic function 
of collection management, and tensions surrounding intellectual 
freedom of ten are commensurate with economic constraint. The 
manifestations of this phenomenon range from very gross and subtle 
shifts in emphasis to the determination that a specific book title 
cannot be acquired. In each case representing the extreme, the 
justification for the collection management decision is economic 
constraint, which may be quite valid, or may be subterfuge for 
censorship, or may be the reflection of nondecision-making 
(nonfeasance). 
The extreme example of determining not to acquire a particular 
book on grounds of insufficient funds needs no explanation, but 
the example of gross yet subtle shifts in emphasis in collection 
management probably does require explanation. This is a situation 
common to most academic libraries during the past two decades, 
and perhaps familiar in other settings as well. It  is a situation whereby 
journals, because of their nature in combination with price increase 
differentials, gradually occupied a greater and greater part of the 
acquisitions budget, causing a diminishment of access to books and, 
with it ,  a diminishment of access to certain kinds of information 
that are conveyed more appropriately in the book medium. Along 
with this shift in local libraries, which then was extrapolated 
nationwide, a shift in subject emphasis took place because of the 
differences in the way scholarship functions among disciplines. At 
issue here is not the judgment of whether these shifts were for the 
better or worse, but the idea that they were effected because of 
economic forces rather than because of planning deliberations 
engaged in jointly between the library and the community or even 
within the library. While these shifts continue, a new economic force 
has entered the arena, and that is the growing corpus of electronic 
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sources. What gross and subtle shifts in the provision of access will 
this new format stimulate? Will we be in a position of control or 
one merely of observation? 
The community is the single most important source of 
information for collection management policy and practice. At the 
same time, the community is likely to constitute the single greatest 
threat to intellectual freedom. Therefore, the more society (the 
aggregate of communities) becomes dependent upon information, 
and the more information that is produced and at greater cost, the 
more critical becomes the role of library collection management in 
ensuring intellectual freedom through the provision of access. 
Institutions and professions hold the public trust and can survive 
as institutions and professions only if they keep that trust. For many 
reasons, however, not the least of which is the influence of economic 
considerations, the public demands ever greater accountability in 
exchange for trust. Trust must be earned. Having evolved from the 
time when its community was composed of patrons-a word whose 
root meaning is protector, defender, and advocate-to a time when 
that community is composed of clients-meaning those who are 
defended-collection management has attained a station toward 
which the community looks for the guardianship of its intellectual 
freedom. But this position is tenuous. Community expectations for 
access have been heightened in recent years by the prevalence of 
information technology. Collection management has not yet devised 
the kinds of mechanisms needed to communicate effectively with 
a broad segment of the community. Collection management interacts 
largely with a select minority of the community, sometimes referred 
to as an elite that supports the library that serves it. In this situation, 
the distinction between patron and client may seem obscure, but 
it is clear that the roles are reversed when a collection management 
decision is biased or prejudiced by a patron (in the original sense). 
INTERLIBRARYCOOPERATION 
In response to pressure exerted on collection management by 
increased publishing production, increased cost of materials, rapid 
introduction of technology, and heightened demand and expectations 
of the community, collection management has gradually become 
dependent on various forms of interlibrary cooperation. Among the 
various and interlocked manifestations of this dimension of 
librarianship is the cooperative development of collections, which 
is an approach that means that agreements other than those between 
the library and the community will determine the breadth and depth 
of immediate local accessibility. From a community perspective, the 
idea of formulating local policy, at least in part on the basis of 
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agreements established to serve other communities, must be 
something like learning that the earth moves around the sun, rather 
than the reverse. To whatever extent collection management may have 
focused on the needs, goals, and ethos of the local community prior 
to the adoption of cooperative policy, that focus thereafter was 
diverted. Cooperative collection management is not a strategy to 
economize, it is a strategy to expand accessibility. Quite the opposite 
of saving money, i t  is certain to cost more money, if only in 
administrative overhead. Therefore, as a program with a dimension 
of cost, cooperation further tightens the parameters in which local 
collection management decisions are made. The dilemma that emerges 
from this set of conditions is that a decision against cooperation 
is equally a decision against greater general accessibility, while the 
decision in favor of cooperation is one that heightens the tension 
surrounding intellectual freedom because of greater specific economic 
constraints locally. This is because the concept of regional or national 
resources is not yet accepted fully by the profession, much less 
understood by the community, thus setting the stage for an ironic 
conflict between accessibility and intellectual freedom. In these terms, 
agreement to' the goal of enhanced access is not achieved easily. For 
one thing, agreement on programs of cooperation assumes agreement 
on increased expenditures, and more so as technology and access 
become almost synonymous. Again, economic concerns are an 
inhibiting factor. Of greater concern to those whose agreement to 
this kind of enhancement of accessibility must be garnered is 
agreement to specialize locally in some way, which is implicit in 
the concept of resource sharing. Guiding deliberation in this matter 
is the principle that the elimination of browsability is tantamount 
to the diminishment of accessibility, a principle that takes on added 
weight when i t  is understood that the local core of resources will 
steadily shrink as a proportion of the total accessibility to resources 
afforded by the library. 
Bearing in mind the potential for negative influence on the 
maintenance of intellectual freedom in collection management 
decisions that is wielded by the community-or a select part of it-
cooperative collection management programs can pose threats to 
intellectual freedom at two levels. One is at the local level where 
i t  always has been, but generating increased tension in decisions about 
the local core as i t  shrinks proportionally and, perhaps, absolutely. 
Another threat is introduced by a new tension surrounding collection 
management decisions, a tension similar in nature to that experienced 
at the local level, but extrapolated at a high level of complexity with 
far-reaching implications when collection management decisions 
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determine accessibility nationwide. It is likely that advances in 
information technology will enhance the ease of, and extend the 
ramifications of, decisions that would limit intellectual freedom. 
THESYSTEMEVOLVED 
Three interrelated shifts are driving an evolution in the social 
system called collection management. The first is the evolution in 
the physical matter of collection management, or the media, which 
is an evolution that has gone from a book centered system to a journal 
centered system to an electronic centered system. The second is the 
evolution in professional perspective, which has proceeded from a 
goal of ownership to one of access in collection management. The 
third is  the evolution in public or community attitude toward the 
collection management system, which has taken us from an attitude 
of trust to one requiring accountability, to an attitude of heightened 
expectation. 
The coincidence of these three evolutionary changes has the 
potential to place the already unsettling intersection of intellectual 
freedom and collection management in an environment whose most 
characteristic attributes are the ethereal pervasiveness of the electronic 
format, the abstractness of access, and the expansive dimensions of 
expectation. Surely such an environment renders that intersection 
of collection management and intellectual freedom even more subtle 
and ambiguous and, therefore, more hazardous. 
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